Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

120. Intelligence Note¹

Washington, July 22, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Kosygin’s Second Conversation with Harriman

Following are the points that seem to us most significant in Governor Harriman’s latest talk with Kosygin.²

1. Much more clearly than in the first conversation,³ Kosygin establishes a link between a Vietnam settlement and prospects for progress on other issues, including, in particular, disarmament and summit level talks. Despite this more explicit linkage, however, the conversation (as well as those with Matskevich and Rudnev) still leaves the impression of a Soviet readiness to proceed on bilateral issues. Indeed, in view of Kosygin’s remark that the Soviet representative at the Geneva disarmament talks will be empowered to act, the Soviets do not appear to rule out at least some substantive disarmament exchanges.

2. On Vietnam, there were three noteworthy points: first the suggestion that Hanoi would be ready for a settlement that Peiping did not approve; second the proposition that we make a counter-proposal to Pham Van Dong’s four points; and third the point that a settlement should be based on the 17th parallel. All of these are of course in line with Moscow’s repeated insistence that we deal with the Vietnamese directly. The last one gives some substance to Yugoslav assertions that Moscow is prepared to accept a divided Vietnam, but nowhere did Kosygin give any assurance of precisely how the Vietnamese would respond to a US overture. Kosygin’s whole approach on this, including his omission of a demand for cessation of bombing and his abstention from any threat of greater Soviet involvement, seems intended to urge the US in the most persuasive way to end its involvement in the Vietnamese war. (With others, e.g., the British, who the Soviets judge are sensitive to threats, Kosygin has played a much more ominous tune.)

3. In line with the “persuasive” approach, Kosygin was remarkably warm toward President Johnson. Some weeks ago the Soviet leaders, privately and publicly, were becoming personally abusive of the President. Lately, however, this has been turned off in public speeches, although Kosygin had been acerbic in his first conversation with Governor Harriman.

4. On disarmament, Kosygin indicated no new impending Soviet initiatives, though Soviet intent to dwell on non-proliferation in terms of insisting that NATO nuclear sharing is inconsistent with it, was underscored. Apparently judging that on this issue a more threatening stance might be effective vis-á-vis the US, Kosygin went further than any other Soviet leader in threatening nuclear sharing among Communist states.

In line, however, with his approach on Vietnam, Kosygin seemed intent to hold out to Governor Harriman a rather glowing, if ill-defined vista of progress on disarmament (including even technical talks on military budget cuts), if only Vietnam went away. It was in this context that he threw in the prospect of a summit (with an advance assurance there would be no haggling over locale), which the Soviets seem to judge would appeal to us.

5. On Germany, we detect no novel substantive line, but note that Kosygin was playing on what he must judge are trends in US thinking when he argued that our advocacy of reunification raises tensions.

6. We think it interesting that in both talks, Kosygin permitted himself to make anti-Chinese remarks in franker terms than is the wont of top Soviet leaders in talking with us. Here again, Kosygin was no doubt hoping to encourage US thinking and policy in directions favorable to Soviet interests (Tito may have made a persuasive pitch to the Soviets on this score when he was in Moscow recently). At the same time, however, Kosygin’s remarks probably do reflect Soviet recognition that their relations with China have small prospect of improving.

7. Looking at the Harriman visit as a whole, Moscow’s intent seemed to be to convey the message that it was up to the US to take the initiative in order to return US-Soviet relations to their earlier, more hopeful course. The Soviet leaders will now presumably await the results of their line on US policy, remaining free, meanwhile, to preach the cause of communist unity against the US, as currently at Bucharest, and to keep alive the specter of a deepening crisis by their assurances of support for Hanoi and the Front.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. The note bears no drafting information, but it was sent as a memorandum from Hughes to Rusk.
2. See Document 119.
3. See Document 118.