Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

110. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11–11–65

Washington, May 26, 1965.

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

The Problem

To assess current Soviet attitudes toward the US, particularly in the light of the Vietnam and Dominican Republic situations, and to estimate probable Soviet foreign policy in the next few months.²

Conclusions

A. Khrushchev’s successors, seeking new ways to cope with the Chinese challenge to Moscow’s authority, have altered the priorities of Soviet foreign policy. They began to do so very shortly after gaining power and well before present US policies in Vietnam went into effect. The new leaders did not set out deliberately to reverse the course of East-West relations which had developed after the Cuban missile crisis. Rather, they gave first priority to efforts to repair the USSR’s position in its own camp and in the underdeveloped world, consciously accepting as a consequence a deterioration of relations with the US. (Paras. 1–4)

B. This revision of policy has led the Soviet leaders to re-enter the Vietnamese crisis and to assume increasing commitments there. Vietnam has now become a pivotal issue in Soviet foreign policy, setting narrow limits on Moscow’s freedom of maneuver in other areas of East-West relations. (Paras. 5–7)

C. Nevertheless, Soviet conduct continues to reflect a concern to avoid high risks and a desire to remain in contact with Washington. In time, experience may persuade the Soviet leaders that competition with China on the latter’s terms is unprofitable and that a hard-line foreign policy is inconsistent with efforts to promote domestic economic growth. During the next few months, however, we expect the USSR to give vigorous opposition to the US on a wide range of issues. We believe that present conditions, particularly the situation in Vietnam, virtually preclude Soviet willingness to improve relations with the US.³ (Paras. 8–14)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate comprising 8 pages.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board. Bundy forwarded the estimate to the President under cover of a June 7 memorandum in which he stated that it was “unusually interesting, and I think you will want to read at least the first page and perhaps the whole thing. The net of it is that the Soviets made a policy decision to mend their Communist fences even at the expense of good relations with us. This is a point which is worth making publicly, and I will be making it to newspapermen who listen, unless you object.” (Ibid.)
2. Unless otherwise specified, this estimate does not consider Soviet reactions to any major changes in US policies toward the DRV or the DR. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The intelligence community issued similar conclusions regarding the new regime’s foreign policy innovations in National Intelligence Estimate 11–65, “Soviet Politics After Khrushchev,” July 1, 1965. The estimate also concluded that though the new “collective leadership could endure for some time, we believe that there will be a strong tendency toward one-man rule” that could come to a head in 1966 or even sooner. (Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry: Job 79–R01012A)