Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

107. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 17, 1965.

3093. Delhi’s 2922 April 15 to Dept, rptd Moscow 247.²

1. Much as I would like to be able to agree with thesis advanced by Amb Bowles in reftel it will be clear from my own reporting that I cannot do so. Soviet leadership has already “come down on other side,” not because of “ideological slogans” but because they regard this posture as fundamental to justifying the very existence of Communist Party monopoly rule in this country and of the Communist system in the world.

2. Soviets have never been prepared to change their policies in response to appeals to reason from outside. Historically any shifts in Soviet outlook have come about because of changes in their assessment of what Marxists call objective conditions. Any influence that we might have on situation must be directed to these conditions. In Korea Soviets learned that use of overt military force across national boundaries would not be tolerated. In Berlin, Soviets recognized that we are prepared to go to bat in defense our vital interests. In Cuba, Soviets learned additional lesson that we have will and determination to use nuclear force in order defend our basic interests. In other words, it was what we did and not what we said that forced Soviets to “come to their senses” in past crises in East-West relations.

3. In Vietnam, basic issue is Soviet determination to aid “national liberation movement” from outside and our equal determination to prevent this. I see no hope of change in Soviet policy this regard until Moscow convinced that to achieve their objectives they must be prepared risk military confrontation with us. In other words, in my view, situation in Vietnam must get worse before it gets better.

4. Meanwhile, we must reckon with fact that Soviets and their Socialist allies are confident that we in time will be forced by weak political base in Saigon as well as pressures both within our own country and by our allies, to temper our own objectives in the area. So long as this confident assessment of situation persists there is certainly nothing we can do in way of rational appeal to Soviets that would force them to retreat.

5. Added to this, of course, is the imperative upon Moscow at the present time to demonstrate its loyalty to a socialist ally and its militancy in backing national liberation movements in its contest with Peiping for leadership of world Communist movement. In my view, this is not a question of making Soviets realize perils of continuing alliance with Peiping. To me it is clear beyond any question that Soviets have already made up their minds on China, that they know that the breach with Peiping is deep and permanent. What they are not prepared to do is recognize their defeat by Peiping for control of world Communist movement.

6. In sum, there can be no “grand global deal” with Soviets at this stage of history. Best we can hope for is tacit agreement between ourselves and Soviets on means by which continuing conflict is waged. Our task at the moment is, as in Cuba, to demonstrate that we are firm but flexible; and in the longer run to convince Soviets that they, in fact, seriously jeopardize their national interests by continued revolutionary militancy and by centering their competition with Peiping on this element alone.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Passed to the White House.
2. In this telegram, dated April 15, Ambassador Bowles suggested that if the Soviet Union could be persuaded to make a clean break with China over Vietnam, the United States would be well on the way to a “global political breakthrough.” On the other hand, if this were not possible, the United States was headed for major trouble. Bowles argued that logically Soviet national interests lay in better relations with the West and dampening inflammatory conflicts around the world rather than in ideological posturing. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)