Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume X, National Security Policy

195. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 1, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Defense Department Budget for FY 69 (U)

My review of the Department of Defense military program and financial budget for the next fiscal year has proceeded to the point where I can present certain conclusions to you. Preliminary estimates indicate that the military forces (Tab A)² and procurement programs which I recommend for your approval will require new obligational authority for Military Functions, Military Assistance, and Civil Defense of $79–82 billion for FY 69. These amounts and previous budgets and appropriations are summarized in the following table:

	New Obligational Authority ($ Billions)c
	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969a
DOD Normal Budget	$50.3	$50.1	$54–57
Southeast Asia	22.4	23.3	25
Total NOA Required	$72.7	$73.4	$79–82

This will result in the following estimated expenditures and share of Gross National Product:

	Expenditures	% GNPb
FY 1967	$68.5	9.0%
FY 1968	73.9	9.1%
FY 1969	77–78	8.9–9.0%

a Based on December 1, 1967, estimates. Subject to further revision.

b Based on a GNP of $862 billion in FY 69.

c Includes $.8 billion in FY 68 and $1.2 billion in FY 69 for the FY 68 pay raises.

The FY 69 Budget was prepared on the basis of two key assumptions:

1. Provision was made for deployments to Southeast Asia, comprising 525,000 men in South Vietnam and 46,700 in Thailand, 3,608 helicopters, 1,572 fixed-wing non-attack aircraft, 1,074 attack aircraft, and 707 ships and boats by June 30, 1969.

2. Provision was made for combat consumption for all items through FY 69 reorder lead time, enabling continuation of the war indefinitely at the currently planned activity levels, barring unforeseen contingencies, without an FY 69 Supplemental.

The Military Forces supported by this budget are summarized in the tables available for your review. Although I have reduced the budgets proposed by the Services for FY 69 by approximately $16–19 billion, my recommended force structure is based on requirements for national security and has not been limited by arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings. In my review of the Service proposals, I attempted, as last year, to eliminate all non-essential, marginal, and postponable programs with the objective of minimizing the costs of supporting the required forces.

In developing the program and reviewing the budget proposals, I have had the continuing counsel and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³ The points of difference between my recommendations and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are set forth in the attachment at Tab B.⁴ It should not be necessary for you to study the attachment in detail—of the differences with the Chiefs, I believe they will wish to discuss with you only three issues affecting the FY 69 budget.

1. Advanced Strategic Bomber (AMSA): The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend Contract Definition and, subject to favorable review, beginning full-scale development of a new strategic bomber in FY 69, at an FY 69 cost of $40 million. Their plan would aim at an Initial Operational Capability in FY 76. Mr. Nitze and I recommend continuing development of advanced aircraft technology and bomber penetration aids, at an FY 69 cost of $25 million. We recommend against beginning full-scale development of a new bomber in FY 69 because we do not believe an Initial Operational Capability in FY 76 is needed. Development, deployment, and five years of operation of a force of 150 AMSAs would cost about $7.3 billion.

2. Modernization of the Fourth (Reserve) Marine Air Wing: The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend buying 15 A–6As and 8 RF–4Js at a cost of about $92 million in FY 69 to provide more modern aircraft for Marine Air Wings. This would free A–6As and RF–4Bs for assignment to the reserves. This is in addition to the 358 Navy/Marine Corps Fighter, Attack, and Reconnaissance aircraft I recommend buying in FY 69 at a cost of $1,485 million. For FY 69, they also recommend procurement of 25 CH–46 helicopters for the reserves at a cost of about $50 million, in addition to 130 helicopters I recommend buying for the Marines in FY 69 at a cost of about $180 million. (Procurement of all new aircraft for the Fourth Marine Air Wing would add about $1 billion to my recommended plan over the next five years.) Mr. Nitze and I recommend against this procurement because, without it, we are greatly increasing the total tactical airpower and helicopter lift capability of all of our forces, including the Marine Corps, and because we believe the total inventory of Marine aircraft is adequate. Moreover, our general policy is not to buy new aircraft for reserve air forces. Under our recommended plan, from 1961 to 1971, the destruction capability of the Marine fighter and attack forces will increase more than fourfold and the helicopter troop lift capability will increase more than tenfold.

3. Development of New Tactical Fighter (F–X/VFAX): Both the Air Force and the Navy want to develop a new fighter to replace the F–4. They believe it is needed to counter the latest Soviet fighters. They recommend that we plan to proceed with “Contract Definition” in FY 69 leading to an Initial Operational Capability in 1975. The FY 69 cost of their latest proposal is estimated at about $104 million. Mr. Nitze and I agree that a new fighter ought to be developed for the mid to late 1970’s, and we recommend including $60 million in the FY 69 R&D budget for this purpose. This will permit an IOC in 1976.

Dr. Foster, the Director of Research and Engineering, has informed me that a properly defined and substantiated joint-Service plan for F–X/VFAX has not yet been developed. Several important issues have not yet been resolved including the extent to which the two Service versions can be common, the size of the crew, and the extent to which all-weather air-to-ground electronics should be included. The recommended $60 million will support an extensive experimental effort in avionics and propulsion to help resolve these issues and to reduce program risks, permitting start of full-scale development in FY 70.

In addition although the JCS do not recommend FY 69 budget action on a Soviet-oriented ABM system, they want to repeat their view that ultimately the U.S. should deploy such an ABM system to protect U.S. population centers against heavy Soviet attacks.⁵

The recommended program has been discussed with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology. They are in agreement with my recommendations with two exceptions. Dr. Hornig is concerned about the apparent decrease in the level of R&D on tactical weapons, and what he considers an inadequate rate of application of new technology to Vietnam. However, he will not be in a position to make specific counterproposals until our R&D budget estimates are more firm. Mr. Schultze believes the FY 69 RDT&E total obligational authority should not exceed $7.45 billion. Our tentative proposal for FY 69 is $7.4–7.7 billion.

Robert S. McNamara

Tab B

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WITH FY 69 BUDGET IMPLICATIONS⁶

A. Strategic Retaliatory Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended maintaining a Minuteman force of [3 lines of source text not declassified] for each Minuteman II. The JCS concurred in the Minuteman force level, but recommended that MK–17s be deployed for Minuteman II and later for Minuteman III. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Air Force recommended slipping the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the MK–17 one year to January, 1970, and retaining MK–11s for Minuteman II in the interim. The Secretary of Defense later recommended canceling MK–17 development and slipping Minuteman III an additional six months.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the previously approved program of buying area penetration aids for all Minuteman missiles and terminal penetration aids for Minuteman III. He also approved deploying an improved version of Minuteman II penetration aids at a cost of $35 million in FY 69. The JCS concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended that no additional Titan II missiles be bought and the Titan force be phased down as missiles were fired in Follow-on-Tests. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended procuring 11 additional Titan II missiles to maintain the force at 54 missiles with a test rate of 6 per year. The JCS recommended retaining the Titan force at 54 UE missiles until a new large throw-weight ICBM is available as a replacement. The Secretary of Defense then recommended maintaining the Titan force at 54 UE missiles by buying 5 missiles in FY 69 (for $11.3 million) and 4 missiles in FY 70 and reducing the test rate to 4 per year.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended developing a stellar-inertial guidance system for the Poseidon force and deploying an average of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He recommended against developing an option [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by end FY 72. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in the development of a stellar-inertial guidance system, but recommended retaining the option [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The JCS recommended planning on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missile. The Secretary of the Navy proposed to initially procure [1 line of source text not declassified] by 1975 if a review in 1969 does not indicate that higher loading is necessary. The Secretary of Defense then reaffirmed his recommendation to deploy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] throughout the entire period.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended against deploying area and terminal penetration aids for Polaris A–3 at a cost of $200 million in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy agreed to defer the deployment, but recommended retaining the option to deploy these penetration aids at a cost of $9 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense agreed to retain this option.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing Advanced Development of an Advanced ICBM, but recommended against starting Contract Definition in FY 69. The JCS recommended completion of Contract Definition in FY 69, and dependent upon favorable review, full-scale development of the missile element of the Advanced ICBM (WS–120A), with the objective of an IOC in FY 73. They also recommended delaying a decision on expenditures unique to a specific deployment mode until study results are available. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended beginning Contract Definition in FY 69 at a cost of $79 million. Subsequently the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force agreed to develop [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that are capable of accepting either Minuteman III or the WS–120A missile; the program would support a deployment date of Minuteman in such silos in FY 72 and an Advanced ICBM IOC in FY 74. Of the $207 million total hard silos R&D program, the Secretary of Defense will authorize $40 million in FY 69. This includes $38 million R&D money for the dual-capable silo and $2 million for site surveys. An additional $10 million was authorized for advanced ICBM technology.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended against procuring a prototype Ballistic Missile Ship (BMS) in FY 69. The JCS recommended Concept Formulation and, dependent upon favorable review, construction of one prototype BMS to be available for tests and training in FY 71. This would require $120 million in FY 69 funds. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended retaining the current basing program for the bomber force and deferring a decision on equipping B–52 G/H bombers with SRAMs until there is evidence that the Soviets have a good low-altitude terminal defense. He also decided not to reduce further the number of Hound Dog missiles in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force concurred in the bomber force basing program. The JCS recommended equipping the B–52 G/Hs with SRAMs, beginning in FY 70. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended modification of B–52 G/Hs beginning in FY 69 at a cost of $68 million and additional SRAM procurement beginning in FY 70. The Secretary of Defense subsequently decided to modify 30 UE B–52s for SRAM in FY 69, at a cost of approximately $45 million, with no increase in the total number of SRAMs to be procured, but retaining an option to buy more in FY 70.

9. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing development of advanced aircraft technology and bomber penetration aids, but recommended against beginning Contract Definition for the Advanced Manned Strategic Bomber (AMSA) in FY 69. The JCS recommended completion of AMSA Contract Definition in FY 69, and subject to favorable review, full-scale development to preserve an IOC of FY 76. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended Contract Definition in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations.

B. Continental Air and Missile Defense

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a Chinese-oriented, system (tentatively with the option of providing for the defense of Minuteman with Sprint missiles following the initial Spartan installation) at an investment cost (including AEC costs) of $4.1 billion in FY 69–73. The Secretary of the Army concurred, but also recommended deploying Nike-X to protect U.S. cities against a Soviet attack. The JCS accepted the proposed light Nike-X deployment as a first step, and concurred in the FY 69 part of the plan, but also recommended deploying Nike-X at the “Posture A” level (at about $10 billion) to protect U.S. cities against a Soviet attack. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. (The investment cost of his recommended plan is now estimated at about $5 billion, including AEC costs.)

2. The JCS recommended production now for deployment of 12 UE F–12 interceptors in FY 72, and initiating Contract Definition now for an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for an IOC in FY 73. The JCS recommended against phasing down of our air defense without modernizing the force. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense later agreed on a new continental air defense plan including deployment of Over-the-Horizon radars; full-scale development of prototype AWACS with a procurement decision based on flight tests; and development and deployment of an improved F–106X aircraft. The plan also includes provisions for augmenting the defense with Tactical Air Command, Navy, and Marine Corps forces in time of emergency, and selective phase-downs of current Century interceptors and portions of the SAGE/BUIC system. An F–12 development program is under review.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing feasibility studies on the sea-based ABM system. The JCS recommended speeding up feasibility and Concept Formulation studies on both the sea-based and airborne missile intercept systems. The Secretary of the Navy recommended acceleration of the sea-based missile intercept system. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the approved program for military survival measures (fallout protection for military personnel) at a cost of $47 million in FY 68–73. The JCS recommended a larger program at a cost of $191 million. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

C. Theater Nuclear Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out 18 Mace in Europe and 36 Mace [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended against the phaseout. The Secretary of Defense affirmed the Mace phase-out in Europe, but deferred the Mace phase-out in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] until FY 70.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out one Pershing battalion now in CONUS in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended against the phase-out. The Secretary of Defense then recommended deferring phase-out until FY 70.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended against developing a MIRV missile for Pershing. The JCS (less the Air Force Chief of Staff) and the Secretary of the Army recommended development and deployment of Pershing MIRV at a cost of $43 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the tactical nuclear bomb stockpile [number not declassified]. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended increasing the tactical nuclear bomb stockpile to [number not declassified]. The Secretary of the Navy contended that [number not declassified] tactical nuclear bombs would be insufficient. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a stockpile of [number not declassified] tactical nuclear bombs in FY 69 and [number not declassified]bombs in FY 70 and thereafter.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing down the tactical Nike Hercules nuclear warhead stockpile to [number not declassified] warheads per U.S. and allied battery. The JCS recommended retaining [number not declassified] warheads per U.S. battery and [number not declassified] warheads per allied battery. The Secretary of the Amy recommended deferring decision pending further study. The Secretary of Defense then agreed to defer decision.

6. The JCS recommended the following tactical nuclear warhead stockpiles, compared to the program recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

• [list (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
• These recommendations are now under review.

D. Army and Marine Corps Land Forces

1. The JCS recommended the following total FY 69 Army force structure compared to that recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

	JCS	SecDef
Active Division Equivalents	21–2/3	19–2/3
Active ISIs	21–2/3	19–2/3
Active SSIs	17–1/3	12
Reserve Division Equivalents	9	8
Reserve ISIs	9	8
Reserve SSIs	13–1/3	15–2/3
Division Force Equipment Sets	30–2/3	27–2/3 (less 2/3 of an SSI set)

The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total FY 69 Marine Corps force structure of 5 division forces (4 active, 1 reserve) with an active manpower strength of 298,000. The JCS concurred with the number of division forces, but recommended an active manpower strength of 330,000. The Secretary of the Navy concurred with the number of division forces, but recommended an active manpower strength of 322,000. The Secretary of Defense will review total manpower strength in connection with specific requirements.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 540 UH–1D helicopters in FY 69. The Secretary of the Army recommended procuring 744 UH–1Ds. Total UH–1D procurement requirements are now under review.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the previously approved FY 69 CH–47 procurement from 60 to 26. The Secretary of the Army recommended retaining the currently approved program to procure 60 CH–47s in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then recommended procuring 48 CH–47s in FY 69 and long lead-time components for 36 CH–47s in FY 70. The Secretary of the Army then concurred.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring the new TOW and Dragon anti-tank missiles only for active Army armored and mechanized divisions. The JCS, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring these missiles for all active and reserve Army and Marine Corps division forces. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the previously approved procurement program for M60 Shillelagh tanks because of technical difficulties in Shillelagh. The JCS recommended procurement not be reduced. This recommendation is now under review.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended changing the mix of Vulcan and Chaparral units and reducing the number of fire units per battalion from 64 to 48. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended no decision be made until completion of a new Army study. The Secretary of Defense then agreed to consider the change in mix to be tentative, pending the results of Army tests and studies next year. (The FY 69 procurement of Vulcan and Chaparral may not be sensitive to the mix decision.)

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended deactivating 8 Hercules batteries in Europe in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended deferring deactivation because of slippage in the Vulcan/Chaparral force. The Secretary of Defense agreed to defer deactivation until FY 70.

9. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the number of Hawk batteries from 83 to 79. The Secretary of the Army concurred. The JCS recommended retaining the previously approved program of 83 batteries. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

10. The Secretary of Defense recommended gradually eliminating all 40mm automatic weapons units from the Army reserve components as Vulcan phases into the active Army. The JCS recommended all 56 40mm reserve units be maintained and modernized with 20mm Vulcan. The Secretary of the Army recommended phasing down the number of reserve units to 40 batteries for which equipment is available, and then phasing down to 16 batteries as Vulcan is deployed in the active Army. The Secretary of Defense agreed to the Secretary of the Army’s alternative.

11. The Secretary of Defense recommended changing the mix of Marine Corps assault transport helicopters in the three active wings from 360 CH–46s and 72 CH–53s to 252 CH–46s and 144 CH–53s. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in this change provided three new light transport helicopter squadrons were approved. The Secretary of Defense then reaffirmed the change in the CH–46/CH–53 mix and recommended creating three temporary light transport helicopter squadrons using existing UH–1E assets in FY 68 and FY 69.

12. The Secretary of Defense deferred decision on procuring the AH–1G as a replacement for the UH–1E in Marine Corps light observation squadrons (VMOs). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 55 AH–1Gs to provide 12 of these aircraft for each of the three active VMOs. The Secretary of Defense then recommended procuring 38 AH–1Gs to provide 12 aircraft for each of the two VMOs deployed to Southeast Asia.

13. The Secretary of Defense recommended that no new CH–46 helicopters be procured to complete the modernization of the 4th (Reserve) Marine Air Wing. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended that new CH–46s be procured to replace UH–34s in the Reserve Wing. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

14. The Secretary of Defense made no recommendation on any type of crane helicopter for the Marine Corps. The JCS recommended developing and procuring 15 CH–54B crane helicopters for the active Marine Air Wings at a cost of $48 million in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 5 for $15 million. The Secretary of Defense then decided not to budget in FY 69 for development or procurement of CH–54Bs.

E. Navy Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the previously approved undersea surveillance system (SOSUS) program in FY 69 at a cost of $73 million. The JCS supported a Navy proposal to expand the SOSUS system to include four rather than two mid-Pacific arrays, to install a new long-range cable in the Philippine Sea System, and to approve an installation in the eastern Atlantic area. The FY 69 cost of this proposal is $120 million. The Navy proposal is now under review.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended disapproving development of a new carrier-based ASW aircraft (VSX). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended continuing VSX development. The Secretary of Defense deferred final decision pending further review. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense approved development of the VSX as part of a plan for 5 CVS carriers and 4 air groups after the war in Southeast Asia, an Authorized Active Inventory (AAI) of 135 VSX aircraft, and a land-based patrol aircraft force of 24 P–3 squadrons when the VSX is phased in. The Secretary of Defense also recommended reducing the end FY 69 force by 2 CVS air groups to bring the number of air groups into balance with the available carriers.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing Contract Definition of a new class of ASW escort, the DX, but deferring construction of the first of these ships to FY 70. The JCS supported the Navy proposal for constructing 9 DXs in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy later recommended constructing 5 DXs in FY 69 at a cost of $252 million. The Secretary of Defense then agreed to the Secretary of the Navy’s recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 3 nuclear attack submarines (SSN) in FY 69 at a cost of $254 million. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 5 SSNs at an estimated cost of $423 million in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy later recommended procuring 3 SSNs in FY 69 and procuring long lead-time items for FY 70 SSNs at a cost of $284 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then recommended procuring 2 SSNs in FY 69 and procuring long lead-time items for 2 FY 70 SSNs, at a FY 69 cost of $178 million.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 40 P–3C land-based patrol aircraft in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in the number to be procured. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense recommended a reduced P–3C buy in FY 69 as part of the new airborne ASW plan. The exact number of P–3Cs to be procured is under review.

F. Navy Amphibious Assault, Fire Support, and Mine Countermeasures Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a FY 69 amphibious assault shipbuilding program of 2 amphibious assault ships (LHA) and 7 tank landing ships (LST). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred. The Secretary of the Navy later withdrew his recommendation on LST construction. The Secretary of the Navy’s recommendation is now under review.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring the construction of one amphibious flagship (AGC) from FY 69 to FY 70. The Secretary of the Navy concurred, but the JCS recommended the AGC not be deferred. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring Contract Definition of the landing force support ship (LFS) from FY 69 to FY 70 and not constructing an LFS in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended Contract Definition not be deferred. The JCS also recommended FY 69 procurement of one LFS. The Secretary of Defense then approved the JCS/Navy recommendation regarding Contract Definition, but reaffirmed his recommendation against constructing an LFS in FY 69.

4. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a force level of 6 CA/CAGs plus 2 battleships for Southeast Asia. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a force of 4 CA/CAGs plus one battleship for Southeast Asia.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended rehabilitating 10 minesweepers (MSO) in FY 69, but recommended against constructing any new MSOs in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred with the recommendation to rehabilitate 10 MSOs, but recommended constructing 5 new MSOs in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring one mine counter-measures support ship (MCS) and one special minesweeper (MSS) from FY 69 to FY 70. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

G. Naval Replenishment and Support Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended an underway replenishment force of 81 ships (including a 10 ship Southeast Asia augmentation) in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a force of 87 ships (including a 12 ship Southeast Asia augmentation) in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then recommended an underway replenishment force of 83 ships (including a 12 ship Southeast Asia augmentation) in FY 69.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring FY 69 procurement of replenishment helicopters. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 18 UH–46s at a cost of $28 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring the FY 69 procurement of 8 patrol craft (PC) to FY 70. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended constructing 3 replenishment fleet oilers (AOR), 5 salvage tugs (ATS), and one destroyer tender (AD) in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

H. Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces⁷

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a 15 CVA force (augmented by Intrepid during the war in Southeast Asia). The JCS (less the Chairman and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force) and the Secretary of the Navy recommended 17 CVAs (including Intrepid until replaced by a new CVA) for the duration of the war in Southeast Asia. The Chairman recommended 16 CVAs but did not address the Intrepid issue, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force recommended 16 CVAs (including Intrepid until replaced by a new CVA). The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended constructing one new CVAN in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended a force of 1,004 Navy fighter/attack aircraft in FY 69. The JCS recommended a force of 1,192 Navy fighter/attack aircraft in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a force of 1,060 Navy fighter/attack aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended a force of 70 Navy reconnaissance aircraft in FY 69. The JCS recommended a force of 71 aircraft. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a force of 87 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a force of 82 Navy reconnaissance aircraft.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 203 aircraft of other types (airborne early warning, utility, electronic countermeasures, tankers, and helicopters) in Navy combat units in FY 69. The JCS recommended a total of 226 aircraft. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a total of 194 aircraft The Secretary of Defense then recommended a total of 190 of these aircraft.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended a force of 417 Marine Corps fighter/attack aircraft and 27 Marine Corps reconnaissance aircraft for FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 55 aircraft of other types (electronic countermeasures and tactical air control) in Marine Corps combat units in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a total of 63 of these aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense concurred with the JCS/Navy recommendation.

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 315 aircraft (fighter/attack, reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and tactical air control) in Navy and Marine Corps reserve combat units in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a total of 353 of these aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

9. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring the following tactical aircraft in FY 69 compared to that recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

	JCS	SecNavy	SecDef
A–6A	113	124	36
A–6D	48	24
A–7A/B	375
A–7E		240	214
F–4J	112	150	36
F–111B	42	42	30
RA–5C	57	24	24
RF–4B/J	30	24	10
EA–6B	31	19	8
E–2A/B	9	9
TC–4Cs	18
TOTAL	835	656	358

The Secretary of Defense’s recommendations may be revised to reflect the latest Southeast Asia attrition estimates.

I. Air Force Tactical Air Forces⁸

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 1,777 fighter/attack aircraft for FY 69. The Secretary of the Air Force concurred. The JCS recommended a total of 1,807 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. The Secretary of the Air Force later recommended reducing the FY 69 force to 1,771 aircraft.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended a tactical reconnaissance force of 360 aircraft for FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended a Special Air Warfare force of 354 aircraft for FY 69. The JCS recommended a total of 420 aircraft. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended a total of 390 aircraft to include 36 UH–1 helicopters. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a FY 69 force level of 396 aircraft and a FY 69 buy of 37 UH–1s.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 391 other aircraft (night warfare, electronic warfare, and tactical air control) in Air Force combat units for FY 69. The JCS recommended a total of 427 aircraft. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended a total of 505 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a total of 455 aircraft and the Secretary of the Air Force concurred.

5. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended procuring the following tactical aircraft in 69 compared to that recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

	JCS	SecAF	SecDef
A–7D	135	220	220
AX	22
F–4E	150	113	113
F–5A/B	49
F–111A	181	181	181
RF–4C	59	51	51
RF–111	45
A–37	81	50	50
UH–1F	60	37	37
OV–10	30
Utility Transports	52
TOTAL	864	652	652

The Secretary of Defense’s recommendations may be revised to reflect the latest Southeast Asia attrition estimates.

J. Airlift and Sealift Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 27 C–5As in FY 69 at a cost of $548 million. The JCS concurred.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 4 Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships in FY 69 at a cost of $187 million. The JCS concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended that the Forward Floating Depot (FFD) program be cancelled. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended that the FFD program be continued. The Secretary of Defense then concurred.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 2 small tanker ships in FY 69 at a cost of $21 million. The JCS concurred.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended no additional C–130 procurement in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on C–130 procurement in FY 69. However, the JCS supported force level of C–130 aircraft would require procuring about 27 C–130s in FY 68–69. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended procuring 25 C–130s in FY 68 at $60 million, and 28 in FY 69 at $70 million. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. The Secretary of the Air Force later recommended buying 27 C–130Es at $10 million in FY 68, $40 million in FY 69, and $30 million in FY 70. The Secretary of Defense again reaffirmed his recommendation.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended no additional procurement of C–2A (COD) aircraft in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on C–2A procurement. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 18 C–2As at a cost of $56.8 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended no additional procurement of KC–130 aircraft for the Marine Air Wings. The JCS did not comment on KC–130 procurement in FY 69. However, the JCS-supported KC–130 force structure would require procuring about 24 KC–130s in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 24 KC–130Hs at a cost of $83 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended against procuring Tactical Support Transport aircraft for the Marine Air Wings and that 26 C–47/54/117s be deleted from the force structure in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on procurement, but recommended that the 26 C–47/54/117s be retained through FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended $31.2 million in FY 69 for the procurement of 12 Tactical Support Transport aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then recommended retaining the 26 aircraft through end FY 69 and then phasing them out without replacement.

9. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out all 336 C–119s from the reserves in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on this recommendation. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended retaining 160 C–119s in the reserves through FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then concurred with the Secretary of the Air Force’s recommendation.

10. The Secretary of Defense recommended that 20 Navy C–118s be deleted from the airlift force structure in FY 69. The JCS concurred, but recognized a need for some Navy Tactical Support Airlift. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a plan (the FY 69 part of) which would phase 10 Navy C–118s into the reserves to replace 13 C–54s. The Secretary of Defense then recommended phasing 14 Navy C–118s into the reserves in FY 69 to replace 20 C–54s.

K. Logistics Guidance

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a procurement objective of 90 days of combat support for U.S. forces committed to NATO. The Secretary of the Air Force concurred. The JCS recommended 180 days of combat support for these forces. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended a 135 day pipeline for forces in the Indefinite Combat category. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a 180 day pipeline. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended the ASW forces be supported at 90 days plus shipfill for the full force (equivalent to 135 days of combat for deployed forces plus shipfill for the full force). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended support at 180 days for the deployed forces plus shipfill for the full force. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended equipment stocks for forces in the Indefinite Combat category through the first 180 days after war starts. The Secretary of the Navy recommended D to P plus a 180 day pipeline. The JCS recognized that provision must be made for replacement of attrition of equipment (including aircraft) beyond 180 days; however, a specific recommendation was withheld pending further analysis by the JCS. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation that more equipment would be bought only when it can be shown that its lack would keep these forces from being able to fight indefinitely.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended 90 days of logistics support for two armored Army Reserve division force equivalents. The JCS recommended that these forces be given logistics support to enable them to fight indefinitely (D to P). The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

L. Major Fleet Escorts

The JCS recommended procuring one nuclear frigate (DLGN) and two guided missile destroyers (DDGs) in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring two nuclear frigates and modernizing two conventional frigates (DLGs). The Secretary of Defense recommended constructing three nuclear guided missile destroyers (DXGNs) in FY 69, one using FY 68 funds. The Secretary of the Navy tentatively concurred with the recommendation pending further review.

REMAINING SIGNIFICANT FY 69 BUDGET DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A. Strategic Retaliatory Forces	JCS	SecDef
1. Procurement of MK–17s for Minuteman II	Yes	No
2. Deploy MK–17s on Minuteman III	Yes	No
3. Procurement of Titan II missiles		5
4. Option to deploy MK–17s on Poseidon by end FY 72	Yes	No
5. Average number of MK–3s per Poseidon missile	[*]	[*]
6. R&D on Advanced ICBM	$75 million	$11 million
7. Prototype Ballistic Missile Ship	$120 million	$0
8. R&D on AMSA	$65 million	$25 million
B. Continental Air and Missile Defense
1. Anti-Soviet Nike-X deployment	Yes	No
2. Introduce AWACS; phase down SAGE/BUIC; modernize F–106 and reduce total number of interceptors; continue R&D on F–12	Yes, but use F–12 in lieu of F–106X, and delay phasedown	Yes
3. R&D on sea-based and airborne ABM systems	$20 million	$1 million
4. Military survival measures program	$30 million	$10 million
C. Theater Nuclear Forces
1. Phase out of 18 Mace in Europe	No	Yes
2. Pershing MIRV	$43 million	$0
3. Tactical nuclear bomb stockpile	[*]	[*]
4. Tactical Nike Hercules nuclear warhead inventory	[*]	Under Review
5. FY 69 tactical nuclear warhead inventory	[*]	Under Review
D. Army and Marine Corps Land Forces
1. Army active division equivalents	21–2/3	19–2/3
2. Army reserve division equivalents	9	8
3. Army division force sets of equipment	30–2/3	27–2/3
4. Marine Corps FY 69 active end strength	330,000	Under Review
5. UH–ID helicopter procurement	744	Under Review
6. CH–47 helicopter procurement	60	48
7. TOW and Dragon procurement	All active and reserve Army and Marine divisions	Active Army armored and mechanized divisions
8. Reduction in M60 Shillelegh procurement	No	Under Review
9. Force objective for Hawk batteries	83	79
10. Army reserve 40mm automatic weapons units	56	40
11. Complete modernization of4th (Reserve) Marine Air Wing	Yes	No
12. CH–54B crane helicopters for active Marine Air Wings	15	0
E. Navy Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces
1. SOSUS program	$120 million	Under Review
2. DX procurement	9	5
3. SSN procurement	5	2
F. Navy Amphibious Assault, Fire Support, and Mine Countermeasures Forces
1. AGC procurement	1	0
2. LFS procurement	1	0
3. CA/CAG force level	6	4
4. Battleship force level (Southeast Asia)	2	1
5. MSO procurement	5	0
G. Naval Replenishment and Support Forces
1. Underway replenishment ship force level	87	83
2. UH–46 replenishment helicopter procurement	18	0
H. Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces
1. Attack carrier force	16	15
2. Navy fighter/attack aircraft force level	1,192	1,004
3. Recommended aircraft procurement	835	358
4. VFAX and E–2B development	Accelerate Development	Under Review
I. Air Force Tactical Air Forces
1. Fighter/attack aircraft force level	1,807	1,777
2. Special Air Warfare force level	420	354
3. Electronic Warfare force level	137	75
4. Recommended aircraft procurement	864	615
5. F–X and A–X development	$128 million	$60 million
J. Airlift and Sealift Forces
1. C–130 procurement	Yes	No
2. KC–130 procurement	Yes	No
K. Logistics Guidance
1. Support of U.S. NATO-oriented forces	180 days	90 days
2. Pipeline for forces in Indefinite Combat category	180 days	135 days
3. ASW support	180 days plus shipfill	90 days plus shipfill
4. Logistics support for two Army reserve armored division force equivalents	D to P	90 days
L. Major Fleet Escorts
1. DLGN procurement	1	0
2. DXGN procurement	0	2
3. DDG procurement	2	0

[* entry in table not declassified]

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 71 A 3470, Final Memo to the President 1 Dec 1967, Notes of Meeting with JCS 11/17 & 11/24, Folder 157. Top Secret.
2. Not printed.
3. Secretary McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 17 and 24 to discuss this draft memorandum to the President. Although no formal record of these meetings has been found, McNamara’s detailed (and often illegible) handwritten notes on both meetings are in the Washington National Records Center, McNamara Files: FRC 330 71 A 3470, Final Memo to the President 1 Dec 1967, Notes of Meeting with JCS 11/17 & 11/24, Folder 157.
4. Not printed.
5. In a November 27 memorandum to Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler wrote in part: “The issue of the level of Nike-X deployment does not bear directly on the FY 1969 budget; however, it is of sufficient significance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to warrant discussion with the President.” (Washington National Records Center, McNamara Files: FRC 330 71 A 3470, Final Memo to the President 1 Dec 1967, Notes of Meeting with JCS 11/17 & 11/24, Folder 157)
6. McNamara initialed at the bottom of the first page.
7. All aircraft force level recommendations in items 3 through 8 are on a Unit Equipment (UE) basis. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. All aircraft force level recommendations in items 1 through 4 are on a Unit Equipment (UE) basis. [Footnote in the source text.]