87. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield1
LBJ: Mike, Dick Russell called me and I told him, he said that he wanted to offer his substitute, but youʼd talked to him about this tabling,2 and that he thought that I was making a terrific mistake by agreeing with that because he thought there would be doubt left as to my authority and it would be an open sore and be coming up—the Fulbrights and the doves all the way through. I told him, I didnʼt think so, that I would favor letting Morse make his case and try to rescind it, and then, without hurtinʼ anybody or getting personal, get up and make a statement that the questionʼs whether you want to rescind it or whether you donʼt and this direct vote on it can be had by tabling. But, I sure donʼt want the motion to table to imply any dilution of that resolution because if it does Iʼm in a hell of a shape as head of the Commander in Chief and with other nations, too.
MM: I donʼt think that it would in any way.
LBJ: Well, it will unless you make a case for it when you make the motion to table or get somebody to do it. Either make Russell or somebody say, “Hereʼs what the authority of this resolution is.” Now, Morse wants to take that away. Now, our position is that weʼre not gonna take it away, because if we leave me in doubt there, whether I have authority or not, hell Iʼd rather turn the authority over to Fulbright. Iʼve got to know what authority I have, and I believe I have unquestioned authority as Commander in Chief—162 cases according to the Attorney General—
MM: Without the resolution.
LBJ: Without the reso[lution]—with the resolution, Iʼve got them in there with me. But is this motion to table in any way, in the light of what they said, diluting it? Now, if it does, Iʼm against it.
[Page 268]MM: No.
LBJ: I think the case ought to be made that Morse wants to rescind it and weʼre not gonna rescind it and thereby, by not rescinding it, it stays just as it is.
MM: Thatʼs right.
LBJ: And that we want every dictator in the world to know, we donʼt want Peking—
MM: The case is made, Mr. President, without even saying a word. [indecipherable] two or three votes.
LBJ: I donʼt agree with you without saying a word. I think it ought to be in that record before that roll call. And, thatʼs the case he makes. And, Iʼm for tabling it. And I donʼt what to rub anybodyʼs nose in it like he does with Nelson and the rest of them. But I do think that they oughta say, Morse wants to repeal this; now, weʼre not gonna repeal it; I am gonna move to table it. If you want to repeal it, you vote for Morse. But, if you want to leave it just as it is, with all the authority that it contains, why, you vote to table. If you donʼt, why you go on and vote with Morse. I just donʼt want some would-be fellow thatʼs waiting to see what to do, depending on the Senate, to misinterpret this, because I know what happened to us in a couple of wars by their misjudging our intentions. Iʼm controlling this thing just as carefully as a human can. Iʼm watching it just [indecipherable] but I cannot have them in doubt about my ability as Commander in Chief.
MM: No, but you have you that responsibility and authority even without a resolution.
LBJ: I agree with it. But all the play, Mike, all the editorials is, whatʼs going to be done this Senate—what this group of twenty or thirty or forty Senators—are they gonna take away authority? Are they gonna hold it back? And, they may interpret this—and the propaganda in all the morning papers is—that theyʼve kinda agreed. So, I think that when we make a motion to table, please see that someone points up the fact that this leaves the President without a bit of his authority changed or diluted.
MM: Ok, Mr. President.
LBJ: Thank you, Mike.
MM: Yes sir.
- Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.10, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.↩
- It was anticipated that Senator Wayne Morse was going to make a motion on March 1 to rescind the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 10, 1964. Senator Richard Russell proposed making a substitute motion to reaffirm the resolution. An alternative response under consideration was a motion to table Morseʼs motion. Russell called the President at 9:20 a.m. on March 1 about the issue but his conversation was not recorded. (lbid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) Later on March 1, the President discussed the issue by telephone with Senator Gale McGhee (at 12:49 p.m.) and Senator Russell Long (at 2:40 p.m). Both conversations were recorded and the recordings are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 6603.01, PNOs 2, 5, and 6. The Senate voted later in the day to table Morseʼs motion by a 92 to 5 vote. For more information, see William C. Gibbons , The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 257–258.↩