Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

70. Paper Prepared by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)¹

Washington, February 10, 1966.

1966 PROGRAM TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ANTICIPATED RESULTS THEREOF

A. Increase the strength of South Vietnamese, US and 3rd-country forces in South Vietnam²

	End ʼ65	End ʼ66
1. South Vietnamese National Military Forces
—Maneuver battalions	**139	162
—Regular forces	302,600	325,000
—Regional forces	132,000	150,000
Popular forces	136,400	192,500
2. U.S. forces
—Maneuver battalions	35	79
—Strength	184,300	*429,000
3. Third-country forces
—Maneuver battalions	10	23
Strength	22,400	45,000
4. US strike sorties per month (includes for end 1966 CAP, SAR, etc.)
—Tactical air	16,500	27,000
—B–52	300	600

* 30,000 less than MACVʼs II-A-Revised

** Breakdown = Reg 108, Ranger 20, Abn 6 = 139

5. All units are to be at full strength at End ʼ66. (This will require continued programs to stimulate recruiting, enforce conscription, and minimize desertions.)

B. Expand the offensive actions of such forces while providing essential defense

The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, in coordination will:

1. Defend military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now under government control.

2. Open and secure lines of communications required to support military operations and for essential support of the civilian population.

3. Conduct clearing and security operations to provide military security in the four selected high priority national construction areas.

4. Conduct intensified offensive operations against major VC/PAVN forces, bases and lines of communications—almost doubling the number of battalion-months of offensive operations from 40 to 75 a month.

5. Increase the level of attack on the infiltration routes through Laos and North Vietnam by more than 60 per cent—from 5,400 to 9,000 attack sorties a month.

C. Achieve the following results in 1966:

1. Increase the population in secure areas to 60 per cent from 50 per cent.

2. Increase the critical roads and railroads open for use to 50 per cent from 20 per cent.

3. Increase the destruction of VC/PAVN base areas to 40–50 per cent from 10–20 per cent.

4. Ensure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now under government control.

5. Military security needed for pacification of the four selected high-priority areas—increasing the pacified population in those areas by 235,000.

6. Attrite, by yearʼs end, VC/PAVN forces at a rate at least as high as their capability to put men into the field.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files, McNaughton VII. Top Secret; Sensitive. McNaughton forwarded the paper to McNamara on February 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the corrected ‘Honolulu Sheet.’” McNaughton also sent copies to Vance and Goodpaster. A draft of the paper was forwarded to Unger by Blouin on February 12 under cover of a memorandum that called it “a draft of the US/GVN military objectives for 1966 which were developed at Honolulu.” (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, JCS Working Papers, 1966–1967)
2. In his “Historical Briefing,” dated February 16, Westmoreland stated that he spent February 6 with McNamara, at which time McNamara “made the decision that we would go for the full package of combat troops that I had asked for, namely 102 total battalions, but that there would be no reserves called.” (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, #4 History File) For McNamaraʼs report of his February 6 meeting with Westmoreland, see The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 312–313.