336. Draft National Security Action Memorandum1

SUBJECT

  • Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam

Now that the extensive deployment and skillful use of U.S. forces has greatly improved our military position in Vietnam, it is imperative that we mount and effectively orchestrate a concerted military, civil, and political effort to achieve a satisfactory outcome as soon as possible.

To this end, I approve the following guidelines for such an effort, and for ensuring that it is effectively carried out.

I.
Our Strategic Aims. These must be to:
A.
Maximize the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam by December 1967 or, if this is not possible, put us in the best position for the longer pull.
B.
Be equally suited to (a) forcing Hanoi to negotiate; (b) weakening the VC/NVA to the point where Hanoi will opt to fade away; or (c) at the minimum, making it patently clear to all that the war is demonstrably being won.
C.
Complement our anti-main force campaign and bombing offensive by greatly increased efforts to pacify the countryside and increase the attractive power of the GVN—all these to the end of accelerating the erosion of southern VC strength and creating a bandwagon psychology among the people of SVN. This strategy is also well suited to exploiting any possibilities of a Hanoi/NLF split.
II.
Action Programs for 1967. To achieve our strategic aims will require a maximum continuing effort in the following nine program areas:
A.
Press a Major Pacification Effort, employing the bulk of the RVNAF. [Page 923]
1.
Devise a concrete and detailed US/GVN pacification plan for 1967 which will: (a) set realistic goals by region and by province, with emphasis on areas or LOCs where early results are possible; (b) provide for adequate force allocations and time-phasing; (c) properly dovetail the military and civil programs.
2.
Retrain, re-motivate and deploy a steadily increasing proportion of ARVN in supporting the RF and PF in clear-and-hold operations as the key to pacification.
3.
Progressively open essential roads, railroad and canals on a planned schedule.
4.
Revitalize and accelerate the civil side of pacification.
5.
Devise improved techniques for measuring pacification progress and presenting them to the public.
B.
Step up the Anti-Main Force Spoiling Offensive, as made feasible by the increase in FW maneuver battalions.
1.
Introduce modest US forces into certain key Delta areas.
2.
Stress offensive actions to clear VC base areas and LOCs around Saigon.
3.
Lay on a major re-examination of our intelligence on VC/NVA strength.
C.
Make More Effective Programs to Limit Infiltration and Impose a Cost on Hanoi for the Aggression.
1.
Refine the bombing offensive with respect to both efficiency of route harassment and quality of targets.
2.
Press forward with barrier system.
3.
Examine other ways to apply military pressure on the North.
D.
Mount a Major, Continuing National Reconciliation Program, designed to maximize the inducements aimed at eroding VC strength.
1.
Expand and revitalize Chieu Hoi Program to handle 45,000 lower level defectors a year.
2.
Press a sustained middle and high level defector program under appropriate auspices.
3.
Ensure that new Constitution is consistent with reintegration of VC into the national life.
4.
Develop a US contingency plan on how to handle VC/NLF in the next local and national elections, examining options of allowing VC to vote or perhaps even inviting NLF to run as a party in next national election.
5.
Enlarge efforts to establish contacts with the VC/NLF.
E.
Press for the Emergence of a Popularly-Based GVN, with adequate checks and balances between the civilians and the military, and between northerners and southerners.
1.
Make clear well in advance to the Directory that the US cannot accept a retrogression to military government, another coup, or blatant election rigging.
2.
Press home to all—civilian and military—the importance of national unity and pulling together, as a minimum US condition for continued US support of SVN.
3.
Use all our influence behind the scenes to bring about a smooth transition to a representative GVN, but one in which the still indispensable military role is not submerged.
F.
Press for Other Key Elements of the Manila Program which will enhance the GVNʼs attractiveness.
1.
Encourage better local government, including elected hamlet, village, and district/province officials.
2.
Insist on a workable scheme of land reform, land tenure, and rent moratorium.
3.
Vigorously attack corruption and misuse of US aid.
G.
Maintain the Civil Economy and Keep a Firm Lid on Inflation.
1.
Enforce a vigorous stabilization program.
2.
Definitively lick the port bottleneck—both movement into the warehouses and movement out.
3.
Maintain an adequate import level.
4.
Generate more rice from the countryside.
5.
Accelerate the creation of infrastructure for economic development.
6.
Mount an imaginative postwar planning exercise.
H.
Devise a Pre-Negotiating and Negotiating Strategy Consistent with the Above.
1.
Take such initiatives as will credibly enhance our posture that we are always ready to talk and ever alert for new avenues to negotiation.
2.
Vigorously pursue serious negotiating leads.
I.
Mount a Major Information Campaign to inform both the US electorate and world opinion of the realities in Vietnam, finding ways credibly to measure progress.2
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S. Secret. Rostow forwarded the draft to Katzenbach and McNamara under cover of a December 12 memorandum stating that the President wanted to issue an NSAM “embracing guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam” and wanted comments on it “if you believe it constitutes a basis for such a NSAM.” This draft was based on a paper by Komer, “A Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam,” November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaugton; see footnote 3, Document 320) In a December 5 memorandum to Katzenbach, Komer proposed that Katzenbachʼs “non-group” prepare a strategic plan for the President, working from his paper. “All it really needs is a preamble, and a bit of cleaning up.” (Johnson Library, Komer Files, Katzenbach) On December 10 Rostow forwarded the draft NSAM to the President, who wrote on Rostowʼs covering memorandum: “Itʼs good. Come in with Bob on Monday.” (Ibid., Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy) The President met with Rostow and Komer on Monday, December 12, from 12:20 to 1:03 p.m., presumably prior to circulating the draft NSAM to McNamara and Katzenbach, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary)
  2. The NSAM was never issued. State Department and Defense Department comments on the draft (and on a revised draft circulated in January 1967) are discussed and excerpted in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 490–494, and The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 392–440. Several internal Defense Department documents commenting on the draft are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 381 Vietnam, filed under December 23 and 27. In telegram 14767 from Saigon, January 3, 1967, Porter stated that he did not understand the need for such a document: “It does not provide guidelines, and it does not include priorities. Instead, it sets out a series of desirable objectives, all of which are already known and accepted.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)