Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden¹

Washington, November 19, 1966, 5:46 p.m.

88128. 1. At luncheon meeting November 11 Foreign Minister Nilsson assisted by Mr. Bergstrom presented to the Secretary an account of Swedish contacts in Warsaw with North Vietnamese representatives and of the late October visit of Swedish Ambassador Petri to Hanoi and his conversations with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh. Memcon of that conversation together with Swedish precis of these recent contacts with North Vietnamese² and our analysis of Hanoiʼs positions as reflected therein³ being pouched.

2. On November 17 Unger conveyed to Minister Nilsson, Bergstrom, Oberg and Ambassador de Besche in New York Secretaryʼs formal thanks, results of our analysis of message transmitted by Swedes and “Points for Clarification” which we would like to have Petri discuss with North Vietnamese Foreign Minister on next visit to Hanoi, speaking always of course for Swedish Government and without reference to conversations with us. Text of “Points for Clarification” follows:

• “1. What does the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister intend that his government would do when he says ‘We know what we will have to do’ [i.e., if US stops bombing of NVN]?⁴ Mr. Trinh named two conditions which the United States must fulfill to bring about a climate for negotiations. It is understood of course that if those conditions were fulfilled, negotiations could promptly be undertaken, but since the fulfillment of those conditions would represent significant steps for the United States, what would be the reciprocal actions by North Viet-Nam? It is encouraging to know that the North Vietnamese apparently recognize this reciprocity but it is essential, if their position is to be accurately evaluated, to know what it is that they recognize they ‘will have to do’.
• “2. What is the significance of the FNL being characterized, as Mr. Trinh put it, as ‘the most valid’ spokesman for the South Vietnamese people? What is this intended to convey concerning the status of the FNL vis-à-vis other spokesmen?
• “3. With reference to the question of reunification, Mr. Trinh referred to the necessity of creating conditions in South Viet-Nam ‘to permit a move in the direction of a future reunification’. The conditions in South Viet-Nam as Mr. Trinh himself implied would grow out of general elections held in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy. Would Mr. Trinh not envisage that the question of unification would be resolved at that time in accordance with the mandate given a new government by the people through those general elections?
• “4. If Mr. Trinh should mention the point raised by the North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw, namely that ‘no military actions should be taken in the demilitarized zone’, Mr. Trinh might be asked whether this is intended to be in effect a proposal for the strict observance of the Geneva Accords in the demilitarized zone north and south of the demarcation line with the full functioning of the ICC throughout the zone.”

3. In reply to Nilssonʼs request for any additional comments Unger referred to Secretaryʼs letter⁵ which mentions possibility that Petri might be asked by North Vietnamese about our knowledge of his contact there and of his conversations, and our suggestion that he respond with a query as to whether North Vietnamese Government would wish Swedish Government to inform us of these matters, in which case Swedes would be happy to explore question.⁶ Unger explained that while there are many channels to Hanoi we have thus far been unable to set up any significant dialogue, and if North Viet-Nam should show a disposition to begin to communicate with us substantively, we would be happy to consider this. It was agreed that Petri and the Swedes in general might not turn out to be most suitable intermediary and that in fact the North Vietnamese might choose to turn to direct contact with us, but it was considered nonetheless useful for Petri to explore the matter of communication if he had any opening from the North Vietnamese.

4. Petri will of course be reporting his conversations directly with Stockholm and it was agreed that our further communications with the Swedes on this subject should be carried out through Ambassador Parsons there. This will be channel for conveying to us Petriʼs reactions to exchanges which have taken place during Nilssonʼs visit here, instructions he is given for his next visit to Hanoi and any other follow-up.

5. Unger indicated we would hope that Petri would again visit Hanoi as soon as this can be done without raising suspicions about any special role he may be playing. Swedes agreed and said that as soon as he makes visit to Stockholm, expected soon, on export questions as well as his Hanoi contact, he can then again visit Hanoi and this will be logical in view of his having reported on his previous visit to his own Foreign Office and presumably received instructions. They thought early December would be a likely time.⁷

6. There was some substantive discussion of the issues which might arise in Petriʼs next conversations in Hanoi, it being understood that this exchange was between the Swedes and ourselves and not for discussion in Hanoi. Unger mentioned Goldberg formulaʼs reference to private and other assurances about a response to bombing cessation and illustrated the kinds of de-escalatory actions by Hanoi which we would take to be appropriate responses, such as a cessation of infiltration, a reduction of the level of military activity and/or terror in South Viet-Nam or some troop withdrawal from South to North. In response to further Swedish probing as to what would come next after these first steps toward de-escalation and their mention of a possible ceasefire, Unger said it was not possible, without knowing more of Hanoiʼs views, to carry the process further. We would hope that once a beginning has been made it would be possible to establish some mode of communication with Hanoi to arrive at some understanding of the next phases of de-escalation, although it was not to be ruled out that this might proceed by mutual example. He also made clear our recognition of the problem of face for Hanoi and our readiness to consider ways to meet with problem. With reference to the fourth point in the “Points for Clarification,” Unger emphasized that we were suggesting this be raised only if the North Vietnamese themselves refer to the DMZ problem. He added that it would always have to be understood that any arrangements that might conceivably be worked out for the DMZ would have to provide for a reasonably reliable means of detecting and dealing with violations; we could not agree to putting American and Vietnamese forces in jeopardy, exposed to surprise action by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong.

7. The Swedes referred to their contacts with NLF representatives outside Viet-Nam and it was agreed that there was no reason not to continue these but at the same time no mention should be made in that channel of the contacts with the North Vietnamese or ourselves. Unger said we would of course be interested if there were any indications from NLF representatives of a desire to talk about bringing the conflict to an end or of any divisions within the VC. It was considered unlikely that the latter would come through these channels which are all outside the country.

8. The need for absolute secrecy concerning the present exercise was emphasized and the Swedes were particularly intent on keeping word of this out of their UN mission in New York.

9. We anticipate that Bergstrom will be in touch with Ambassador Parsons early this coming week to reopen contact on this matter but we envisage no further action required until Petri is in Stockholm and preparing for a return trip to Hanoi. At that point we will of course wish to be kept informed and have an opportunity to pass on our thoughts before he again leaves Stockholm. You will note this traffic is being handled Nodis and identified with the code word “Aspen”.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ASPEN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 662–663.
2. See Document 303.
3. Apparently a reference to a memorandum from Fred Greene of INR to Unger, November 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ASPEN)
4. Brackets in the source text. Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, quoted the text of a paper provided by the Swedish Government stating that, in further talks with Petri, he “has now made clear that he repeatedly tried to make Mr. Trinh elaborate on this statement. Mr. Trinh, however, avoided to do so.” (Ibid.)
5. Not further identified.
6. Telegram 652 from Stockholm, November 29, stated that, according to Swedish officials who had had further “exhaustive talks with Petri to doublecheck accuracy his reports,” there was “no doubt at all in Petriʼs mind that Trinh meant and expected what he had said to be passed on to US.” (Ibid.)
7. Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, indicated that it was intended that Petri would return to Hanoi about December 10. (Ibid.) However, Petri did not return to Hanoi until January 1967.