Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, November 15, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Additional Contributions in Vietnam and Your Trip

We have now received replies and reports from all our Embassies,² leading to the following judgments:

1. Australia and New Zealand. If the elections come out right, both will do more. But they need no urging and your arrival right after the elections would be badly misconstrued.

2. Korea. Park has now announced the formation of a service force, and is being vigorously attacked by his opposition for this. The Embassy believes it crystal clear that this is the maximum to be expected before the elections next March. With the decision made and the issue controversial, a stop by you in Korea would be a great mistake in my judgment.

3. Japan. Alex thinks the Japanese may be willing to undertake civilian assistance on a few projects but not on a broad basis. While a Japanese stop by you could be pegged to broad discussions, it could not be expected to produce more than very modest results in terms of any additional Japanese contribution.

4. GRC. The Embassy feels there is a distinct possibility of more civilian help in fields of engineering, agriculture, and health, subject to agreement on financing. However, it is my judgment that these contributions can be obtained without a visit by you, and that any such visit would in any event have to be directed to some other clear objective—lest we appear to stir up the question of GRC military forces.

5. Philippines. The Embassy feels it is definitely premature to seek additional military contributions, and that any further non-military assistance should arise from clear GVN initiative. There are various possibilities, but the slim pickings and the strong chance of negative reactions to a visit by you—which could hardly have any other purpose at this moment—lead me to recommend strongly in the negative on your stopping there.

6. Malaysia. The Embassy believes GOM would not now consider a military contribution. There is a fair chance they might be willing to send police and development advisors to a relatively secure Vietnamese province, but Bell doubts they have enough manpower to fully “adopt” a province. A stop by you might be some help, but the pickings would again appear slim.

7. Thailand. Martin is just in with the judgment that the Presidentʼs pitch will take some weeks to sink in. He reports a strongly negative reaction by Dawee. While Martin gives no judgment on your stopping, my own would be negative in the next 2–3 weeks, while the matter is obviously under intense private discussion.

8. Singapore. The Embassy thinks there is no chance of any kind of assistance for the present.

9. Burma. Byroade believes the Burmese would not be prepared to do anything.

10. India. The Embassy believes that GOI might be persuaded to consider some form of humanitarian help but might well feel compelled to offer similar contributions to North Vietnam. Bowles recommends against pressing the issue.

11. Pakistan. The Embassy believes GOP would consider civilian as well as military contributions to SVN to be beyond the realm of their political-military capabilities at this time.

12. Iran. The Embassy rates chances of getting any military element as infinitesimal. Tehran believes there would be an even chance of persuading the Shah to enlarge the Iranian civilian medical effort, but Saigon recommends against this on usefulness grounds for the moment. Meyer does recommend you stop in Tehran if you go to any neighbors.

13. Turkey. The Ambassador is not optimistic regarding a new approach to Turks for manpower contribution to Vietnam. If we are to approach Turks at a high level, the Ambassador suggests the best opportunity would be when President Sunay visits Washington in early December.

14. Greece. The Embassy doubts that GOG is now willing to become involved even marginally in the Vietnam issue.

In terms of these responses and judgments, I find great difficulty in suggesting a meaningful itinerary for a trip by you.³ For the various reasons given above, I would be clearly negative on Seoul, Taipei, Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, New Delhi, Rawalpindi, Ankara, and Athens. Burma, Malaysia, and Iran are at best make-weights and would create a very confusing picture of the purposes of the trip. Even a “search for peace” motif would have little bearing in these places, as likewise in India and Pakistan in view of their attitudes and the recent Harriman visits.

In short, my own conclusion is that the only stops that make real sense would be Japan—always justified on broad grounds—and Saigon itself. If you did this routing to Paris, you could refuel in Tehran and stop briefly if you wish. This is not of course a trip that will raise new forces, but it does make other kinds of sense.

As an alternative, I suggest the possibility of your doing a Tehran-Saigon-Tokyo itinerary after the NATO conference. This would be short enough to be compressed into the period between the NATO conference and Christmas, and might fit better with your other commitments and the possible importance of preparing carefully for the NATO conference itself.

I hate to seem negative, but a highly selective contribution-seeking tour seems almost worse than none. I cannot imagine what the press and other capitals would make of it. Hence, the middle ground seems to me the only feasible kind of trip that would have any merit.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–3 VIET S/LOUISIANA. Secret. Drafted by Bundy.
2. See Document 302 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. In circular telegram 83500, November 11, the Department noted that Ruskʼs upcoming trip in connection with the NATO meeting on December 15 might be directed in part to obtaining additional manpower contributions for Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–3 VIET S/LOUISIANA)