306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
10856. 1. I met Lewandowski at DʼOrlandiʼs apartment at 3:00 p.m. Saigon time.
2. Lewandowski began by saying that he was “grateful” to me for being “so responsive to my request” that he see me today on the eve of his visit to Hanoi. What he was about to say was not “official” in the sense that he was not instructed by Hanoi to do it. But before his departure, he wished that “some things could be clear.” He added, “you may not be prepared to answer right away and, if so, I will understand.” He had four questions, as follows:
- A.
- “Regarding the offer at Manila concerning the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam on the condition that the troops of North Viet-Nam [Page 840] would withdraw (and, he said, “North Viet-Nam, of course, doesnʼt admit that they are there at all), does this condition mean the United States withdrawal depends on control by the present South Vietnamese Government of territories not now under the control of Saigon?”
- B.
- “In case of a cease-fire, would the United States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and not to interfere in the creation of a new Government of Viet-Nam? The question of how the new Government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise.”
- C.
- “In case of a cease-fire, would the United States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish, whether by referendum or by election?”
- D.
- “In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the United States be ready to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery of the International Commission in bringing peace to Viet-Nam, and if so, would the United States publicly declare its intention to this effect?”
3. I said that these were questions which I would have to refer to the U.S. Government, and that I would do so and provide answers as soon as I could.
4. I then said I had some questions to ask, and I asked him the four sets of questions listed in your State 83786.2 When I had finished reading him these questions, which I did slowly so that he could take it all down, I added that none of what I had just said represented a position which he was authorized to put to Hanoi in our behalf. We would, however, review his answers and then decide what we wished to propose.
5. I then became silent, thinking that perhaps this would be the end of the meeting.
6. Without any prodding at all from me or DʼOrlandi, he said, “Well, some of your questions cannot be answered now. As to your question no. 1, my present role is in accord with the instructions of my government who would be prepared for me to take any role which would bring peace nearer. The two roles set forth in your question, that is, on the one hand, to work to facilitate a better understanding and pave the way to contact or, on the other, to be an intermediary, do not exclude each other. In fact, they could be done together. If the ideas which can be developed are not too far apart, then there can be talks, and if the ideas then start separating, both sides can withdraw. On the other hand, if I am successful in bringing the two sides together and they agree on something together, I can withdraw feeling that I have achieved something useful.”
7. As to the second question, Lewandowski said “You have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize that diplomacy in Viet-Nam is different than what it is in Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers are very [Page 841] difficult to get. One has to be very patient and look for indirect symptoms.” He was not, he said, an agent of the Hanoi government, but “if and when they decide they want you to know something,” he said, “they would tell me. Of this I am confident. Each time I go, the Prime Minister asks me about Americans and what the Americans think.”
8. “On your third question, it is a frame without a picture. It is very theoretical.”
9. “As to the fourth question, it recognizes that you canʼt trade bombing suspension for something else. The question of bombing suspension in the first instance could be discussed informally. But if well founded hopes developed for reaching some agreement, then the bombing suspension could be brought in in the second phase.”
10. DʼOrlandi remarked that in the beginning of our talks, Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing suspension would not be a precondition.
11. Lewandowski said, “Yes, there must be positive steps—not speeches or declarations. A package deal is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is the only one. The A and B in your fourth question are the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful. We must go right through to Z, including everything that needs to be in the package deal.”
12. I remarked that we would certainly be willing to accept the formula of a package deal as a way of doing business without, of course, committing myself to the substantive elements which might be in it.
13. DʼOrlandi thought that the package deal idea was a “positive step forward.” He regarded it as a “very substantial concession.” He saw the two distinct parts with no direct link between. The first, he said, gives full satisfaction. Phase B, he said, is very reasonable indeed.
14. The atmosphere was much the best that it has ever been since we have met. He had plainly asked for the meeting and said so. As I was about to leave, he said very much as an afterthought and in an extraordinarily mild tone of voice that he had forgotten to say something that he had meant to say which was that there should be no further escalation because to do so would “freeze the atmosphere.” I noted the casual tone and said equally casually that one could assure that that applied both ways.
15. Comment: Lewandowski is due to take off at 11 a.m. Tuesday, Saigon time. If you can get me a reply into my office by 9 a.m. Saigon time, I will try to get it to him if you desire. On the other hand, we have the perfectly good basis for saying there wasnʼt much time to give him an answer. End comment.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:06 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 266–268.↩
- Document 305.↩