Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

283. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Honolulu, October 26, 1966, 1920Z.

91125. Air campaign against North Vietnam (U).

1. The air campaign directed against North Vietnam is an essential element of our strategy for achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this message is to establish clearly the critical importance of these operations to our military efforts in South Vietnam and to identify the grave risks involved should these operations either be suspended or their scope significantly reduced before NVN actually ceases infiltration of men and material into SVN and the DMZ.

2. Self-imposed controls on the use of air power against NVN have had an adverse impact upon the effectiveness of air power in reducing the capability of NVN to direct and support the insurgency in SVN. These operations, nevertheless, have had a significant impact upon the military capabilities of the North Vietnamese Army and the VC. Indeed, the amount of disruption and enemy material destroyed has been of such magnitude as to represent the probable balance of power which to date has denied the enemy a capability for seizing significant portions of I and II Corps. The enemy has been unable to move concentrations of requisite military force to SVN to accomplish such a task without incurring unacceptable losses from air attack. The tactics of the enemy, the nature of the terrain in SVN and the concealment which it affords all dictate that we must not withhold our airpower until he closes with us in close ground combat. We must begin disruption, harassment and attrition of enemy forces as far back as we can find and attack them, thus degrading his capability qualitatively and quantitatively before he reaches the battlefield. Otherwise, his full capability must be met on the battlefield in a mode of combat which is certain to increase our casualties by appreciable and unnecessary numbers.

3. The risks described above are of immediate and pressing concern in connection with NVA concentrations now known to be in and near the DMZ. This is an area where the enemy is adept at moving and concealing large forces, and from which he can attack with little warning. The military security of our numerically smaller forces in this area depends in great measure on the ability of our air power to deny the enemy freedom to move and concentrate in positions from which he can attack with great advantage. A stand-down of air operations against enemy forces in or within supporting distance of the DMZ for even the shortest period of time would create the gravest of risks to the security of friendly forces in the area. The enemy would be accorded a greater freedom of movement for his men and supplies. We cannot afford to risk creation of a sanctuary of this nature close to our own forces.

4. Our air campaign in the North is a major military activity wherein we have the initiative and control over the intensity of combat. In SVN, the enemy can engage or disengage on the ground almost at will, thus in a sense pacing the ground war to his advantage. Such is not the case in the air over his homeland, where he must make a concession if he is to gain any relief from the pressures being applied against him. It must be quite apparent to him that decisions which can increase his losses at home will not be of his own making. We cannot afford to relinquish these initiatives except under conditions clearly indicative of success in our over-all objectives.

5. There are very serious military risks attached to any form of a partial stand-down, either in terms of reducing the targeting base or in restricting air operations to small geographic areas. As soon as such reductions become apparent in the past, the enemy has reacted quickly by readjusting his air defenses and our attrition has increased proportionately. It is essential that we avoid any voluntary simplification/reduction of his air defense problems. In fact it is becoming critically apparent from current attrition trends that a broader target base in NVN is urgently needed.

6. Our primary objective in the air campaign against North Vietnam is to make it as difficult and costly as possible for the NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause Hanoi to cease controlling and directing the insurgency in SVN. To achieve this objective, a steady increase in the pressure applied to the enemy is necessary to cause him to reconsider his support of the aggression. The most recent increase of pressure was applied through the systematic destruction of the NVN POL system. Inaugurated in early July, the program has resulted in the destruction, greatly reduced capacity or abandonment of all major POL targets authorized for attack. In recent weeks our pressure on the enemy has not continued to increase. In fact, it has decreased. Our air power is not being used to its maximum effectiveness. Many lucrative targets and target systems should be attacked to increase the pressure applied to the enemy.

7. This is not the time for relaxation of pressure. A broadened target base designed to lead Hanoi to expect attacks anywhere, at any time, against any type of military target or activity that supports their aims is essential. The targets and freedom of actions proposed by the JCS for Rolling Thunder 52 are a first step towards this broadened target base. Implementation of RT 52 would again increase the pressure on NVN, although not using our air power to its maximum effectiveness. It is time now to tell Hanoi that no military target, no activity that helps sustain the NVN effort to prosecute the war, is free from attack.

8. In summary, air operations in NVN have not yet reduced NVN support of the insurgency in SVN to the level desired. Hanoi has not been brought to the negotiating table. However, air operations in NVN have prevented the enemy from supporting his forces sufficiently to mount any major offensives or to seize and hold any vital areas in SVN. The NVN air campaign is the one action that brings the war home to North Vietnam. It disrupts the daily life in North Vietnam. It causes multiple and increasing management and logistic problems. It prevents the enemy from conducting an aggression from the comfort of a sanctuary.

Any continued relaxation of pressure in our air campaign against North Vietnam will provide the enemy with the incentive to sustain and increase his support of the aggression in SVN. Our allies in SVN will consider the US irresolute in its determination to force the Hanoi government to stop supporting the insurgency. The communists will be encouraged to increase their disruptive efforts throughout SEAsia. Our alternative is to convince Hanoi that its best hope is the negotiating table. A broadened target base is essential to achieve this end. The JCS proposed RT 52 is the first step towards a broadened target base. It is recommended that RT 52 be implemented now, with additional broadening of the target base authorized at the earliest to clearly signal our intent to Hanoi.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Repeated to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, and CGFMFPAC. The source text is marked with an indication that McNamara saw the telegram.