Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

275. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Possible Conditions of a Cessation of Bombing

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Assistant Secretary Bundy
• Ambassador Dean of the United Kingdom
• Sir Michael Stewart, Minister, UK Embassy

Dean said that he had come to talk about the conditions under which we might be prepared to cease bombing, for the guidance of George Brown in future contacts with Gromyko, specifically if and when Brown went to Moscow in response to Gromykoʼs recent invitation to him.

The Secretary said that the first question was where we wanted to come out. In general, we looked to a solution under which all North Vietnamese elements were withdrawn, there was a return to full observance of the general principles of the 1954 Geneva Accords and of the 1962 Geneva Accords in toto, and South Vietnam was thus left free to determine its own future.

The Secretary said that this was the eventual objective. However, the question of bombing could be separated from it. It seemed to him unlikely that all the elements of an eventual solution could be embraced in a written and negotiated agreement; some of the elements would come into place on a de facto basis and through a withering away of activity. In any event, the question of de-escalation was important and interesting, in itself.

The Secretary therefore said that, in connection with the bombing, he was not inclined to spell out the details of a final settlement. The point was to get a significant process of de-escalation started. It would be difficult to get around a conference table while military operations were going full blast. But the way might be prepared by “sufficient identifiable concrete military action to indicate that a process of de-escalation was under way,”

The Secretary then said that if we did stop bombing in response to such action, it must always be recalled that we could not “write in blood” that we would not resume. There was a possible snag here in that the Communists wanted a cessation accompanied by a guarantee that the bombing would not be resumed. Hence, serious difficulty could arise if the other side carried on everything else, so that we felt we had to resume.

Therefore, the Secretary said, we must know what would happen if we stopped bombing. Gromyko had said that things would be different. We needed to know in what way and how. At the same time, we recognized that the action on the other side might be hard to smell out and that we might have to probe for a time to see what the true basis was and would be. In sum, the Secretary said that we must have “some indication” that something concrete would happen on the military side. At the same time, if this something did not extend into significant de-escalation, we would have to resume. Thus, Mr. Brown should explore with the Russians to see what more the Soviets could say about what would be different.

The Secretary noted that the bombing constituted in our judgment a major incentive to Hanoi to stop the war. It was a military plus, but it also played a key political role, for without it Hanoi could simply watch events in the South and play them as it chose without any elements of pain to itself.

The Secretary said that Gromyko had indeed gone a little further than any past Soviet statement, by saying that things “would be different.” He then remarked that Foreign Minister Peter of Hungary had told him that it was his impression that Hanoi would accept a solution based on the 17th parallel. When the Secretary had pressed him whether he in fact had this from Hanoi, Peter had responded that he had good information and that he was making the statement soberly on the basis of official responsibility. If Peter had any grounds for such a belief, Gromyko must be aware of them, and therefore may go further and give us something more on which to build.

Dean then said that various forms of concrete actions had been mentioned in discussions with other Americans, specifically reduced military activity in the South, or a cessation of infiltration. It had apparently been made clear in connection with these conversations that the US could not accept a mere cessation of infiltration through the DMZ, but a combined cessation of DMZ infiltration and acceptance of ICC policing of the DMZ had been mentioned as an acceptable concrete action.

The Secretary responded that the last could not be a final answer, but must be part of a process of significant de-escalation.

The Secretary then returned to the suggestion that Brown could ask the Russians: “What more can you say?” and start the process of probing moving.

The Secretary said that he wanted to make clear that he was not concealing from the British any piece of paper on the precise conditions we could accept for stopping the bombing. The subject had been discussed at great length between the President, Secretary McNamara, and himself. The fact was that there were too many variables and a wide range of possibilities that defied precise delineation. Among the variables he specifically mentioned the political confusion in Communist China and its possible effect on what would be acceptable.

Dean chimed in that Hanoiʼs view of the American elections and the Manila Conference might also affect the timing question. He said that Gromyko had spoken to Brown in terms of a possible January visit by Brown. He asked, in effect, whether we thought this timing made sense.

The Secretary did not respond directly on this question, and it was left open.

The Secretary then returned to what Gromyko had said, and attached particular significance to Gromykoʼs response to the question of which Eastern European country had the most effective influence and role with Hanoi. Gromyko had responded flatly: “Moscow.” The Secretary then summarized what he had been saying along the following lines:

a. The issues of a final settlement and de-escalation could be separated.

b. The Communist side said it regarded the suspension as an ultimatum, and was therefore talking about a cessation. In that event, you must elevate the price, and this could be summed up as actions amounting to “the serious beginning of a process of de-escalation.”

Sir Michael Stewart asked what we would think of any proposal to suspend the bombing and see what would happen. The Secretary responded that the Communist side appeared clearly to regard a suspension as an ultimatum. If the suspension went along without reciprocal action, a very dangerous situation would be created. Therefore, there must be “some substantial information” because what we had to consider in effect amounted to a cessation even if we stopped the bombing without saying we were doing so finally, as a cessation, at the outset.

The Secretary then went back to the main threat, saying that his remarks should give George Brown enough to start discussions with Gromyko. If Gromyko produced any response, then we could consult urgently about how to move toward a deal.

Dean returned to the question of concrete actions that we might regard as adequate. He asked in what areas to look. The Secretary responded that the actions we could consider should be “something highly relevant to continued infiltration.” Dean said this was most helpful. In explaining his definition, the Secretary said that any action meeting this criterion would surely have a significant effect on the other sideʼs morale, which would make it thus a serious matter for them to undertake.

Finally, the Secretary noted that Ambassador Thompson had that day seen Dobrynin to ask him specifically about Gromykoʼs remark that “things would be different.” Thompson had asked whether Dobrynin had anything to add, and the response had been negative. Thompson had also alluded to the remarks by the President and Brezhnev, in order to counter any negative implications the Soviet side might have drawn from the Presidentʼs press conference remarks.

Comment: It seemed to Mr. Bundy likely that the conclusions Dean would have drawn from their conversation, and reported to Brown, would be roughly as follows:

a. As to the degree of likelihood of responsive action by Hanoi, that we must have “some substantial information” that such action would take place.

b. As to the nature of responsive action by Hanoi we would regard as satisfactory, that we would be looking for actions that would be concrete and in the military sphere, and that we would require actions indicating that a significant process of de-escalation was being started. The best area to look was in the sphere of actions “highly relevant to continued infiltration.”

c. That in the nature of the problem the US could not be more precise than this as to what it would accept in return for a cessation of bombing, and that it would be highly useful in any event if Brown were able to obtain from the Russians any indications that went beyond the general statement that “things would be different.” Such an indication could open the way to further discussions that would bring about an understanding on which a cessation of bombing could be based.

d. That the Secretary was not suggesting at this point any acceleration of the contemplated January date for Brownʼs discussions in Moscow.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved in S on October 19. The meeting was held in Ruskʼs office. In a letter to Bruce, October 18, Bundy explained that the meeting flowed from a “rather painful dinner party” on October 15 at which George Brown pressed Bundy and McNamara relentlessly for the “minimum terms” on which the United States would stop the bombing and claimed that what they told him “did not square with what he had been told by the President.” (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)