231. Intelligence Note From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Assessment of Current Situation in North Vietnam
Our assessment of the impact of the war on Hanoi leads us to believe that the strains are severe but not unbearable. The North Vietnamese people appear somewhat weary but not disaffected, and the regime has no evident difficulty in exercising effective control. The leadership has debated alternate strategies for conducting the war in the South but has not deviated from basic policy goals. Bombing has seriously disrupted North Vietnamʼs small modern industrial sector as well as seaborne foreign trade, but has not materially interfered with the maintenance of adequate [Page 631] lines of communications. While some shortages of consumer goods exist, the supply of basic commodities, including foodstuffs, appears adequate for minimal needs. Some evacuation of urban areas, particularly Hanoi, has taken place recently.
Morale and Central Government Control. Our intelligence on popular attitudes in North Vietnam is understandably spotty. However, what can be gleaned from various sources indicates that there is some dissatisfaction with hardships, as there always has been, but there is no serious dissidence. Although some war-weariness undoubtedly exists, the populace has an attitude toward the war that varies between enthusiastic support and resignation. Interrogations of prisoners in the South indicate that recruits for operations in South Vietnam start out in a state of high morale. The North Vietnamese regime has also been able to exploit nationalist sentiments and the instinct for self-preservation in order to impose an unprecedented degree of mobilization on the people, so as to insure the continuation of vital transport and essential production.
There is no evidence that any significant portion of the population blames the Hanoi regime for the bombing. Instead “US imperialism” is the focus of hatred. Although some of the people realize that American bombers are concentrating on military targets, most appear to believe that the strikes are aimed at civilian targets as well. A number of reports show that considerable evacuation of city dwellers to rural districts has taken place without substantial discontent. Nor is there any evidence to suggest the central government is experiencing difficulties maintaining control over areas outside of Hanoi.
The Leadership. Evidence of major disagreements within the leadership, notably Defense Minister Giapʼs alleged loss of influence, is tenuous and difficult to assess. However, in a number of recent polemical articles there have been clear hints of past and continuing disagreements over proper strategy in thwarting the strengthened US/GVN forces in the South. One side apparently argued unsuccessfully for a more cautious military policy against those who advocated maintaining an aggressive posture. There is no evidence, however, that the dispute involved a more fundamental change in political strategy, such as an effort to get negotiations underway.
The Economy. It seems evident that North Vietnamʼs small heavy industrial sector has been seriously affected by the bombing. Since mid-1965 Hanoi has been concentrating its productive efforts in dispersed light industry and agriculture while relying on outside assistance for the essential products of heavy industry. According to the North Vietnamese press, light industry is producing at about the same level as in early 1965. Poor weather, the disruption caused by bombing, and other priority calls for transport combined to reduce substantially procurement from the spring crop. It seems likely that the same factors will adversely [Page 632] affect the harvest now underway. Despite Hanoiʼs denials, the Chinese have provided small quantities of rice. Visitors to Hanoi and intercepted letters from North Vietnamese in the countryside indicate that sufficient food is available. The rice ration has not been reduced, but meat is quite scarce. Western medicines are in particularly short supply. There are conflicting reports about the availability of consumer goods and textiles, but these appear adequate for minimal needs. Prices are kept low to guard against inflation, although the average workerʼs buying power is insufficient to allow a run on goods.
Although the bombing of Haiphong has made off-loading more difficult, communist shipping continues to bring in supplies at a high rate. In July 1966 seaborne imports of goods other than petroleum reached the record volume of 80,500 tons, 76 percent of which arrived on Soviet ships. (Non-communist shipping is now almost nonexistent.) Strikes on transportation routes have all but halted North Vietnamʼs two principal exports, anthracite coal and apatite. Petroleum products are being imported by rail and sea at a level somewhat reduced from the high of last spring, but the supply is ample for North Vietnamʼs needs. Although distribution patterns have changed, there is no evidence of any shortage of POL as a result of the concerted bombing effort. DIA estimates that the entire country has POL stocks (most in small, dispersed storage areas) to meet normal civilian/military needs for two months and that two medium-sized tankers a month will be able to supply North Vietnamʼs needs.
According to a recent CIA study,2 the internal transportation system is now running more efficiently, though at obviously greater cost in manpower, than before the US bombing program began. Ingenious methods of repair and alternate means of communication, based in part on the Korean experience, have ensured the maintenance of adequate communication and rendered the transportation system increasingly less vulnerable to interdiction.
Civil Defense and Evacuation. The North Vietnamese are keenly aware of the need for continually improving their civil defense. An August 7 Nhan Dan editorial stresses the importance of digging shelters and communications trenches, evacuating urban areas, dispersing offices and living quarters of those remaining in the cities, and preventing resettlement areas from becoming densely populated zones.
Evacuation of some citizens, industries, and government ministries from Hanoi has taken place throughout the summer. Possibly about 40% of the populace had been evacuated by late August, although this figure must be weighed in light of other reports that many people apparently [Page 633] move out of the city during the day, but return at night, in part owing to the lack of accommodations in the countryside. Canadian ICC reports3 describe a large-scale section-by-section evacuation of old people and children, with priority given those living near bridges and dams. Some government ministries have been relocated (probably to a limestone region near Phu Ly, whose caves and grottos were used by the Viet Minh in the war against the French) and retail store hours have been ordered cut to reduce daytime activity in Hanoi.