Attachment
PROVN SUMMARY STATEMENT
The situation in South Vietnam (SVN)
has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to
ensure eventual success. “Victory”
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can only be achieved through bringing the
individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support
willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The critical actions are those that occur at the
village, district and provincial levels. This is where the war must
be fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond
it must be won. The following are the most important specific
actions required now:
Concentrate US operations on the provincial level to include the
delegation of command authority over US operations to the senior US
Representative at the provincial level.
Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US–GVN combined effort to solidify and
extend GVN influence.
Authorize more direct US involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels adequate to
ensure the accomplishment of critical programs.
Delegate to the US Ambassador unequivocal authority as the sole
manager of all US activities, resources and personnel
in-country.
Direct the Ambassador to develop a single, integrated plan for
achieved US objectives in SVN.
Reaffirm to the world at large the precise terms of the ultimate US
objective as stated in NSAM
288:4 A free and
independent, non-communist South Vietnam.
The task of the enemy is much easier. He is opposing a “government”
that cannot validly claim the active loyalty of a majority—even a
significant minority—of the people. The US and the GVN, on the other hand, are dealing
essentially from a point of weakness. Building upon the foundations
of an ineffectual government, we must develop and “deliver” a
positive program that assists the GVN to create an attractive environment so that a firm
commitment of the individual to his nation will take root and grow.
The VC do not have to deliver until
they win. We have to deliver in order to win. The strategic
implications of failure necessitate total resolve and effort.
The Strategic Importance of South Vietnam
The future role and accompanying strategy of the US in Asia,
especially regarding the security of Southeast Asia, critically
depends on the outcome of the current conflict in SVN. US foreign policy, through the
short range, will have as its central focus the containment of world
communism. Communist China today poses the most immediate danger.
Targeting on the less-developed nations, the Communist Chinese have
adopted the aggressive doctrine of “wars of national liberation” as
a vehicle for communist encirclement of the US and Western Europe.
Reiterated
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by Marshal Lin
Piao on 2 September 1965, this doctrine is currently being tested in
SVN.
US strategy in mainland Southeast Asia includes supporting the
provisions of the 1962 Geneva agreements in Laos, continuing to
strengthen Thailand economically and militarily and restoring peace
and security in SVN. In general, US
policy calls for the continued development of the individual
countries of all Southeast Asia and their increasing regional
integration—economically, socially and politically— through the
agency of such programs as the Mekong River Development Scheme and
the recently established Asian Development Bank.
The outcome of US involvement in SVN
will determine the future strategy which we as a nation can or will
be willing to adopt in Asia.
Major Problem Areas
Five major obstacles stand out above all others as hindering the
achievement of the ultimate US objective in SVN:
A Well Led and Adequately Supported Communist Political Military
Machine: Long experience, the defeat of the French under the
nationalist mantle, a formula attuned to peasant aspirations and
sanctuaries continuous to the entire western flank of SVN have provided the Communists a
significant advantage.
An Inefficient and Largely Ineffective Government, Neither
Representative of Nor Responsive to the People: Instability,
ineffectual leadership, corruption, over centralization and disdain
for the peasantry have compounded the limitations of skills,
experience and equipment.
The Marginally Effective US Method of Operation: Rapid expansion,
lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict, inappropriate
response and interagency competition have undermined US efforts to
overcome the other four problem areas which fundamentally determine
the nature of the conflict in SVN.
The Escalating Requirement for Material Resources to Prosecute the
War and Meet Consumer Demands: Having an underdeveloped agricultural
economy, SVN does not possess the
indigenous resources, the communications infrastructure or the
skills necessary to sustain the rapidly escalating conflict.
The Vietnamese Peasant Outlook: Fatalism and war-weariness have
sapped peasant motivation; governmental corruption and inefficiency
have caused disillusionment; and deeply ingrained traditional values
have retarded social change.
US Short-Range Objectives
US short-range objectives must be designed and established to provide
a base for gaining the initiative in the current struggle and to
ensure
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significant
progress toward overcoming the crucial obstacles. The five major
short-range objectives should be:
The defect of PAVN and Main Force
VC units and the reduction of
VC guerrillas and political
infrastructure among the population.
The development of GVN leadership and
institutional practices capable of furthering nation building.
The establishment of an integrated US civil-military organization and
method of operation capable of ensuring execution of US–GVN plans and programs in SVN.
The provision of a war-supporting economic infrastructure and initial
foundations for economic growth.
The development of an allegiance to the GVN among the South Vietnamese people.
The Concept of National Operations
The situation in SVN is both
challenging and unorthodox; it calls for the application of new and
imaginative emphases and techniques. The US must devise an effective
counter to “wars of national liberation.” The proposed US concept of
operations is a broad-front offensive which directs major efforts
along three mutually supporting axes—eliminating armed Communists;
ensuring the effective performance of the GVN; and conducting an effective combined US–GVN Rural Construction Program. To
launch and sustain the momentum of this offensive, four initiatives
must be taken now:
- (1)
- The deployment of US and Free World
Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) to destroy PAVN and Main Force VC units and base areas and to reduce
external support below the sustaining level. Rural
Construction can progress significantly only in conjunction
with the effective neutralization of major enemy forces. The
bulk of US–FWMAF and
designated ARVN units must
be directed against base areas and against lines of
communication in SVN, Laos
and Cambodia as required; the remainder of these forces must
ensure adequate momentum to priority Rural Construction
areas.
- (2)
- The establishment of Rural Construction
as the essential vehicle for extending security to,
developing the requisite leadership of and providing the
necessary social reform for the Vietnamese people.
The war has to be won from the ground up; the people of the
countryside are the target. RVNAF must be the main Allied military element
supporting Rural Construction, with the US providing
material and technical assistance and stimulating social
reform as required. Requisite authority and resources must
be provided to the province chief.
- (3)
- The exercise of more direct US
involvement to ensure the attainment of US–GVN objectives.
Discriminate US involvement in GVN affairs—ranging from skillful diplomatic
pressures, through the application of politico-economic
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leverage, to US
unilateral execution of critical programs—is essential. The
GVN has been either
unwilling or unable to accomplish successfully many
requisite tasks. The eventual creation of a cohesive society
in SVN requires, however,
that GVN achieve
effectiveness and be directly credited with success. The US
must exercise its influence to evoke GVN performance.
- (4)
- The delegation of command authority from
Washington to the district level in SVN and the concentration
of delegated authority at each intermediate US
organizational level in SVN. The requisite flexibility and
responsiveness of day-to-day operations can only be achieved
if those closest to the situation are delegated adequate
authority and means to influence counterpart action. An
Executive Agent in Washington should coordinate support
activities in the US; the US Ambassador in SVN, raised to the new post of
Single Manager, should exercise unequivocal authority over
all in-country US activities, personnel and resources; and a
single, senior US representative (SUSREP) should be
appointed at each lower echelon to function as the
counterpart of his parallel GVN senior official. Maximum authority must be
delegated to province. The Single Manager must be authorized
an adequate super-agency planning staff and a deputy for
Rural Construction and Development (RC&D) who exercises
operational control over USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and the
Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group (JUSMAAG) as
well as MAP functions (a
reduced MACV). US military
units in SVN must be under
the command of a newly established CINC US Forces Vietnam,
coequal with the Director of RC&D.
Priorities. US–GVN priorities for action must be established on the
interrelated bases of population and natural resource
concentrations, the location and nature of the enemy, available
Allied resources, current successes and military logistical
requirements. The complex interrelation of considerations for
establishing priorities and the varying mixtures of limited
military, economic and political resources that may be marshaled to
achieve any one objective make the determination of priorities
extremely difficult. For these same reasons, establishing clear
priorities is all the more important. After securing requisite
logistical bases, the first priority must be the Delta (current
emphasis on An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon).
The second priority area comprises the Coastal Lowlands; the third
is the Central Highlands.
Mid-Range Objectives and Subobjectives
Successful achievement of the short-range objectives should allow
gradual transition toward mid-range development objectives. These
objectives, together with representative subobjectives, are as
follows:
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The established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability.
Subobjectives would include: elimination of VC infrastructure, use of Allied forces to support
completion of the Rural Construction Program and transfer of
Regional Force-Popular Force responsibilities to the National Police
as the RCP progresses.
A government representative of, and responsive to, its people.
Subobjectives would include: an efficient governmental and
administrative system, increased authority and prestige of province
chiefs and the development of responsible and forward-looking
political parties.
A US organizational presence adequate for assured national security
and development. Subobjectives would include: termination of the
Executive Agent, return to the country team organizational concept
(as the RCP nears completion) and the reduction of the US presence
commensurate with increased GVN
capability.
The amelioration of divisive social factors. Subobjectives would
include: maximization of minority group integration into the social
fabric, expansion of social reforms and the reintegration of the
former VC into the society.
A viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion.
Subobjectives would include: initiation of major land reform,
acceleration of Mekong regional development and the development of
light industry.
Long-Range Objectives: The Ultimate South Vietnam
Achievement of US–GVN mid-range
objectives will lay the foundation for the long-term development of
SVN as a free, independent,
non-communist nation. Development should proceed toward a society
that enjoys inner social cohesion; a viable government; a
diversified, maturing economy; and an adequate security posture. In
less than 50 years, SVN should have
effectively integrated its significant minority groups into the
fabric of its society. The government should be basically democratic
with firmly established political institutions capable of
withstanding crises and allowing for the legal and peaceful transfer
of political power. Economically, SVN should have passed the take-off point to
self-sustaining growth. A somewhat smaller, well-equipped and
well-trained military establishment, backed by regional and
international security guarantees, should be able to ensure national
security. Throughout the long-range period, the US presence should
be minimal.
[Here follows a section on “Measuring Progress.”]
