197. Memorandum of Meeting1

PARTICIPANTS

  • W. Averell Harriman
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • Llewellyn Thompson
  • Leonard Unger

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam: Negotiations

Amb. Ungerʼs check list2 was reviewed. It was agreed that a message to Saigon should be prepared exploring the possibilities and problems of secret GVN talks with the NLF-VC.

The group agreed that we need to know much more about the leadership and composition of the NLF and the VC. Amb. Johnson commented that Mr. Helms had told him in a recent conversation that CAS was beginning to develop the capability to obtain better intelligence on this subject through penetration of the NLF-VC. He concurred, however, that more had to be done and that Saigon should be informed that we consider this a top priority requirement.

It was agreed that the question of an amnesty offer by the GVN to the NLF-VC was closely tied to the question of secret talks. A meaningful amnesty offer should open up the possibility of NLF leadership (not[Page 549]merely rank and file) returning to “normal” political life in the south. Any GVN initiative to engage in direct talks with the NLF-VC should be taken against the background of the amnesty offer.

It was recognized that there would be considerable resistance in Saigon, both on the part of the GVN military leaders and the Embassy, to the idea of negotiations with the NLF-VC. Amb. Thompson suggested that the idea might be sold on the basis that it offered the possibility of sowing dissension in the ranks of the enemy and peeling off non-communist elements from the NLF. Amb. Johnson commented that this point had to be handled very carefully because dissension could be sowed in both directions. He thought that in its present mood of confidence the GVN would be hard to persuade that an initiative for talks with the NLF-VC was desirable. He thought that it would take six weeks at a minimum to prepare the ground in Saigon.

It was agreed that Amb. Unger would prepare a draft of a message to Saigon.

The subject of a Congressional resolution setting forth US aims in Vietnam was discussed. Amb. Unger said that he visualized such a resolution as a means of emphasizing the limited nature of our objectives and our readiness to engage in unconditional talks. If the right language could be worked out, such a resolution might be a way of getting Fulbright back on the track. Governor Harriman commented that it was hard to conceive of any resolution which would be acceptable to both Congressional hawks and doves—to Fulbright and Symington for example. The group agreed that there could be no more effective way of convincing Hanoi and the rest of the world of our unity and determination than to bring Fulbright around.

Amb. Unger will prepare a draft Congressional resolution so that the group can see how it might look.

  1. Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 72 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 8/8/66. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Harrimanʼs office. Assigned by the President in July to devote full attention to the search for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, Harriman established a “Negotiations Committee,” which met once a week beginning with this meeting. In an October 4 memorandum to Katzenbach, Harriman stated that his committee met each Thursday “to develop, assess and follow up all leads to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.” Principal participants were U. Alexis Johnson, Llewellyn Thompson, William Bundy, Joseph Sisco, Leonard Unger, Thomas Hughes, and Benjamin Read. (Ibid., S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State—Rusk)/1
  2. Not found.