195. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
1522. 1. George met noon 27th with Ray and Out for four-hour lunch at secluded restaurant and stroll in park of St. Cloud. Ray present during most of talk but both men seized occasion as it arose for private work with George. Ray helpful in keeping Out to issues at hand when latter tended to stray into jungle of Vietnamese politics. Outʼs identity and history, the major themes of conversation, are subject of separate message;2 he is extremely sensitive this matter and welcomed assurances his name would become known only to handful of men in highest positions of U.S. Government. In these messages, therefore, he will be referred to by cover name. Following is summary of highlights of conversation which ranged widely over twenty years of Vietnamese history and politics.
2. Out presented himself as a Cochinchinese nationalist, of intellectual stripe, accustomed to good bourgeois comfort and with horror of physical combat and miseries of life in the Maquis, which his friend Nguyen Huu Tho appears able to tolerate. He expressed abhorrence and fear of Communists and apprehensiveness of DRV Mission in Paris. He is interested first in Cochinchina autonomy, second in a Vietnamese federation, and ultimately in an Indochinese federation to include Laos and Cambodia, although Sihanoukʼs instability seems to him an obstacle. Except for regional bias, Outʼs point of view as far as he expressed it to George, held few surprises. He appeared eager to use any means to bring war to an end before Cochinchina could be submerged by North (DRV) or Northerners (like present Premier). His conversation reflected no hostility toward U.S. or Americans except as sustainers of governments not chosen by people. He spoke with feeling of Diem government as bad U.S. creation.
3. Outʼs channel of communication to Vietnam is liaison officer stationed at Prague, who makes weekly visits here to carry messages. Ordered to report 28th to be available following meeting with George, he failed to appear. Moreover, Out was notified 28th by DST (French equivalent of FBI) not to leave French territory. Out feared liaison officer may have been intercepted carrying documents which compromised Out. Whereas he had hoped be able prove his bona fides and authority within two weeks, he now believed a month would be required.
[Page 541]4. George asked how Out was able to maintain his authority at so great a distance. Out gave no clear answer except to allude to subsequent performance of which he seemed sure, even though execution might be delayed.
5. Asked how and where next steps might be carried out if U.S. received proper assurances, Out said best locale might be Saigon. George expressed doubt and suggested it might be possible arrange for Tho and others to proceed to safe neutral spot where talks could take place in suitable atmosphere. Out replied that Tho was in effect a prisoner, not because he was detained but because he and his associates feared he might be replaced by someone unacceptable to them. George commented that U.S. view of coalitions including Communist elements was that these tended to become Communist tools. Out admitted FLN contained Communist members but said it was no more under Communist direction than the Movement Populaire Cochinchinois of 1946. (His statement regarding Tho suggested less confidence.)
6. With reference to possible outcome of contacts between U.S. Government and FLN, Out had little precise to offer but tenor of his remarks suggested belief that somehow might emerge a cessation of military action in Cochinchina, popular election of government in South acceptable to FLN, and gradual diminution of hostilities in 17th parallel region as upper hand is gained by U.S. forces, which would remain as “protection.”
7. George handed over prisoner list which Out pocketed without glancing at it. He accepted without comment Georgeʼs statement U.S. would consider acceptable evidence release any two civilians and any two military, with preference for those needing medical care. Ray mentioned possibility of quid pro quo. Out misunderstood this as reference to money and took offense. Reassured, he replied subject could be discussed later. Alone with George thereafter, Out said he would not ask for corresponding gesture on part of U.S.
8. Since delay in prisoner release seemed certain, George said he would report conversation to Washington and propose temporary return to his home. Simple code message based on reference to car would bring him back to Paris within hours to resume contact. Communication would be through Ray as Out indicated that great concern for his safety and especially for his wife, who is cardiac, made him reluctant have any possible compromising document about him. George said before he left Paris he would let Ray know. Ray too expressed some anxiety regarding his own security. He would return to Spain if need arose as his visa is still valid. In reply to question, both men explained fear of French on grounds latter have “own plan” for Vietnam.
Comment: In this tangle of improbables, George feels some confidence in Outʼs sincerity. Certainly there was no doubt of his cordiality, to [Page 542] which George responded in kind. Whether Out can in the end produce remains to be seen.3 On balance it seems at this time U.S. has nothing to lose in playing along with Out and company as long as interests of both parties remain parallel. This may not be very far. We might, however, along the way, win freedom for some prisoners and to some extent undermine NLF. George did all possible to assure Out of importance U.S. attaches to contact and its maintenance. In the early phases, such risks as there are threaten Out and his friends rather than U.S.
In meeting, Ray played role of honest broker with more seeming disinterest than he displayed in New York. In aside to George he said much of what Out had to say of himself and his history he had never heard before despite intimacy of their families. His attitude was one of slight aloofness, which may have reflected some apprehension or reluctance on part of one of his former eminence to serve as a “letter box” (his word). Outʼs manner toward Ray, however, suggested latter was trusted collaborator.
It is clear that Outʼs point of view in many respects departs from reality as U.S. sees it, and his claims and pretentions in the eyes of a detached observer are implausible on the face of them. Nevertheless, Vietnamese politics is a sphere in which the implausible need not be synonymous with the impossible. Note: George requests authorization proceed as stated numbered paragraph 8 above.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Elm Tree. Drafted and authenticated by Bohlen. According to a July 30 cover memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson sent a copy of the telegram to the President on August 1. (Ibid.) George, Ray, and Out are code names for Sturm, Khanh, and Le Van Truong, respectively.↩
- Telegram 1523 from Paris, July 30; see footnote 3, Document 179.↩
- In telegram 55594 to Paris, September 28, U. Alexis Johnson asked McBride to tell Khanh: “Have heard nothing since Georgeʼs meeting two months ago and nothing has happened.” McBride replied in telegram 4675, September 30, that an Embassy official had met earlier that day with Khanh, who stated that Le Van Truong had delivered the message regarding the release of prisoners to Tho “about a month ago.” Telegram 5440 from Paris, October 13, reported that Khanh had again seen Le Van Truong, who was under the impression that one U.S. prisoner on Sturmʼs list had been released but was very disturbed about his failure to deliver on the agreed-on number, since it cast doubt on his influence within the NLF. Le Van Truong further stated that if the authority of non-Communist elements was waning within the NLF, it was due to Hanoiʼs recently increased efforts to strengthen its influence, which had led to tension between Hanoi and the NLF. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE)↩