Attachment
Washington,
June 1,
1966.
Intelligence Report2
AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF
BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM3
Summary
The Rolling Thunder
program, a systematic but restrained air offensive against selected
economic and military targets in North Vietnam, was begun on 2 March
1965. The basic objectives of the air attacks on North Vietnam have
been made clear in public statements by the President and other high
officials of the US Government. These objectives are (a) to reduce
the ability of North Vietnam to support the Communist insurgencies
in South Vietnam and Laos; (b) to increase progressively the
pressure on North Vietnam to the point where the regime would decide
it was too costly to continue directing and supporting the
insurgency in the South; and (c) to bolster the confidence and
morale of the South Vietnamese.
The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Vietnam has
been a carefully controlled means of gradual escalation to achieve
strictly limited objectives. Consequently, the program has operated
under a set of firmly defined ground rules which have limited both
the choice of targets and the areas to be bombed. The existence of
large restricted areas has effectively insulated almost 80 percent
of North Vietnamʼs limited modern industrial economy from air
attack; these areas contain 75 percent of the nationʼs population
and the most lucrative military supply and LOC targets.
The estimated dollar cost for the restoration of economic and
military targets attacked in the Rolling Thunder campaign is less than 10 percent of the
value of the economic aid given to North Vietnam in recent years by
Communist countries.
[Page 430]
|
Restoration Costs of Facilities Attacked by the
Rolling
Thunder Program Million US $ |
|
Economic |
Military |
Total |
| Attacks on fixed targets |
23.6 |
26.4 |
50 |
| Armed reconnaissance missions |
12.8 |
0.7 |
13 |
| Total |
36 |
27 |
63 |
About 57 percent of the total damage—$36 million—is attributable to
the destruction of economic targets. This cost has been broadly
distributed throughout the economic sector, and no one sector has
been forced to bear unacceptably high levels of damage. In terms of
national capacity the greatest damage was inflicted on electric
power and petroleum storage facilities. These target systems lost 27
and 17 percent, respectively, of their national capacity. In each
case, however, the target system has adequate cushion in the form of
excess capacity to absorb these attacks, and economic activity could
therefore be maintained at almost normal levels.
The damage to military facilities is just over $ 27 million. Almost
60 percent of this damage was to military barracks, but the effect
has been negligible. The damage to military targets has shown a
definite downward trend since the peak month of July 1965.
The damage to military facilities not only has resulted in losses of
equipment but also has prompted the abandonment of installations
such as airfields and the dispersal of equipment and supplies
normally stored in ammunition and supply depots.
The United States has placed restrictions on the air offensive
against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian casualties. It
has been to North Vietnamʼs interest to assert otherwise, however,
and propaganda media attempt to give the impression that the air
offensive has been a vicious and unrestrained assault on the
civilian population, hospitals, schools, and other nonmilitary
objectives. Nevertheless, in only one instance have Hanoi officials
presumed to provide a total for the number of casualties. In
September, Egyptian journalists were told that total casualties were
75,000, including 40,000 killed and 35,000 wounded. No procedures
devised in this report for the purpose of estimating casualties can
support a figure of this magnitude.
Although the Rolling
Thunder program has flown many thousands of attack
sorties against targets in North Vietnam, the toll in human
casualties has been light. Based on sample data, through the end of
1965, North Vietnamese casualties—both civilian and military—are
estimated
[Page 431]
to have ranged
from 11,700 to 14,800, divided about equally between killed and
wounded.
|
Estimated Casualties Resulting from Rolling
Thunder |
|
Military |
Civilian |
Total |
| Attacks on fixed targets |
3,900 to 4,700 |
1,700 to 2,400 |
6,500 to 17,900 |
| Armed reconnaissance missions |
2,600 to 3,200 |
3,500 to 4,500 |
6,100 to 7,700 |
| Total |
6,500 to 7,900 |
5,200 to 6,900 |
11,700 to 14,800 |
About 55 percent of these casualties were military personnel. The
civilians killed or injured by armed reconnaissance attacks were for
the most part truck drivers or transport and construction workers
rather directly engaged in maintaining the logistic pipeline to
South Vietnam.
Approximately 3,000 civilian deaths (one-half of total civilian
casualties) as a result of military action against North Vietnam is
a small number. The impact of 3,000 civilian casualties is slight in
a country where over 350,000 persons died in 1965 from other causes
and where the accidental deaths alone produced casualties some three
to five times greater than those resulting from the Rolling Thunder program.
The economic and military damage sustained has presented an
increasing but still moderate bill to Hanoi, which in large measure
can be (and has been) passed along to Moscow and Peiping.
The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam has been to force
Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity,
particularly in transportation and distribution. Reconstruction
efforts have been hampered by difficulties in allocating manpower.
The regime has relocated large elements of its urban population.
Problems in the distribution of food have appeared, although these
problems are not yet pressing. Where the bombing has hurt most has
been in its disruption of the road and rail nets and in the very
considerable repair effort which became necessary. On the other
hand, the regime has been singularly successful in overcoming US
interdiction efforts.
An examination of destroyed and damaged facilities shows that only a
small number were truly essential to the war effort. The major
essential restoration has consisted of measures to keep traffic
moving, to keep the railroad yards operating, to maintain
communications, and to replace transport equipment and equipment for
radar and SAM sites. These measures
have probably been effected at a cost of between $4 million and $5
million, or between 5 and 10 percent of the total economic and
military damage sustained in North Vietnam to date.
[Page 432]
The ability to react and to offset the effects of the air attacks has
not been without its costs. It is estimated that the diversion of
manpower to tasks associated with dispersal programs and emergency
repair and maintenance of lines of communication throughout North
Vietnam may now require the full-time services of 200,000 workers
(equivalent to about 10 percent of the nonagricultural labor force)
and the part-time impressment of another 100,000. An additional
150,000 people are also obligated, on a part-time basis, to serve in
various aspects of civil defense which take them away from their
normal pursuits. Thus a significant share of the labor force is
diverted in varying degrees to supporting the war in the South. The
diversion of labor has been supplemented, particularly in the
northern provinces, by Chinese logistic support troops.
In response to the intensified US and Vietnamese air offensive in
1965, all countries of the Communist camp have extended economic
assistance as proof of their support. Total assistance extended by
China and the USSR in 1965 is on
the order of $250 million to $400 million, of which military aid
accounted for $150 million to $200 million. This aid is a relatively
insignificant drain on the capabilities of both countries.
The USSR is by far the major source
of military equipment for North Vietnam, supplying 70 to 95 percent,
or $142 million, of the total provided in 1965. The major components
of Soviet military aid were SAM
sites (15 to 20), antiaircraft guns (1,000 to 1,200), planes (44),
motor vehicles (2,600), radar, and jet fuel. Chinaʼs identified
military aid, totaling only $11 million, consisted principally of
planes (8) and trucks (1,400). In addition, large amounts of
infantry weapons and ammunition are provided by Communist China. The
inclusion of the cost of this equipment would probably raise the
value of Chinaʼs total contribution by a few million dollars.
Military aid from the Eastern European Communist
countries—consisting principally of small arms and ammunition,
medicines and medical equipment, and some trucks—is valued at only a
few million dollars.
[Here follows the body of the 146-page report.]
