Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, May 15, 1966, 1:29 a.m.

3448. Personal for Porter from the Secretary.

1. It is intolerable that Ky should take such far reaching move as that against DaNang² without consultation with us.

2. However, immediate problem is how to pick up pieces and prevent a major debacle. Most urgent need is to insist that principal figures in DaNang area (such as Ky, Vien, Dinh, Lam, Nhuan and Thi) agree at once to prevent further fighting among SVN elements pending further discussion of more lasting solution. This may require rough talk with several of them but United States can not accept this insane bickering. I recognize this is tall order but you, MACV, General Walt, Thomsen and others must do your best in next few hours.

3. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the disarray among South Vietnamese leaders has been rapidly undermining support of American people for war effort. The question “what are we being asked to support?” is becoming insistent and is becoming more and more difficult to answer.

4. We must rely heavily upon you at this moment and assure you of our full confidence.³

Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk.
2. In Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973, p. 136, Jeffrey Clarke summarizes the situation as follows: “Government forces, commanded by Vien, seized Da Nang in the early morning hours of Sunday, 15 May [early evening hours of May 14, EST]. Two South Vietnamese Marine Corps battalions, supported by tanks of the South Vietnamese Army and covered by planes of the South Vietnamese Air Force, moved quickly into the city and secured the mayorʼs office, the radio station, the I Corps headquarters and other military installations, and the police stations. Two airborne battalions under the command of General Dong provided reinforcements. Little fighting transpired, as most of the dissidents fell back inside several Buddhist pagodas, which the troops refrained from attacking. Ky and Co later joined Vien, and during the next four days an uneasy truce prevailed inside the city.”
3. In telegram 4613 from Saigon, May 15, Porter reported on his meeting that evening with Thieu and Ky, during which he stated that the U.S. Government was “extremely annoyed that they would carry out operation of this importance without in any way consulting or informing us.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII)