125. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Vietnam—The Critical Issues
In Vietnam we face an enemy whose main hope is that American political life cannot stand the strains of protracted war and of baffling political turbulence in Vietnam.
They are playing us as they did the French in 1953. They know we are militarily stronger than the French. They are not yet convinced we have more stamina.
They do not believe they can defeat us in the field.
They do not believe they command majority support in Vietnam.
They are counting, like all the Communists before them, on the power a determined, disciplined minority can wield against a split and distracted majority.
Our task is to convince them at the earliest possible moment that they are wrong; and that time is their enemy, not their friend.
Our tasks break down into two groups:
- —those things we must do to avoid defeat;
- —those things that might help them decide to end the war sooner rather than later.
Minimum Essentials.
- —to maintain present relatively favorable casualty rates with respect to VC and PAVN main force units;
- —to keep supplies through Laos down to a level that prevents a major build-up of VC/PAVN forces;
- —to keep sufficient Vietnamese military unity to maintain the ARVN as a reasonably effective force in the field;
- —to avoid political violence and chaos during the transitional phase through which we are now passing;
- —to keep inflation (and the weight of U.S. military and civilian personnel and expenditures) from tearing South Vietnamese society apart.
If we do these things we can stay in the game; but war-weariness in Vietnam and the domestic strains of the whole affair might well cause a break in Saigon or in Washington at some point, if it appears endless. We must, therefore, look to measures which will force a favorable decision in Hanoi soon rather than later.
To Force a Decision to Negotiate on Terms Relatively Favorable to Us.
- 1.
- Increase the cost to Hanoi of continuing the war by hurting them badly around Hanoi-Haiphong.
- 2.
- Find a way to block or radically to inhibit the supply roads through Laos.
- 3.
- Increase sharply the attrition rates against VC-PAVN main force units to the point where they begin to disintegrate.
- 4.
- Produce a relatively stable consolidation of anti-Communist political groups.
- 5.
- Get inflation under control and steadily build up rural reconstruction in the provinces.
4 and 5 (counter-inflation; stable politics) we must obviously try to do; but, unless we are extremely lucky, they will proceed at a pace not likely in themselves to impress the VC and Hanoi that they should give up their effort.
3 (higher attrition of VC-PAVN) could happen, if our build-up proceeds and we are extremely successful in finding, fixing, and destroying VC/PAVN main force units. But it depends on their not evading us and also on their rate of replacement and supply flows through Laos.
We are, therefore, brought back to look afresh at the Laos supply line and the Hanoi-Haiphong targets.
It is right that we should look hard at these. The Communists have obviously made an assessment much like this one. They have invested great military resources and diplomatic vigor in trying to keep us out of Hanoi-Haiphong; and, with Souvanna both incapable of closing the corridor [Page 359] and nervous about our moving troops into the corridor, Hanoi has felt free to build roads and mount a formidable truck-based supply line.
Hanoi-Haiphong Targets.
I am conscious of the international issues these raise; and there can be only one target officer in this government. I would only recommend a fresh look, bearing in mind that many of the targets can be attacked with relatively few planes: it took two aircraft to take out the Haiphong power plant the other night. They bombed at night on radar and were lucky. But for precision targets small well-planned operations often do better than big ones, due to smoke and dust obscuring the target.
The Laos Trail.
Here Iʼm sure we ought to concentrate our best brains and efforts. The VC are now dependent on that trail for ammunition. Since manpower reserves are low in VC-controlled areas, they are also dependent on the trail for fighting men. It is a true jugular. But itʼs tough to cut and hold cut. Roads can be repaired overnight. Trucks are hard to find. Nevertheless, we are improving due to spotter teams; small spotter aircraft; more sorties; more experience. The number of trucks shot up is increasing. The number of trucks seen coming down the road decreased in the past month rather sharply. We should push the new denial weapons program to the hilt.
The equation of victory in Vietnam is as complex as anything this nation has ever faced. No element in the equation can safely be neglected. But the key to shortening the war lies not merely in trying harder on items 3–5; but focusing sharply on Hanoi-Haiphong and, especially, the Laos Trail.
Against this background we could go to work to stimulate VC-Saigon contacts, dialogue, and, ultimately, negotiation.
Now a word about the home front. At some stage the moment will come for you to speak again on Vietnam. The theme might be: We are all being tested by this crisis.
- —The Vietnamese by their desire to move towards constitutional government despite the war. We support this; but it will require great restraint and mutual accommodation, as democracy always requires. Our support can only be effective against the background of such restraint and mutual accommodation.
- —The Vietnamese military, ourselves, and other fighting allies: to maintain military unity and effectiveness in the face of a difficult, thoroughly professional form of aggression. Weʼre doing well. Pride should be expressed in U.S., as well as Korean, Australian, and Vietnamese forces.
- —The Vietnamese and ourselves in carrying forward the Honolulu program for the people, despite the war. Again the Vietnamese have a great responsibility to improve the quality and vigor of their administration.
- —Finally, the American people: we are being tested to understand the nature of the war; to understand the confusing but essentially constructive struggle of a democratic nation to be born; and, above all, by the fact the Communists are counting on us to despair and give up.
After such a statement we would need to follow up by a systematic campaign to make clear the constructive—if precarious—process of political development going forward in Vietnam. If our people really understood, I believe they would be quite tolerant of the birth pangs.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret.↩