Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

121. Paper Prepared by the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, April 14, 1966.

HEADINGS FOR DECISION AND ACTION: VIETNAM, APRIL 14, 1966

With the apparent sorting out of the political crisis in Vietnam, the following appear to be the headings under which we ought to consider our strategy for the next phase.

1. A high-level U.S. statement.

We should consider a statement which would express satisfaction at the forward movement toward constitutional democratic government; link that movement to Kyʼs January 15 speech and the Honolulu Declaration; but also indicate that our capacity to assist South Vietnam is dependent upon the demonstration of unity and responsibility in the widening circle of those who will now engage in politics, including the maintenance of order; the effective prosecution of the war; the vigorous prosecution of revolutionary development. The statement might include a passage suggesting that the historic problems which now confront South Vietnam in making a constitution and democratic political parties is like that which other nations have faced in their history, including the U.S. at the end of the 18th century, and many contemporary developing nations. It might be wise for the South Vietnamese, as they make arrangements suitable to their unique situation and history, to examine some of the successful experiences of developing nations in the contemporary world.

2. Bombing the North.

a. Was the Mu Gia pass operation sufficiently successful to make it a milk run?

b. Is this the time for oil?

3. Accelerating the campaign against main force units.

Is a step-up desirable and possible? When and how can we get the I Corps back fully into the game? Could the GVN in general do more?

4. Stabilization.

From all evidence, inflation is the most corrosive immediate factor on the domestic front. We need a vigorous and imaginative program urgently.

5. Revolutionary construction.

We need to accelerate the whole track on the principle of concentration of effort. Are we prepared to let the South Vietnamese put more of their manpower into all dimensions of pacification (including PAT teams and police) while we continue our build-up?

6. Vietnamese politics.

There are at least three major dimensions:

a. Intelligence.

As the political process widens out, we need to use all our resources in the cities and in the provinces (including military advisers, AID, etc.) to understand better the personalities and interests that will be reflected in the members of the constituent assembly. We should crank up a systematic effort which would yield us the same kind of knowledge of the local interests and personalities as we would for a U.S. national political convention.

b. Political education.

We must use every device that is not counter-productive to get the Vietnamese to examine other nationsʼ solutions to the constitutional and political party problems they now face. The notion of a junket for a group of representative leaders to Korea, Japan, Mexico, etc., should be now seriously considered. In addition, we might see if some part of the local press might be willing to run a series of articles for discussion on the constitutions and political party organization of such countries. Seminars in the universities might be helpful. What the Vietnamese need are their own Federalist Papers.

c. Constitution-making.

As in the case of Korea, we should try to get, in the most discreet way possible, some professional outside (preferably U.S.) experts to help.

7. Negotiation.

Following on from the appeal to the VC in the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique, we should consider whether, when, and how we might suggest to the government that they try to open a covert dialogue with the VC and perhaps, when the constitution and party-making process is firmed up, an open invitation to the VC to stop their terror attacks and join in making a democratic nation, including a willingness to have them take part in constitution-making. This would be a political warfare measure, unless there are some unexpected results from Saigon/VC contacts. Nevertheless, it might be useful to get some captured or defected VC into the constitution-making game.

WR

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Copies were sent to McNaughton, Komer, Carver, William Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers.