88. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 0
Secto 94. I made one hour call on Gromyko this morning with Harriman and Pushkin present.1 I started by asking Gromyko how he envisaged Laotian representation at conference. Gromyko said he saw two possible solutions. First was seating of coalition government if one “acceptable to all sides in Laos” could be formed prior to conference. If this not possible, alternative was seat representatives of “three existing forces” in Laos. These he described as Souvanna government, Pathet Lao and “rebels”. Gromyko added if we had any doubts about reality of Pathet Lao movement we had only to look at map.
I pointed out our understanding this was to be conference of governments. I observed Pathet Lao was merely military arm of a political party. I said we had no objection political parties themselves being heard if conference so desired. However, I was unaware of any invitation to Pathet Lao. I asked him to clarify this point.
[Page 192]Gromyko said that from outset of talks between co-chairmen he had made his position clear that unless coalition government formed before conference the “three existing forces” must be represented. He said we did not like Pathet Lao because we apparently considered left wing or Communist-oriented. However, “there can be no step forward” so long as we adhere to such ideological considerations. In response to my repeated questioning whether Pathet Lao had been invited to conference and if so by whom, Gromyko asserted there had been “understanding” among co-chairmen that “efforts should be made to ensure that representatives of existing forces be physically available in Geneva.” He had assumed each co-chairman would see to this. Soviets for their part had done so in arranging for Souvanna and Pathet Lao representatives to come. Question of neutral and independent Laos to which principle we all subscribed was political one to be resolved on tripartite basis mentioned.
I said we stood firmly for Laotian neutrality and independence but believed conference should not prejudice or instruct Lao on how to form government. We disagreed all Laos divided into three parts. Moreover it was not for us to decide or to intervene at conference in processes of forming government. Gromyko agreed conference should not interfere in internal affairs of Laos but insisted that understanding of Co-chairmen as to measures for providing Laotian representation was not interference. I said proposal for including Pathet Lao representation offered entirely new basis and we were not prepared to start conference on that basis. I reminded Gromyko Pathet Lao had not been seated at Geneva in 1954 but had been represented by Hanoi. Pushkin observed Pathet Lao were included in 1957 Vientiane agreements at which I noted that under those agreements they were supposed to disappear.
At this point Gromyko stated USSR wants to safeguard peace as he supposes does U.S. However, he had impression we were creating artificial difficulties on what Soviets regard as trifling matters since Pathet Lao after all were real Lao force, repeating again “as any glance at map will show”. I asked him why he was so insistent if matter was so unimportant and noted again this was first time we had heard of any invitation to Pathet Lao. Gromyko said we were evidently intimidated by Pathet Lao and asked whether we did not want to hear them. I said we had no objection to hearing them but they should not be regarded on same level as governments. I asked Gromyko whether Souvanna himself did not claim to speak for Pathet Lao. Gromyko replied Souvanna and Pathet Lao agree on many things but not on question of speaking for Pathet Lao at conference.
I then asked Gromyko how in absence of agreement on Pathet Lao he thought we might get conference started since we were all eager to begin. He did not see how this could be done without Pathet Lao. As [Page 193] final thought I suggested as possible solution that Laos not be seated but that individual Lao might state their views in any way co-chairmen agreed. For example they could be seated in balconies and be called upon if they wished to speak. Under some such arrangement any formal agreement on Laos seating would be unnecessary and conference could proceed.
However, Gromyko held flatly to position that conference could not begin without Laos representation. He said in absence of coalition government he was prepared open conference today without seating any Lao at table (since Phoumi group absent) on condition tripartite seating be adopted Monday. I said we ready to begin today only under conditions I had outlined. Gromyko refused to envisage anything but tripartite representation, and we closed on this point. I said we would consult further with others.
I communicated foregoing to Lord Home and Couve before lunch. Couve will see Gromyko at three p.m. and sound him out in particular on how he envisages coalition government. Lord Home seeing Chen Yi at five.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1361. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Vientiane, and Bangkok.↩
- A memorandum of conversation of this meeting between Rusk and Gromyko is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 and Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1868.↩