Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

84. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Oslo⁰

Washington, May 9, 1961, 10:45 p.m.

Tosec 34. Following is text of instructions for Geneva Conference on Laos approved today by the President:¹

• “1. That the Secretary proceed to Geneva and attend the Conference as the head of the US Delegation on the assumption that a cease-fire, verified by the ICC or other conditions satisfactory to us, will prevail by May 12. In the absence of such conditions, that the Secretary be authorized at his discretion to stay away from the opening meeting or to attend and request a suspension pending clarification of the situation in Laos. In the meantime the Secretary would have an opportunity to concert our policies with other friendly delegations.
• 2. That we continue to support the present government of Laos and press for its representation at the Conference. If this is impossible, that we accept an arrangement whereby the present government, the Souvanna group, and if necessary the Pathet Lao would participate as observers. If a coalition government with a dangerously large or influential Pathet Lao component seeks admission, as the RLG, the delegation will request new instructions.
• 3. That as an opening position the United States should propose a constructive package to assure a neutral, independent, peaceful, sovereign and socially and economically viable Laos. Such a program would avoid recriminations and discussion of the past while pointing to the future, not only for Laos but for Southeast Asia. It would include the following three points:

  A. A neutral, politically independent Laos with a firm international guarantee against external aggression.

  B. The establishment of Laos as a peace sanctuary with internal military forces reduced to that necessary for maintenance of internal security. This condition would be supervised and maintained by a Peace Preservation Commission of Neutrals, preferably with UN blessing, whose mission would be first, to insure the phased withdrawal of foreign military personnel and prevent the entry of new military personnel or equipment except the minimum required to train and equip an internal constabulary and, second, to prevent infiltration and subversion within Laos. The Commission would have terms of reference, personnel, equipment, and access to the country appropriate to its mission.

  C. The United States would invite the USSR and other interested missions to join it in underwriting the cost of an extensive technical and economic aid program for a neutral and independent Laos to be administered by a commission of neutral nations from the area.

• 4. If the Communists reject these proposals, as they probably will, the United States Delegation can consider four contingencies for which instructions would be requested:

  A. It can continue presenting our proposals at infrequent sessions for several months providing an acceptable cease-fire is maintained;

  B. It can seek to suspend the Conference on the basis of a de facto cease-fire while the principal political elements in Laos turn to the formation of a coalition government;

  C. It can seek to negotiate a compromise based on a federated or partitioned Laos;

  D. It can take the matter to the United Nations either before or after the Conference has adjourned; or

  E. It can leave the Conference on a clear issue of principle, or seek to have it brought to an end.

  These are not mutually exclusive. The combination of them will depend on circumstances. Our position on the ground in Laos is weak. We cannot enforce what we would like. The Communists will insist on getting a Communist-dominated coalition government. Therefore, it is recommended that we keep under constant advisement what military and political actions we should take in Laos, Thailand, and Free Viet-Nam to strengthen our hand or anticipate a break-up of the Conference.

• 5. It is recommended that we be prepared to have the Conference fail and be adjourned if we cannot reach some satisfactory agreement.

  With that possibility in mind, we should now consider plans by which, if necessary, the political and military position of the present government may be consolidated in southern Laos. It is possible that the Communists might accept such a de facto division.

  However, if the Communist forces, following the break-up of the Conference, should renew their offensive, we will face the ultimate decision: whether or not to introduce U.S. forces into this area through SEATO or with those SEATO members prepared to participate. Our military plans and preparations should be kept in a high state of readiness against this eventuality. To support this eventuality the MAAG in Laos should utilize the existing period of cease-fire to intensify its training and reorganization of the FAL.

• 6. It would not be in our interest to have elections held within Laos for at least a year. The crucial question that we will be faced with early in the Conference is who would head up a new Lao government and what would be the composition of a coalition government.

We should in the first instance have as our objective a government consisting of all of the principal political elements within Laos except those of the extreme right and extreme left with Souvanna Phouma as a member but not as the Prime Minister. If this does not prove feasible, as is likely, we may be confronted with the acceptance of a government headed by Souvanna Phouma and including at least two Pathet Lao ministers. After appropriate consultations have been held by the United States Delegation in the early stages of the Conference, the Delegation would be in a better position to make recommendations on this crucial point and to ask for instructions.”

Bowles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–961. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared in substance with Bowles. Repeated priority to Vientiane for Ambassador Brown and priority to Bangkok for Charge Unger.
1. Kennedy approved these instructions in the form of a memorandum from Rusk, undated. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office File, Countries, Laos Security, 5/2/61–6/30/61)