Office of the Historian

61. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy0

Washington, April 26, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Laos—Deteriorating Situation and Need for Critical Decisions

This is the backdrop for sending Ambassadors Harriman and Young to Laos:

1.
The military situation in Laos is becoming intolerable with the fall of Muong Sai and with Communist offensives continuing against key areas. They could result in the capture of Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Paksane, effective bisection of the country and control of the Mekong basin areas. This would seriously threaten Thailand and Vietnam.
2.
Politically, Souvanna and his Communist backers are calling for political talks to work out a coalition government before the 14-Nation Conference. The Royal Lao Government may be receptive to such a move.
3.
If these military and political trends are not reversed, the 14-Nation Conference may be little more than a Communist victory celebration.
4.
The Chinese Communists are taking an increasingly hard line, demanding in effect our expulsion from Laos as the price for a cease-fire, let alone a conference.
5.
It would appear that the U.S. has a choice between two difficult and unpleasant alternatives:
a.
To intervene militarily in Laos under Paragraph 5 to hold the territory now remaining under Royal Lao Government control. It must be recognized, however, that Peking has stated it will “not remain idle”; or
b.
To accept a political solution which will lead to a Souvanna government. He has aligned himself with Communist objectives which would turn us out of Laos and in time convert Laos into a Communist puppet.
6.
If we choose the first alternative we must make military preparations immediately, take urgent steps to prevent a political sell-out by the RLG, seek the cooperation of our allies, and develop a rationale which would justify our intervention.
7.
Should we decide on the second course of action, we should support negotiations with Souvanna to strike the best bargain possible.
8.
In any event, the threat to the security of Thailand and Free Vietnam will be great. In order to bolster their position we must be prepared to give them public and binding assurances coupled with additional economic and military assistance to demonstrate our resolve.
9.
In either course of action we can enhance our moral and political position by getting the UN Security Council to call for the cease-fire we have been unable to get otherwise. At the most, this would bring world pressure on the Communists as they pursue a military solution in Laos; at the least, such UN action would help justify the SEATO response to the Communist offensive, and broaden support for our military actions there.

[Page 142]

Recommendations

a.
I recommend that Ambassador Harriman be instructed to give the King and Royal Government of Laos the assurances of support based on 5a above as suggested in the attached letter for your signature.1
b.
I recommend that Ambassador Harriman give Thailand and Vietnam general assurances along lines of paragraph 8 above.
Chester Bowles2
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2661. Secret.↩
  2. Not found attached.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩