Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

50. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM–232–61

Washington, April 11, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Laos (U)

1. On 28 March 1961, Lieutenant General T.J.H. Trapnell¹ submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report together with nine recommendations on the situation in Laos.² These recommendations are:

a. Bomb Plaine des Jarres.

b. Provision and use of reserve.

c. Convert PEO to MAAG.

d. Put US advisors down to FAL battalion level and integrate additional Thai and Philippine personnel into advisory group.

e. Provide armed helicopters.

f. Place PEO advisors with key staff counterpart in FAL GHQ, particularly in logistics positions.

g. Provide PEO an organic intelligence production and counter-intelligence capability.

h. Authorize support for nine additional FAL battalions.

i. Establish JUWTF for unconventional warfare and psychological warfare campaign.

2. On 31 March 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 a and c above, and by memorandum requested the Secretary of Defense to take action deemed appropriate. The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 b and f above, were referred to CINCPAC for appropriate action, with advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of action taken and of requirements for further assistance in such action. The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 d, e, g, h and i above, were referred to CINCPAC for comment and recommendation.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received and considered the comments of CINCPAC on the recommendations referred to him for comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the Trapnell recommendations subject to the following considerations:

a. Put US advisors down to FAL battalion level and integrate additional Thai and Philippine personnel into advisory group. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the Chief, Programs Evaluation Office, Laos, is placing US advisory personnel at battalion level and that the Minister of Defense, Royal Laos Government, has agreed. However, Royal Laos Army (FAL) commanders in the field resist US advisors because of reluctance to have US advisors observe their shortcomings.

b. Provide armed helicopters.

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the present maximum potential to be gained from the helicopters now in Laos is their use as utility aircraft and that the development of armed helicopters in an armed reconnaissance and suppressive fires role is still in an experimental stage. For this reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the current limited capabilities in this field should not be used indiscriminately but only by trained personnel using sound tactics. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the provision of armed helicopters to the FAL would provide a basis for further evaluation of the entire concept by its employment in an operational environment.

(2) Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense authorize the utilization of up to six US Army armed helicopters, crews to be furnished in the same manner as the B–26 crews, if requested by CINCPAC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will furnish you CINCPAC’s views on this subject.

c. Provide PEO an organic intelligence production and counter-intelligence capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit appropriate and timely recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in line with the developing situation.

d. Authorize support for nine additional FAL battalions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that on 30 March 1961, the RLG Minister for National Security requested an increase in the FAL troop ceiling for six special battalions, one parachute battalion, replacements undergoing training, and service troops. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also note that, for the most part, these forces are now in being. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense authorize additional MAP support for an increase in FAL personnel of 5936, broken down as follows:

• 6 infantry battalions (2520)
• 1 parachute battalion (800)
• Replacements undergoing training (1654)
• Service troops (982)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also request that Defense Support funds be provided in the amount of $652,000 for the pay of these forces for the months of May and June.

c. Establish JUWTF for unconventional warfare and psychological warfare campaign. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that this recommendation has long-range aspects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit appropriate and timely recommendations on this subject separately.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that CINCPAC has taken appropriate action to implement the recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 b and f above. However, with respect to subparagraph 1 b, General Trapnell envisions that two Thai regiments be provided as a reserve for Royal Lao Government forces to be employed promptly should the military situation in Laos deteriorate drastically and suddenly. CINCPAC considers that establishment of such a reserve, which might have to be committed prior to implementation of the SEATO Plan for Laos and the arrival of US forces, requires further political consultation with the Royal Lao Government. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense take appropriate action to obtain the approval of the Royal Thai Government to establish such an immediately ready reserve of two Thai regiments for the contingency postulated.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer³

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 63 A 2382, 092 Laos 1961, April-May. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. On March 14, Lemnitzer instructed Trapnell to visit Southeast Asia to appraise the U.S. plan for the recapture of the Plaine des Jarres, examine the extent to which Phoumi had put his best officers in forward combat areas, and to appraise relationships among Ambassador Brown, Admiral Felt, General Boyle, and Phoumi and determine if Brown’s influence was positive or negative. Trapnell was ordered to return on about March 25. (Memorandum from Lemnitzer to Trapnell (CM–133–61), March 14; ibid., Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Laos No. 1)
2. A copy of the Trapnell Report, March 28, is an enclosure to a memorandum from Lemnitzer to McNamara (JCSM–206–61), March 31. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 092 Laos 1961, January to March)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.