Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

449. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Paris⁰

Washington, April 8, 1963, 9:13 p.m.

Tosec 16. To be delivered to the Secretary by 8 a.m. Following is wrap-up on Laos requested by Secretary:

Situation

Military situation remains very confused but it is fairly certain that Xieng Khouang ville and possibly Khang Khay have been seized by dissidents backed by PL with at least psychological and possibly material support from VM located in area.¹ Kong Le seems still in control over the main PDJ airfield and roads leading to it. Ultimate communist intentions are not discernible now but Kong Le himself feels that entire PDJ is menaced and that he may not be able hold.

In Vientiane situation also tense but Quinim cremation went off safely despite apparently serious possibilities of violence. In funeral oration Souvanna made solemn appeal for unity. Fact Souvanna asked ICC to establish presence on PDJ became public but Souphanouvong has reportedly opposed. We have no reports yet on action ICC intends. Souvanna also saw Soviet and British ambs and requested intercession their govts with NVN and PL to withdraw VM cadres and stop PL attacks. (As of 1900 Washington time April 8 these appeals to co-Chairman not yet publicized and although he did so privately with UK and Soviet ambs Souvanna has not publicly put blame for fighting on communist side.)

Steps US taking

FYI Only. On military side US has encouraged FAR and Meo ADCs to move so as to be in better position to assist Kong Le or provide him with withdrawal route and we are indirectly supplying neutralist forces with emergency materiel by various means. However we are not encouraging aggressive action by FAR or Meo unless such action would specifically assist survival Kong Le since we wish avoid escalation. End FYI.

Unger has been urging Souvanna to: a) seek ICC presence on PDJ, b) make appeal to co-Chairmen, c) give KL open public support and place blame for fighting on communist side, d) make trip to PDJ himself or with Souphanouvong. Unger has also been instructed to work with British and French to develop specific means where Soviet amb could engage himself in PDJ situation.

Thompson saw Dobrynin April 6 and stressed our concern over situation.²

Suggested talking points

1. Situation is most serious since Agreements went into effect since communist attacks if unchecked could mean destruction of center force on which balanced coalition depends.

2. However, recourse to Geneva machinery can restore situation if all parties concerned act positively in accordance their obligations under Agreements.

3. Therefore reactions of communist side provides real test of their intentions towards Geneva Agreements and peace in area.

4. If the communist side fails to act so that peace is restored and the neutralist force preserved, the neutral solution for Laos will collapse with obvious grave consequences for us all.

Dept press

Linc White said following in answer to question PDJ situation: “Our information is that the Kong Le neutralist forces have been attacked by the pro-communist Pathet Lao, and there are indications that they are supported by some Viet Minh military personnel. We have no detailed information on how serious the fighting is in the Plain of Jars.

The fighting now going on not only appears to be a serious violation of the cease-fire, but if it continues will endanger the implementation of the Geneva Accords with all the dire consequences that such a breakdown will mean for Laos. In these circumstances, we consider it incumbent on the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Accords and the ICC to take prompt and effective action to stop the fighting which has been instigated by the pro-communist Pathet Lao, and to ensure that the cease-fire is restored. Such action is essential in order to preserve the independence and neutrality of Laos.”³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 Laos. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Lloyd in S/S, and approved by Koren. Rusk was attending the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the SEATO Council, April 8–10. Additional documentation is in volume XXIII.
1. According to telegram 1400 from Vientiane, April 8, the Embassy concluded that the Pathet Lao, using dissident neutralists as a front and North Vietnamese as psychological support, were bent on overtaking Kong Le’s military positions one by one. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos)
2. Memorandum of conversation, April 6. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, 1961–1964, Special US-USSR File, 1963)
3. The source text is unsigned.