432. Memorandum From Michael V.
Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to
President Kennedy0
Washington,
November 8,
1962.
REPORT ON LAOS AND THAILAND
At 4 p.m. today the following officials will assemble in the Cabinet Room
to give you a report on the current situation in Laos and Thailand:1 Secretary
McNamara, Mr. William Bundy (Defense); Governor
Harriman, Mr. Koren, Mr. Sullivan (State); Mr. Janow, Mr. Fowler (AID); General Clay (JCS); Mr. Ray Cline, Mr.
Hepworth (CIA).2 The Report will include the
following topics.
I. Laos
- (a)
- The current political situation between the three factions. The
status of the economy. Progress towards demobilization and
integration. Prospects for the future (Harriman and Janow).
- (b)
- Current intelligence estimates. Continued Viet Minh presence in
Laos and utilization of the corridor. Intelligence estimates of the
future Soviet and Viet Minh intentions (Cline).
- (c)
- Diplomatic and economic moves by the U.S. presently under way or
contemplated in light of the above (Harriman and Janow).
- (d)
- The status of current U.S. military plans (General Clay).
II. Thailand
- (a)
- Report on current political situation in Thailand including talks
with Marshal Sarit on the
withdrawal of certain military units and on the economic and
military aid programs (Harriman, Janow and Bundy).
- (b)
- Current intelligence on political situation in Thailand and
evidence, if any, of Communist penetration in the north (Mr.
Cline).
[Page 912]
[Attachment]
Talking Paper on Laos for Meeting with the President on November
83
I. Lao Political
Situation
- 1.
- Our policies have been designed to forward the neutral
solution involving a unified Laos if that proves at all
possible. However, we are also working to ensure that if this is
unsuccessful the failure will: (a) be clearly ascribable to the
Communists, (b) find Souvanna and the other non-Communists on the
same side, and (c) that this side will have strength enough to
hold its own in a partition.
- 2.
- There has been no real progress towards the unification of
Laos nor on the demobilization and integration of forces. In
fact, Souvanna publicly
expressed his discouragement November 7 and said that he would
resign unless there was progress soon in solving the problems of
civil and military unification. Meanwhile many of Souvanna’s
neutralist supporters are known to be maneuvering behind his
back (e.g. Quinim is
staying in PDJ to await
Souphanouvong);
neutralist forces in Phong Saly have split dangerously and
friction between Kong Le
and PL forces in PDJ is steadily growing.
- 3.
- There has been some evidence of cooperation between Phoumi and Souvanna who in several recent
instances supported each other against the PL. However, the arrest on November
5 of four KL officers (two of whom were on Souvanna’s personal
staff) by Phoumi’s right-hand military commander has revived old
animosities and probably destroyed chances of bringing KL and
Phoumi together in the
immediate future at least. Phoumi has also been borrowing freely from the
Treasury and there are reports of graft among his group.
- 4.
- Steps to bolster non-Communist elements:
- (a)
- providing follow-on spares, POL and some transport
facilities to Phoumi’s forces;
- (b)
- exerting careful pressure on Phoumi to demobilize the
FAR down to a
manageable size of around 40,000 and to strengthen the
political base of the FAR by civic action programs;
- (c)
- encourage French military presence to fill the gap
left by the departure of the MAAG (Phoumi is proving particularly
obstructive). The French military mission is in touch
with Kong Le which
we hope can lead to a satisfactory working relationship
with the neutralist forces;
- (d)
- making arrangements to assist some of the military
forces loyal to Souvanna at his request;
- (e)
- continuing our relief and non-military supply activity
with the Meo. (The PL are
running a continuing campaign against Air America
operations.)
II. International Political
Situation
- 1.
- The major international problem remains that of a continued
VM presence and the use of
Laos as a corridor to SVN.
- 2.
- We are encouraging activity by the Lao themselves to
investigate VM presence and to
press for their removal.
- 3.
- We are encouraging tougher stands against the PL by Souvanna.
- 4.
- We are encouraging ICC
investigations, none of which have yet taken place.
- 5.
- Stepping up our propaganda on Communist violations of the
Geneva Agreements.
- 6.
- If pressures by Souvanna and the ICC fail to bring about the withdrawal of the Viet
Minh, it will be time to consider high level approach to the
Soviets. Timing and nature of this approach will depend on other
aspects of the international situation and its success, if made,
would be directly related to the current struggle for leadership
in the Communist world.
III. Economic
- 1.
- Unger is now in
position to negotiate an economic assistance program with
Souvanna, including amounts. He will coordinate his presentation
with French and British.
- 2.
- Proposed U.S. import program
- $15 million commodities
- $5 million cash grant to purchase kip
- plus cash grants as needed to maintain and demobilize
FAR. Unger has not yet used
the $2 million cash grant authority given him in
September; but can be expected to use it fairly
soon.
- 3.
- Project assistance
- (a)
- Rural development
- (b)
- Teacher training
- (c)
- Refugee relief and resettlement
- (d)
-
Nam Cadinh road to be build over two years at a
cost of $8.5 million from FY 1960 funds
$13 million total
- 4.
- Third Country aid
The British have agreed to finance $3 million of commodities and
services annually for the next three years. We have not yet had a
definitive
[Page 914]
French
commitment but we believe it is likely that they will probably make
about $3 million available to meet foreign exchange
requirements.
