On return from a White House meeting on Laos/Thailand in which the
Departmental principals met with the President, General Taylor indicated the following
decisions were reached:
[Attachment]
2
Paper Prepared in the Department of State
I) Progress towards resumption of
three-Prince negotiations
A) Timing of Meeting
Phoumi has agreed to attend a three-Prince meeting at the Plaine des
Jarres if Souvanna sees the
King first, which Souvanna
says he will do. Souvanna is
reported planning to leave Rangoon for Khang Khay on May 25 and
presumably will see the King in Luang Prabang within a few days
thereafter. Meanwhile Boun
Oum and Phoumi
are going to Manila from May 28 through May 30. Souphanouvong and Nouhak of the
PL are reported as being absent
from Khang Khay. Thus the timing of the meeting is uncertain.
B) Conditions for Meeting
Phoumi has agreed to give Souvanna the ministries of Defense and Interior
provided that all important decisions to be unanimous among the
three factions and that military forces will remain intact pending
an
[Page 792]
agreement on
integration. The RLG has also reaffirmed its adherence to the
Zurich, Ban Hin Heup and Geneva agreements of the three princes.
Phoumi will not make the
restoration of Nam Tha a condition for further tripartite
discussion. Thus there do not appear to be any obstacles on the RLG
side to the next meeting.
II) Broadening of Political Base
of the RLG
Brown has pointed out to all
the leading Lao political figures that we have completely lost
confidence in Phoumi as result
of Nam Tha and its aftermath. He has suggested to all concerned that
Phoumi should devote his
time to military affairs. The Lao have also been told in Washington
and Vientiane that Boun Oum
should strengthen the government by bringing in the wisest advisors
available to assist him on the political side of the
negotiations.
Brown has broached the idea of
Phoui entering the
government to Phoui directly
and to others. Phoui expressed
interest but did not wish to push the reorganization of the RLG
himself or have it initiated prior to next three-prince meeting.
General Tucker is endeavoring to bring about a strengthening of the
officer corps of the FAR end is
introducing measures which if carried through will make the FAR more amenable to MAAG advice and control.
Sarit, when reassured that
we were not aiming at the elimination of Phoumi or wholesale revamping of the RLG, undertook
personally to urge Phoumi to
cooperate fully with General Tucker and Ambassador Brown.
Although no changes in the RLG have thus far occurred, our efforts
have caused widespread ferment among Phoumi and his followers and have undoubtedly
reduced Phoumi’s ability to obstruct further negotiations.
III) United States planning for
the period following the formation of a government of national
union, including the role expected of the FAR; and the status of planning for
other contingencies, such as a breakdown of negotiations or of
the cease-fire.
The recent action stationing United States forces in Thailand has
given our planning for Laos a new background against which to build.
We believe that the presence of these forces and the demonstration
of United States ability to move such forces rapidly provide
material assistance to the sort of plans which we contemplate. We
would expect at least some of these forces to remain in Thailand
until satisfactory progress is made in the establishment of a new
government, the withdrawal of foreign military forces, and the
integration-demobilization process for the Lao forces.
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Essentially our post-Treaty planning for Laos involves four stages:
- A)
- A carefully phased withdrawal of United States military
assistance forces from Laos step by step with our
satisfaction concerning the departure of Viet Minh forces
from Laos.
- B)
- An interim period (of indeterminate duration) during which
there would be a “soft partition” of Laos under the
provisional government, with the FAR retaining its integrity and its control
over the areas now in friendly hands and the Pathet Lao
similarly holding territory now in their control.
- C)
- Steps toward integration of the armed forces on a pro rata
basis and demobilization only when we are satisfied Pathet
Lao have similarly demobilized.
- D)
- Elections should be held only when we feel we have
assurances that non-Communist elements in Laos have
consolidated their political and administrative positions
adequately to dominate the Communist minority.
Planning for each of these steps is as follows:
- A)
- Armed forces departure
- 1)
- Providing maximum equipment and mobility to ICC in order supervise
Viet Minh withdrawals.
- 2)
- Relying, however, primarily on our own
intelligence which we would conduct in cooperation
with the Thai. To this end we have “stay behind”
plans for both Meo and Kha units to operate
clandestinely in Laos and provide intelligence
screened through points in Thailand.
- B)
- “Soft Partition”
- 1)
- Stimulation of “troika” concept for interim
Defense and Interior arrangements.
- 2)
- Efforts to improve capabilities of FAR (see B–2 under
military).
- 3)
- Effort to obtain high calibre French military
trainers.
- 4)
- Stockpile arrangements in Thailand for FAR which can be
transposed into Lao depots.
- 5)
- Planning re financial assistance which would
assure continued FAR
payroll.
- C)
- Integration and Demobilization
- 1)
- Understandings with Souvanna re the steps he will take to
end the use of Laos as Viet Cong corridor
(particular reference to elimination of Tchepore
operation).
- 2)
- Understandings with Souvanna re steps to be taken to
create a military force loyal to him and his
government (particular reference to the role
envisaged for Kong
Le forces).
- D)
- Non-Communist Political Control
- 1)
- Diplomatic efforts to assure appropriate
distribution of portfolios in provisional
cabinet.
- 2)
- Efforts to introduce more responsible elements
into RLG in order provide cooperative non-Communist
political basis.
- 3)
- Assistance, together with British and French, to
help Souvanna
maintain political independence from
Communists.
- 4)
- Cataloging all competent non-Communist leaders and
potential leaders as “talent pool.”
- 5)
- Plans for economic assistance on bilateral basis
with the new Souvanna government.
- 6)
- Encouragement of UN
Technical Assistance group to remain quietly on
scene and plan for expansion.
In consequence of the recent cease-fire breakdown at Nam Tha and the
altered circumstances resulting from the stationing of United States
forces in Thailand, an inter-departmental group has been reviewing
and revising contingency plans. The first drafts of these revised
plans will be completed May 25.3 Essentially they cover the following
contingencies:
- A)
- A prolonged stalemate resulting from Communist
intransigence with increased Communist subversion, but no
significant cease-fire violations.
- B)
- Cumulative cease-fire violations of a nibbling variety
patently designed to destroy the territorial basis of the
RLG, and
- C)
- A massive Communist rapture of the cease-fire with the
intention of conquering Laos by military means.
Planning against these contingencies consists of a spectrum of
integrated political-military acts, including:
- A)
- Military assistance of the type now rendered
Viet-Nam.
- B)
- United States and SEATO
military intervention for the purpose of reinforcing the
cease-fire but continuing the political negotiations. (This
would envisage stationing United States forces in Laos but
avoiding combat with Communist forces.)
- C)
- United States and SEATO
military intervention in Laos with combat forces having a
mission of clearing Communist elements from those areas of
Laos considered strategically important to our interest and
to the interest of our allies in Southeast Asia.
All of these contingent plans will be backed up by a Special National
Intelligence Estimate examining the probable Communist reactions to
the execution of each U.S. and SEATO action. This SNIE has been through two drafts and has received
preliminary consideration by the United States Intelligence Board on
May 23.4 Final action on its is expected May
30.