363. Memorandum of Discussion With Former President Eisenhower0
May 13, 1962.
Participated in by McCone, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
The essential views and conclusions of President Eisenhower reached after an extended discussion of the existing situation in Laos, Vietnam and Thailand and the proposed political and military steps to be taken, all of which are reviewed hereafter, follows:
- 1.
- President Eisenhower stated categorically that if Laos was lost, South Vietnam and Thailand would ultimately go because they would be outflanked. All Southeast Asia would be lost, and Indonesia would follow and the world would be divided. He therefore places the greatest importance on the maintenance of Laos.
- 2.
- The most important to “strengthen the shoulders of Laos” by dynamic action in South Vietnam and Thailand. He approved the placing of Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force units in Thailand as a means of encouraging the Thais to rise to their own defense. The South Vietnam actions as outlined by Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer were considered constructive and hopeful by President Eisenhower.1
- 3.
- Strengthened South Vietnam and Thailand could result in pressure on Laos which might make possible the rolling back of the Viet Cong and Viet Minh either from outside action by South Vietnamese and Thais or by a properly led RLG force reorganized and with improved morale and determination as a result of the favorable trends in their neighbor states.
- 4.
- Every effort should be made to partition Laos by an East-West line dividing Laos into North and South areas. Conceivably a line might run diagonally from the South Vietnamese border at a point north of the 17th parallel to the Thailand border at a point as northerly as possible, thereby securing all of South Vietnam and as much of Thailand as possible from being outflanked by Communist force.
- 5.
- If such a division is to be attempted by negotiation through the “Troika” plan then we must recognize that the negotiating position at the moment is very weak and can only be strengthened by shows of action on our part in Thailand and South Vietnam and by not disclosing under any circumstance our true intentions in Laos (that is whether we will or will not commit U.S. Forces). In other words, we must evidence willingness to supply a deterrent to improve our negotiating position.
- 6.
- President Eisenhower now understands the complexity of the situation, the difficulties we have encountered with Phoumi, the extent of the Communist penetration of Laos and the alternative courses of action open to us. He indicated both his support of a dynamic effort and a willingness to try to influence political leadership of his party from entering into public debate on the question.
- 7.
- Although President Eisenhower did not mention it today, I am sure he had in mind the importance of some type of a joint resolution of a type he mentioned to me on Thursday evening.2 Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of our “being invited” by the recognized Governments in Thailand and South Vietnam to participate in their defense, reciting in detail his own experience in Lebanon. Also, he urged we avoid establishment of any line which provides the enemy with a “sanctuary,” reciting his experience with the Yalu in the Korean war.
- 8.
- President Eisenhower made it quite clear he would not at this time privately or publicly urge moving U.S. combat troops into Laos.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/10/62–5/16/62. Secret; Eyes Only. The time and place of the meeting are not indicated on the source text. A notation on the source text indicates that the original went to the President.↩
- See vol. II, pp. 379–387.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 355.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩