Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

359. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)⁰

Washington, May 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Three-Phase Contingency Plan for Laos

I submit for your consideration a three-phase contingency plan to guide our further actions.

• —It is a graduated plan, designed both to buttress our effort to achieve international agreement and a government of national union, and to prevent communist military takeover of Laos.
• —It is non-provocative in that it proposes no action against communist-held territory.
• —It involves only the minimum US military action necessary to restore an effective deterrent.

Phase I

A. Purpose.

All the moves comprising Phase I are now underway. In this phase our purpose is political—to signal to the communists the double message (1) that we do intend to prevent a takeover of Laos by military means; and (2) that we do not intend to encroach on communist territory. Our moves are designed to give the communists pause in their pursuit of military gains and at the same time to give them no reason for the kind of fear that would lead them to escalation. Simultaneously we prepare the ground for negotiations on a government of national union.

B. Moves.

1. Diplomatic

• —Letter from President to Khrushchev
• —Acting Secretary to Dobrynin
• —Ambassador Thompson to Gromyko
• —UK (as co-chairman) to Gromyko
• —UK (MacDonald) to Souvanna/PL side at Khang Khay

2. Military

• —Seventh Fleet element to Gulf of Siam
• —US Battle Group remaining in Thailand

3. Lao Government Formation

• —Souvanna to return to negotiate
• —Phoumi to negotiate realistically

4. Denigrating Phoumi

• —Series of moves designed to reduce Phoumi’s influence and prominence so as to make it unmistakable to Laos and the world that US actions are designed to support the people and government of Laos and are in no sense a vindication of Phoumi.
• —Such moves would also tend to reinforce Phoumi’s apparently increasing willingness to negotiate realistically.
• —They would further prepare ground for replacement of Phoumi should that become necessary.

5. Domestic

• —Background press conferences reiterating goal of cease-fire and negotiated settlement.
• —Congressional briefings along similar lines.
• —In later stages, groundwork for Phase II.

C. Prospects.

These moves may accomplish our purpose: to stop communist military gains and get the negotiations going again for a government of national union. With luck we have four or five days to see if these moves achieve results. We will also be scrutinizing intelligence indications for signs that the tempo should be stepped up.

Phase II

A. Purpose.

Our purpose in Phase II is still political—as it was in Phase I. But failure to obtain a cease-fire as a result of Phase I and the necessity of prepositioning forces for possible intervention in Laos under Phase III will require greater emphasis on specific improvement in our military capabilities in the immediate area. Moves required to this end are likely to engender corresponding communist moves. To reduce the risks of escalation, our purpose must be clearly conveyed to the communists, and the forces placed along the Thai border—particularly US forces—must be no more than what is compatible with an intervention in defense of RLG positions. The plan calls for cool nerves and both austerity and restraint on the part of the military.

B. Moves.

1. Diplomatic

• —Tell the USSR our intent: to halt the fighting and get the negotiations going, but not to threaten the communist-held position.
• —Make this clear to other countries, especially neutrals, that would be flustered by military moves.

2. Military

• —Move US Battle Group from Korat area to Nongkhai, opposite Vientiane. (Politically important to commit US forces to hold capital, if necessary.)
• —Move Thai units to key border points in position to enter Lao territory, and intermediary points as militarily feasible. (Each such unit should be just strong enough to occupy and hold relevant RLG territory in Laos if actual intervention becomes necessary and we move into Phase III, but obviously insufficient to take over Northern Laos and North Vietnam.)
  • Chong Mek (opposite Pakse)
  • Mukdaharn (opposite Savannakhet)
  • Nongkhai (opposite Vientiane)
  • Feasible points on periphery of Sayaboury Province
  • Points along border east of Chiengkham
  • Chiengkong (opposite Ben Houei Sai; strengthen existing unit)
  • Chiengsaen (near Burma/Thai/Lao border; strengthen unit now being positioned there)

3. Lao Government Formation

• —Bolster Souvanna, deflate Phoumi, to end of achieving workable balance in government of national union.
• —Encourage reorganization of RLG to reduce strength of anti-Souvanna element.

4. Handling Phoumi

• —Strengthen MAAG influence in directing FAR by refusing requests for assistance unless Phoumi accepts and implements US advice.
• —Unless Phoumi demonstrates a radical change in attitude, proceed with his replacement, in consultation with the Thais. By this time, the Thais will probably be so much with us that we might well be able to let them handle the elimination problem by themselves, with appropriate oriental finesse.

5. Domestic

• —In the early stages, proceed to develop political and public support for Phase III, should it become necessary.
• —In the latter stages, develop appropriate bipartisan political support for the introduction of American forces into Laos for the purpose of enforcing an effective cease-fire—for example, by means of Congressional action similar to the Formosa Resolution.

C. Prospects.

We believe that these additional steps should make crystal clear to the communists our determination not to permit a military takeover of the territory remaining under the jurisdiction of the RLG and at the same time minimize the risks of escalation by avoiding a threat to communist-held territory. A cease-fire would, in our judgment, be the actual result, despite bloc denunciation of our “aggressive” actions and intentions. This would permit further efforts toward the formation of the government of national union. Because we would not, at this stage, introduce military forces into Laos, we do not think the communists would feel compelled to do more than make comparable preparatory moves on their part. However, if communist military encroachment continued on the ground in Laos and the situation deteriorated significantly, we would move to Phase III.

Phase III

A. Purpose.

Our purpose in Phase III still remains political, but the military element becomes more prominent and the risks greater. The immediate problem is achievement of a cease-fire and an end to communist military advances. At this stage the introduction of US/Thai troops into Laos is the only feasible way of stabilizing the situation. This action will undoubtedly lead the communists to take comparable action on their part. To keep risk of further escalation within bounds, it will be essential to make clear to all—including our own personnel within Laos—the limited military purpose of our intervention (to secure RLG territory, not to attempt to recapture communist territory) and our ultimate political aim of achieving the negotiated formation of a government of national union. Here again the task requires extreme self-discipline and steady nerves.

B. Moves.

1. Diplomatic

• —Again notify USSR of our intentions, underscoring the limited military purpose of our moves.
• —Make same point to other governments likely to be most flustered (neutrals, Japan) by fear of escalation.

2. Military

• —Move US Battle Group from Nongkhai to Vientiane. (This would be necessary both for political reasons cited above and to ensure Thai willingness to move forces into Laos.)
• —Thai units already prepositioned along Mekong would cross into Laos and proceed to the RLG line of contact with KL/PL forces extending from Attopeu to point on the Mekong south of Ban Houei Sai where the Mekong departs from Thai-Lao border (roughly at river bend at Ban Pak Hop). Thai forces would not move into territory controlled by KL/PL. (They would not advance toward or attempt to capture Tchepone.)
• —JUSMAG advisers would accompany Thai units to which they are attached.
• —RTAF would provide tactical air support and reconnaissance to the advancing RTA units but would not attack enemy positions.
• —Both to meet probable Thai position and to enhance deterrent, additional US air elements would be introduced into Thailand and some of them positioned toward Lao border to back up Thai air operations if necessary.
• —Neither on ground nor in air would forces entering Laos initiate action. Some combat would be inevitable in areas (e.g., Attopeu, Saravane) which are RLG outposts.
• —Additional US ground forces would be introduced to Thailand as backup and some might be sent to Lao areas where Thai forces need reassurance. Marines from 7th Fleet would be airlifted to Korat or Udorn. Elements of First Special Forces Group from Okinawa might also be introduced.
• —Steps would be taken to reorganize the FAR and develop a counter-insurgency capacity to deal with PL/DRV pockets and infiltration tactics; with proper leadership and secure bases provided by Thai and US units there is no reason such capacity could not be developed expeditiously.
• —Counter-insurgency capacity might be enhanced by airlifting some Meo elements to RLG territory.

3. Lao Government Reorganization

• —By this stage, Phoumi would probably have been eliminated and the government substantially reorganized. Further steps would depend on the situation at the time.
• —Presumably Souvanna would by this time have been squeezed out, but if he had survived, he might be useful in providing at the minimum a coalition “umbrella” over a de facto partition and at the maximum the foundation for a true government of national union.

C. Prospects.

If our purpose is made clear and our actions do not belie it, we believe that our intervention to hold RLG territory would probably result in an effective cease-fire and a de facto partition. We think it certain that the DRV would introduce additional forces overtly into Laos and it is likely that Chinese Communist “volunteers” would also appear on the scene, at least in northern Laos. The development of Chinese Communist tactical air support capabilities in the DRV and even northern Laos is also possible. However, we believe the communist purpose is likely to be no more than ours—to prevent the loss of controlled territory. Their fear of war spreading beyond Laos would have risen sharply and we believe they would carefully phrase their response to the level of our initiative. Thus they would almost certainly prefer not to initiate offensive military actions—particularly against US or Thai troops—in order to avoid escalation on our side. For the same reason, the communists would probably not attempt direct action against Thailand. They could be expected, however, to try to expand their hold on areas not under direct US-Thai control and to carry out guerrilla harassing of our forces (we also believe the FAR, suitably trained and led, could successfully cope with guerrilla action).

If Phase III does in fact become necessary, the risk of escalation is considerably higher. If the plan is carefully and professionally implemented, however, there should be a minimum of fighting and few casualties. The bulk of the American people will as a consequence be both relieved and gratified, as will most of our allies and other Asian nations although for different reasons. The major domestic problem will be with the chest-beaters on the right, although their call for greater belligerency will be undercut by the double success in stabilizing Southeast Asia and minimizing casualties.

If Phase III does not work as intended and a limited war ensues, the nation will close ranks initially. But the longer the war lasts, the higher frustrations will mount. The most effective move would be an early negotiated settlement, before either casualties or frustrations get out of hand.

Conclusions

A war in Laos is not “winnable” in the sense of recapturing communist areas. But some such set of moves as those described above that are designed to strike a precise balance which does not threaten territory held by their side or fail to protect territory held by ours seems to hold the most promise.

At best our objective of a peaceful neutralization of Laos will be one with relatively little effort. If de facto partition is the outcome we must be prepared for US forces to remain on guard duty for many years. If—as we do not believe likely—the communists escalate, we will probably face a limited war or conceivably a larger, even nuclear, war.

But we estimate the chances of these dire eventualities as very low. At each stage the likelihood of an effective cease-fire and a de facto partition would probably increase. At the same time, the chances of a true government of national union would probably diminish. An “umbrella” coalition over a de facto partition, on the other hand, would remain possible—and, in any event, the international political costs would be minimized by our continued public insistence on a negotiated settlement and by our military restraint.

One final point remains. The stakes in Laos are not Laos alone. A communist Laos will immediately step up the tempo of fighting in South Vietnam. And it will move Thailand smartly up to the top of the communist agenda. On the other hand, either a true government of national union, or a de facto partition enforced by American troops on guard duty will go far to stabilize not only Laos, but the whole of Southeast Asia.

The job yet to be done in Asia may not be completely impossible with the southeast salient under attack, but it is far more difficult. A stabilized balance of power in Southeast Asia would give us time not only there but in the north and south as well. The gain may well be worth the risk.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.51/5–1562. Top Secret. The Deputy Director of INR, Thomas Hughes, sent this memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Cleveland under cover of a May 15 memorandum. Hughes stated that “while the paper has served as the basis for the important discussions at the White House in the last few days, it should not be assumed that all the contingencies mentioned in the paper are now being planned for.”