313. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State2

1450. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary from Harriman.

On arrival here I find that despite flat assurances Phoumi previously gave Forrestal and Sullivan re his willingness meet with Sarit and me in Bangkok, he now definitely refuses come here. In reflecting on Phoumi’s motivations I am impressed by having read in a memorandum of the conversation between Phoumi and Forrestal/Sullivan3 that Phoumi frankly admitted his policy was designed to discourage Souvanna and cause him to leave Laos and return to Paris.

Thus little value my repeating to Sarit and Phoumi what has already been told them by Admiral Felt, namely that US will not give Phoumi military support should cease-fire break down. Purpose my talks with Sarit and Phoumi is persuade latter begin negotiations with Souvanna in good faith. Therefore if I do talk to Phoumi I must be in [Page 663] position to twist his arm to point recommended by Ambassador Brown of withholding military supplies as discussed in reftel 1449.0

Will see Sarit tomorrow morning in attempt enlist his active support. I don’t wish become involved any program seeing Phoumi jointly with Sarit unless I have prior satisfactory understanding with Sarit. We might be able work out some compromise which would involve my going Vientiane for purpose seeing King, thus saving Phoumi’s face but still retaining essential elements of dignity for US Govt.

Vital element in this picture is to keep Souvanna from throwing in his hand. Unanimous opinion here is that, unless Phoumi appears to begin negotiations some positive action must be taken give Souvanna sufficient evidence of our seriousness and good faith.

Feel Dept quite right in Deptel 14091 that Phoumi has thrown down the gauntlet in refusing see me and in King’s speech, press interviews, etc. Under circumstances I believe I must be in position to back up what I tell Phoumi with action. Therefore I request authority referred to above soonest. You may be sure I will use it only to such extent and at such time as I believe absolutely necessary.

Harriman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2162. Secret; Niact.
  2. Not further identified.
  3. In telegram 1449, March 21, the Embassy in Vientiane suggested that Phoumi’s refusal to go to Bangkok was an indication that the current economic sanctions against the RLG were not working and the United States must consider suspending military aid. After review with the MAAG, the Embassy recommended total suspension of deliveries of U.S. military supplies and equipment for FAR, including vehicles, POL supplies, weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, and spare parts. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2162) Dated
  4. March 19. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–1962)