305. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State0
1348. Yesterday morning Admiral Felt and I, accompanied by Minister Martin and Col. Croizat called on General Phoumi at Lao Embassy. Lao Ambassador Nou Ing Ratanavong also present. At beginning conversation General Phoumi commented on his headaches and general ill health beginning Feb 26 for which he was still under treatment but noted he felt better. In any case planned return Vientiane today (March 7).
[Page 649]Phoumi promptly took initiative by reviewing military and political situation. Stated military plans developed over past six months now largely carried out. In Plaine des Jarres Pathet Lao controls only main road; in Sam Neua general bastion position again in RLG hands. His present situation that of commander who has launched offensive but been stopped short of objective. He stressed dependence FAR on US military support; with it FAR could handle Pathet Lao although not Vientminh as well.
On political front Phoumi indicated his intention see Souvanna Phouma soon to discuss “new formula” (i.e., King and six councils). He noted Souvanna Phouma prepared consider this and also that Souvanna has confided his inability control Pathet Lao.
Speaking from notes, Admiral Felt then presented points contained President Kennedy’s message.1 Although it obviously contained some bitter medicine, there was no change of expression on faces Phoumi or Lao Ambassador during entire presentation.
Following presentation Phoumi promptly replied that references to his unwillingness cooperate were not in accordance with facts. Rehearsed entire history of discussion and negotiation from abortive Phnom Penh meeting through Zurich, Geneva, Ban Hin Heup, etc. Asserted throughout this period he has been pursuing Souvanna Phouma and always willing and anxious talk with him and cooperate. Then asked Admiral Felt whether US planning withdrawal or disengagement from Laos.2
Admiral Felt replied in negative, affirming essential requirement was to rally all anti-Communist elements in Laos. He added that President Kennedy aware Phoumi’s abilities and leadership qualities and believed he had major role to play. I emphasized to Phoumi that we are persuaded only possible and acceptable solution Laos is through peaceful negotiation to bring contending forces together in coalition, and Souvanna appears only figure who can lead such coalition. Since Communists inevitably will be strong element in coalition it was essential for non-Communists and anti-Communists to form solid front to provide [Page 650] basis of strength to balance off Communists. Therefore essential he work with Souvanna Phouma if there is to be truly neutral Laos.
Phoumi said he was willing accept Souvanna Phouma as President of Council but latter has never demonstrated true neutrality. Phoumi surmised that it is here that his and US views diverge. Said he was prepared recommend Souvanna any time he could be assured latter indeed neutral and able form stable govt.
Phoumi again referred to new formula of King and six councils and in reply my question stated this proposal put forward by him with full approval of King. However since King a constitutional monarch, he was himself legally debarred from proposing formula and Phoumi was serving as his spokesman.
When Admiral Felt asked why RLG has not managed secure Kong Le’s defection, Phoumi replied Kong Le assumes Souvanna will form govt with heavy Communist influence and he sees no point in defecting now to what will probably be weaker side.
In conclusion Admiral Felt again strongly emphasized evidence of Phoumi’s willingness to cooperate was necessary if he was to retain any public support in US. Phoumi remarked that US support essential for continued operation of FAR and hoped this conversation would have beneficial result in that regard.
Comment: Throughout conversation Phoumi gave impression being firmly convinced he was in right and various efforts with Souvanna Phouma which he cited were clearly evidence his willingness cooperate. In my view, he gave no indication that message conveyed by Admiral Felt had altered his thinking. This borne out by his reply to press inquiries later in day concerning progress in formation coalition govt. Phoumi was reported as having said “no definite results can be expected at this point,” adding that RLG continues insist on Defense and Interior portfolios. “Two posts can only be in hands Prince Souvanna Phouma when he has proved Laos is really on way to true neutrality. Right now we have to be very careful in this matter.”
Foregoing said to press following earlier remarks by Phoumi concerning his meeting with Felt to effect “our discussion will create better understanding between our two parities,” and statement that he had told Admiral “everything concerning situation Laos.” Conclusion could be drawn that “better understanding” was created in spite of Phoumi’s continued insistence on Defense and Interior.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–762. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Saigon for Admiral Felt, priority to Vientiane, and to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Felt’s message was the same as the one in Document 298. See also Document 304.↩
- In CINCPAC telegram 080834Z to the JCS, repeated to the Department of State, the White House, and Vientiane, Felt agreed that Phoumi “gave no indication delivery of President’s msg altered his thinking,” but Felt noted that Phoumi had asked if the United States planned to abandon Laos before he delivered the President’s message. Felt also added that Phoumi made it clear that the only significant difference between the United States and the RLG was their estimate of Souvanna. According to Felt, Phoumi stated that when Souvanna shed his Communist leanings and was prepared to fight Communists, he would “welcome him with open arms.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–862)↩