3. Memorandum of Discussion at the 473d Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants and items 1–2. The following discussion is taken from item 3, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]
Mr. Dulles reported that there was little change in the military situation in Laos. The pro-Communist forces claim that they still hold Xieng Khouang and that near Paksane they have cut the road running south [Page 7] and east of Vientiane. Secretary Herter said the Boun Oum government had been legalized by the Laotian Parliament by a vote of 41 to 0 with only eleven abstentions. In reply to a question by the President, Secretary Herter said that no reaction to this development had been received from India.
[Here follow the remainder of item 3 and item 4. The following discussion is taken from item 5, “Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations.”]
General Lemnitzer then summarized the JCS comments on Southeast Asia. Limited operations there, he said, were handicapped by logistical limitations stemming from lack of communications, lack of transportation, and lack of port and terminal facilities. Furthermore, the existing facilities were extremely vulnerable to disruption and are inadequate to support sustained operations. These limitations, however, have been offset to some degree by countermeasures. The Pacific Command has recently been augmented by an airborne battle group and an aircraft carrier. Equipment has been pre-stocked in the Pacific area. Periodic mobility training exercises are planned. The Air Force modernization program will improve our limited war capability in the Pacific. We now have authority for overflights in the Pacific area. Other corrective action which is, or could be, taken will enable us to use additional bases and improve strategic signal communications and strengthen over-the-beach supply methods.
In concluding, General Lemnitzer said that most of the problems adverted to in the limited war study were not new.1 Additional funding would alleviate many of the deficiencies pointed out in the study but in the light of total requirements, not all of the deficiencies could be remedied at once.
The President said this was the kind of report he could understand. Secretary Herter said the JCS report was very encouraging, especially as regards airlift. However, Secretary Herter felt he must take exception to Paragraph 9 on Page 6 of the JCS report. This paragraph indicated that indecision and lack of clear-cut policies could contribute to starting a conflict we desired to avoid and then went on to say “a pertinent example is the recent conflict of judgment between the Department of Defense and the Department of State concerning the proper implementation of U.S. policy in Laos.” General Lemnitzer said this [Page 8] paragraph appeared in the JCS report because the JCS thought that last August when Kong Le rebelled, the U.S. should have built up the Phoumi forces. At that time the State Department embarked on a course of building up Souvanna Phouma. This issue was not settled and as a result Kong Le had several months in which to build up his forces. Secretary Herter replied that the Phouma government became the recognized government of Laos and therefore the government with which the U.S. had to deal. Moreover, our allies supported Souvanna Phouma and were opposed to Phoumi. We had been successful in continuing military assistance to Phoumi even when he was a rebel against the recognized government. Moreover, we had worked constantly to shift power from Souvanna Phouma to Phoumi and had finally succeeded. If the U.S. had armed Phoumi last August, it would have been arming rebels against the recognized government.
The President said the word “indecision” must be eliminated from the JCS report. No agency of the government had the right to say that another agency was indecisive and did not know what it was doing. It was proper to say that the problems were such that decisions could not be made immediately but dereliction of duty should not be imputed to another agency. The President said that even now we did not know what we could do about Laos because of the attitude of our allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were correct from the military point of view in stating that it was better to use small forces promptly than to use larger forces later but the question of when small forces can be used involved a political judgment.
General Lemnitzer said the JCS had experienced for some time a feeling of frustration about Laos. The President asked to whom the JCS report was made. Secretary Gates said the report was made to him and would be a part of the NSC files. The President said the criticism in the report of another government department must be removed.
[Here follows the remainder of item 5, a more general discussion of U.S. limited warfare capabilities.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on January 5.↩
- The study referred to was a JCS report entitled “Possible Deficiencies in U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations,” dated December 28 and transmitted to the NSC on December 30, 1960. (Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs) This report was an outgrowth of an earlier study, “U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations,” September 28, 1960. (Ibid.) For texts, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. III, Documents 134 and 121.↩