Office of the Historian

292. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)0

Washington, February 7, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Defense/State paper on Contingencies in Laos1
1.
The main points made by this study are indicated below.
a.
Situation. A resume of the current political situation.
b.
Possible outcomes of the present situation.
(1)
Phoumi may give in to the current pressures.
(2)
Phoumi may give in on Defense and Interior, but negotiations break down on other issues.
(3)
Phoumi refuses to give in to current pressures.
c.
Assurances (before applying sanctions).
(1)
From Souvanna that government he plans to form is acceptable to us.
(2)
From Soviets that PL/VM will not take advantage of a weakened RLG.
d.
Sanctions
(1)
Isolate Phoumi politically.
(2)
Economic
(a)
Withholding monthly deposits.
(b)
Blocking access to RLG fund dollar deposits abroad.
(c)
Stopping project assistance.
(d)
Stopping social assistance.
(3)
Military
(a)
Stop money for pay and rations.
(b)
Stop supplies.
(c)
Cease MAAG operational support and contract services.
(d)

Withdraw military advisers, trainers and technicians.

[Page 619]

The probable general order of seriousness of impact of military sanctions is ascending in the sequence listed above. The Meos are specifically excluded from all forms of sanctions; they are covered by “another approved plan.”

e.
Additional possibilities which at some point may occur from the current situation.
(1)
Phoumi may elect to leave the country.
(2)
Phoumi may elect to go to Southern Laos with as many supporters as he can muster.
(3)
Phoumi may accept full-force of all U.S. sanctions which will leave him helpless against PL/VM if they choose to follow up their advantage.
2.
The degree to which U.S. personnel would be endangered as the result of imposing sanctions are estimated by CHMAAG in the message attached. He is not optimistic. Plans for evacuation require timely notification of impending imposition of severe sanctions to ensure the wide-ranging lift for withdrawal can be implemented. Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9, which are marked, present the essential views.
3.
The study is not explicit on the following points:
a.
What we would do if one or both of the assurances are not forthcoming or, if made, are broken.
b.
Whether or not we will redress the power balance, that we have upset purposefully, during the period of negotiations following breaking the Defense/Interior impasse.
c.
The extent to which we assess the Soviets are capable of controlling or preventing ChiCom intervention in Laos now or when Laos is neutral.
d.
What we would do if RLG right-wingers, independent of Phoumi, execute a coup d’[tat and attempt to control key areas of the panhandle.
e.
What we will do about Communist infiltration through Southern Laos into SVN while the combination of any part of the sequence of sanctions, negotiations, accord in Geneva, investiture of a coalition government, equipping of the ICC, and reconstitution of the national army is in progress.

Except for points c and e, these omissions are not of major importance as the study recognizes the imminent multiple possibilities in which the U.S. will be faced with the alternatives of fighting or losing Laos. There is no attempt to define the parameters of that decision, although our commitments and losses in SVN, and the rationale of our argument re Laos with the Thais, are forcing us to the point where we cannot allow Communist control of Southern and Western Laos regardless of the ambiguity in which the ultimate decision may be presented.

WHB
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T–028–69. Secret.↩
  2. Attached but not printed. A covering note from Bagley to Taylor reads in part as follows: “The attached State/Defense paper on Laos (summarized in my covering memorandum) was discussed Tuesday, 7 February, at State. It was noted, but not adopted in any formal way. The principal result of the meeting was the decision to study a new political approach in Laos—to contact Souvanna direct, determine in detail his plans for a government and subsequent reconstitution of the Army and, if acceptable, seek the King’s concurrence and express our support.”

    February 7 was a Wednesday, not a Tuesday. Bagley is referring to the meeting on February 6; see Document 289.

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