Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

216. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, November 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Memoranda on Laos Requested by the President

Enclosed are two memoranda concerning the recent fighting in the vicinity of Xieng Khouang and the role that General Phoumi Nosavan is playing in the three Princes’ negotiations in Laos. These were requested from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs following the President’s telephone conversation of November 2 with Ambassador Harriman in Geneva.¹

Also enclosed are comments of Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown on the attacks on Xieng Khouang city October 27–28.²

L.D. Battle³

Enclosure 1⁴

November 2, 1961.

Recent Fighting in Xieng Khouang

Recent fighting around Xieng Khouang city resulted from an effort by the Meo to divert enemy troops attacking Meo positions in an area northeast and east of the Plaine des Jarres. On October 27 the Meo commander of a force assigned to block a road leading from Xieng Khouang exceeded his standing instructions and fired into Xieng Khouang itself, although there is evidence that the first round of the exchange of fire came from within the city. Mortar fire hit a French mission school killing five children and wounding three, damaged the house of the Polish member of the ICC, and wounded three soldiers. After approximately 12 to 15 mortar rounds, incoming fire ceased but for the rest of the afternoon of October 27 and the day of October 28, there was considerable outgoing mortar and artillery fire from Xieng Khouang city. As soon as the report of the firing reached Vientiane, the royal armed forces instructed the Meo to cease firing on Xieng Khouang and the Meo have so far complied.

The October 27 firing on Xieng Khouang was naturally heavily exploited by Communist propaganda and was the subject of vitriolic comment by the Communists at the Geneva Conference. Harriman replied at a Conference session that the first fire came from Xieng Khouang city but did not admit that return shelling came from RLG forces. The latter was because Phoumi had stated he has no knowledge of the shelling nor admitted participation of Royal Lao forces.

There have been press reports datelined November 1 from Vientiane saying that Meo tribesmen have cut off the town of Xieng Khouang from the Plaine des Jarres airfield which lies to the West of the city. On October 31 the orders were sent to Meo forces not to harass or fire on the Xieng Khouang-PDJ-Khang Khay Road, nor on roads running east and south from Xieng Khouang ville within 5 miles of the city. Meo commanders at Pho Khe, Pa Souk and Tha Lin Noi have acknowledged receipt of this instruction on November 1. It is possible, however, that runners may not have reached some isolated units. In any event, no confirmation is available in Vientiane concerning the press report that the road between PDJ airfield and Xieng Khouang has been cut. However, it is quite possible that enemy forces are somewhat nervous about using this road in view of the recent attack in Xieng Khouang sector and have decided to advise the ICC not to use the Xieng Khouang airfield and the road to Xieng Khouang-Plaine des Jarres. In this connection, it is worth noting that Meo have been within 4 kilometers of Xieng Khouang city since last April and operating close to the Plaine des Jarres airfield. Since the cease-fire of May 3, the Meo have been under restraining orders limiting their activities to defense, small scale harassment, and diversionary tactics.

Commenting on the recent Xieng Khouang incidents, Ambassador Brown has said that as long as the Kong Le Souvanna government continues efforts to take over control of these Meo areas through military force and through conscription of personnel to carry ammunition, intimidation of village officials, and so on, it is inevitable that the Meos will resist and that they will attack elsewhere in order to divert pressure. In this last month, furthermore, there has been an increasing use of PL and Viet-Nam Communists forces in operations against the Meo and a decrease in the proportion of Kong Le forces. This use of foreign troops has further embittered the Meos.

Enclosure 2⁵

Phoumi and the Three Princes’ Negotiations

Although we would be unwise to assume that Phoumi has abandoned his personal ambitions, there is evidence that, for the present at least, he is endeavoring to follow our recommendations in his negotiations with the other two Princes and is not himself preventing the three Princes from coming to an agreement. In fact, there are signs that Phoumi and Souvanna are coming nearer together on the formation of a government and that it is Souphanouvong and the Communists who are blocking Souvanna’s efforts to achieve a solution.

Phoumi contends that if Souvanna is to play a truly neutral role, he must free himself from PL domination by coming out of Xieng Khouang to consult with various political leaders in other parts of the country. Phoumi also considers that Prince Souphanouvong must give proof of his good faith by participating in the inter-factional discussions. The RLG originally proposed that the next meeting of the three Princes take place at Vientiane and refused to go to the Plaine des Jarres, but more recently Phoumi has publicly stated that he and Boun Oum are willing to meet “anywhere”. On October 31, however, Phoumi told Ambassador Brown he prefers that any talks among the three factions should take place in the King’s presence at Luang Prabang, but that there should not be another meeting until Souvanna is able to present concrete proposals agreed to by Souphanouvong with respect to a coalition government and a unified Lao delegation to Geneva.

In their talk on October 31,⁶ Ambassador Brown suggested that Phoumi attempt to obtain from Souvanna a four-point commitment:

(a) A Souvanna delegation would go to Vientiane to make security arrangements for a Plaine des Jarres session.

(b) Souvanna and Souphanouvong would receive Phoumi even in the absence of Boun Oum.

(c) Souvanna has definite proposals to submit.

(d) Souvanna would meet subsequently in Luang Prabang.

The ICC would evidently play a go-between role in attempting to obtain such written assurances from Souvanna.

Souphanouvong, for his part, did not attend the Luang Prabang meeting in October and has given no indication of willingness to leave Xieng Khouang. He has openly objected to Souvanna’s verbal engagement at Luang Prabang to appoint Phoui Sananikone as the head of a unified delegation at Geneva and seems to be preventing Souvanna from producing a Cabinet list for negotiation.

In Vientiane Ambassador Brown is putting strong pressure on Phoumi to give public evidence of his desire for a peaceful solution even if it means going to rebel-held Xieng Khouang. In return, we consider that the Soviets must exert a similar influence on Souphanouvong and Ambassador Harriman has been instructed to underscore with Pushkin the point that the PL now seem to be largely responsible for the delays encountered in forming a coalition government.⁷

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was taken from the President’s weekend reading folder of November 4.
1. See Document 217.
2. These comments, [text not declassified] are summarized in the final paragraph of enclosure 1, [text not declassified].
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Signature of the officer who signed for Battle is illegible.
4. No drafting information appears on the source text.
5. No drafting information appears on the source text.
6. As reported in telegram 651 from Vientiane, October 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–3161)
7. In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, October 31, Battle noted that the White House received the weekly telegraphic reports from Geneva as well as other pertinent reports on Laos from other missions in the field. Battle suggested that the weekly memorandum prepared by the Department of State might no longer be timely or necessary. If this was the case the Department would like to discontinue it. On a covering note, November 3, attached to Battle’s memorandum, Manfull noted that Bromley Smith had approved discontinuance of the mandatory weekly memorandum. (Ibid.)