174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia0
227. Eyes Only Ambassador from Secretary.
Problem in Laos is to try to get Soviets to agree to substance and reality of neutrality and not use that word to cover communist take-over by political rather than military action. Critical points are (a) composition of coalition government, (b) verified withdrawal all foreign military elements including Viet Minh, (c) international control commission arrangements for protection Laos as well as interested powers and neighbors against efforts to undermine neutrality.
French Ambassador’s talks with Souvanna Phouma at Xieng Khouang on coalition government (see Vientiane’s 340 and 3481 being repeated) most discouraging. Souvanna sees himself as Prime Minister and head of “center” group of eight, to whom would be added four from Pathet Lao and four from Boun Oum Phoumi group. Those he mentions for center group are almost all strong Pathet Lao sympathizers. These plus four Pathet Lao would clearly swing Laos rapidly into communist camp.
We are now trying to arrange talk in Paris between Souvanna and Harriman in order that we can impress upon him directly that our policy regarding neutrality is genuine, that we are prepared to support him as Prime Minister on basis his genuine neutrality, that center groups [Page 401] must be determined to maintain neutrality and should include several strong figures national standing not associated with either Pathet Lao or Boun Oum, and that we are prepared back neutral Laos with substantial economic and other aid.
Character government is crucial point: It would do us no good, for example, to trade concessions by us on this in exchange for concessions by Soviets on control commission since latter would then be a farce. Good point to press on Soviets is importance separating “hostile camps” by verified withdrawal all foreign troops in whatever guise including trainers, advisers, etc. Laotians left alone could go much further with neutrality than possible at present.
Linkage Laos and Berlin can be tricky. In our minds problem is how we can expect to make any constructive advance on complex and stubborn issues Germany and Berlin if we are unable to reach agreement on relatively simple and lesser problem Laos on which heads of government have apparently same objectives. We do not see profitable path in trading concessions on Laos for concessions on Berlin since this would be quite unmanageable in two widely divergent contexts.
If your Soviet colleague seems to discuss Laos on assumption that Pathet Lao will finish up its military action as dry season returns in September, you should warn him that they must not count on US and SEATO playing passive role. United States has gone very far in attempting reach peaceful solution Laos but if it becomes apparent Khrushchev’s assurances to Kennedy on this matter were meaningless, US would have to look to its responsibilities. American government and people are showing readiness to respond to unprovoked pressures Sino-Soviet bloc and it would be serious mistake to underestimate their determination and capacity. Today’s announcement Soviet resumption nuclear testing and obvious effort intimidation free world will merely reinforce conclusions American people are regretfully drawing about present course Soviet policy. Problem ought not to be who wins a war but how war is to be prevented. Laos is in situation where right step can be taken.
This might be enough fuel for a start, but we would try to respond promptly if any promising leads open up.
Your messages through State channels “Eyes Only” will be given special attention here and distributed only to me.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–3061. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Johnson.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 172.↩