Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

109. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State ⁰

Bangkok, June 4, 1961, noon.

2185. Dept for Acting Secy from Amb Brown.

Such an original and far reaching proposal¹ of course requires most careful study before considered opinion can be given. Details of proposed arrangements, for example, could in many cases be decisive of how basic power relationships worked out in practice. My preliminary reaction, however, is as fols:

Concept has basic appeal from standpoint logic and cold blooded US self-interest. Ability maintain strong Western position in southern Laos with capacity plug Ho Chi Minh trail access route Hanoi to South Vietnam, insulation of Thailand from pressure of Commie presence on eastern bank Mekong wld clearly put US in better position prevent Commie take over SEA than if they shld gain control of, or dominant influence in, all Laos.

Loss of strategic Plaine des Jarres would be militarily serious and requires further analysis. We would face problem of what to do with our loyal friends the Meos. On other hand I have always felt that Sam Neua and Phong Saly were expendable. Other side would doubtless also claim northeastern Luang Prabang.

I doubt however (A) concept would in practice have desired results proposal or (B) if it would be negotiable except perhaps in extremes.

• First: I do not think that central govt of Souvanna and civil servant types, plus a Souvanna controlled Vtiane/Luang Prabang region would be a reliable neutral insulation for Thailand along the crucial western and northern reaches of the Mekong. One of Souvanna’s main weaknesses is in admin, judgment of men, and understanding what goes on in his govt. He must be bolstered by some hard headed conservatives to keep him posted and on right track. I would have grave doubts as to character of govt he would choose both for the center and for his region if he were left alone to do it (e.g., he considers Quinim a neutral) and of the capacity of his regional govt to resist infiltration and long remain the kind of buffer we need. We must remember that we will have little power to direct choice of personalities and arrangement of functions.

  I do not think, for example, that Souvanna would accept the King’s definition of who was a proper neutral for his central govt, even if the King went so far as to try to participate so deeply in its formation, which is unlikely. This govt could well be slanted adversely to US.

  I feel that one might well consider a Souvanna less undesirable when flanked by strong extremes than when alone with uncertain quantities.

  It is essential for US to have someone in the local ring on whom we can reasonably count to fight for US during the internal pol battle and particularly the infighting.

• Second: I do not think that either the PL or Souvanna would be likely to buy this idea. Souvanna considers himself the one destined to be saviour of his country. He feels he has wide-spread support throughout the population in all areas. He has always opposed the division of the country. He would be likely to consider this a division.

  The PL would strongly resist any central govt in which they were not included. Moreover, in view of their present very large influence in the panhandle (they control over half including regions very near to Thakhek and crucial corridor regions on the South Vietnam border), they would be reluctant to turn it over to Boun Oum. Even if they did, there remains as the Dept has pointed out (Deptel 748 to Vtiane)² the serious problem of how to remove them physically from their strong position.

  Phoumi will also be most reluctant to depart from national scene if there still is to be one.

  The King would be most reluctant to accept what would seem to him as such extensive de facto partition.

• Third: I agree with the Dept that the imagination boggles at the problems inherent in the task of negotiating such a proposal. Even if it is negotiated in principle, being more extensive and loosely knit than previous conceptions, it will afford us very little opportunity to influence the all important details of organization and personnel choices upon which success or failure from our viewpoint would so largely depend.

  Support of important neutrals for this idea would seem at least undoubtful. Burma and Cambodia, for example, were very strong opposing any partition in their opening speeches at Geneva. India took a similar line. (We consider it very dangerous to have Krishna Menon as the sponsor for so complex and delicately balanced a proposal with so much at stake.) Reaction of Thai, South Vietnamese and King, the potentially important fourth group exemplified by Phoui, and probably also Phoumi despite his known arriere pensees about partitionment is likely, at least initially, to be that they are being let down again by the US.

• Fourth: one thing seems very clear to me, namely, that we should keep this idea very much in reserve for the present. We have not yet had any real chance to come to grips with substance at Geneva, or even to feel out the participants very deeply. We have not seen the results of any Phoumi/Souvanna/Souphanouvong discussion which Phoumi is approaching with a very satisfactory attitude (Vtiane’s 2190 to Dept).³

  We have had no direct contact with Souvanna. If reports of division between Souvanna and PL turn out to be true this should help US in resisting division of govt by thirds and in distribution of portfolios. We have never yet tried out the argument that division should at the very least be division by fourths, i.e., Souvanna, PL, Savannakhet, other pol groups. We do not yet have any clear idea on what type of control mechanisms we may be able to develop.

If we advance this idea now, or have it advanced by someone (our sponsorship will be almost impossible to conceal), it will become the basing point to which the other side will begin to add their demands.

If it is rejected by the other side, we will have suffered all the disadvantages of the plan and much loss of face in SEA without gaining any of its advantages. Therefore, I recommend that we further nurture and refine it in quiet for possible use as ultimate fallback position, and do not advance this idea until it is more definitely proven that the possible alternatives are worse.

Foregoing are merely preliminary thoughts after one night’s reflection. I would like an opportunity to comment further after having pondered more deeply and after having had a chance to examine various practical questions such as relationship of central and regional govt. Control of army, admin of foreign aid, treatment of PL forces, relationship of SEATO to central govt and Boun Oum and Souvanna regions, etc. I understand that there is a position paper dealing with some of these problems in connection with a possible ultimate federal solution. Could a copy be sent me?

I have discussed proposal briefly with Amb Young who is commenting separately.⁴

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–461. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Vientiane and Vienna for Rusk, priority to Paris, and to Geneva for Harriman and London for Rusk.
1. Although no reference telegram is indicated, Brown, who was in Bangkok, was responding to Document 105.
2. The reference is in error. Telegram 748, January 12, refers to staffing arrangements at the Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 121.51J3/1–1261)
3. In telegram 2190, June 3, Brown reported that Phoumi assured him that he would not let Boun Oum meet alone with Souvanna and Souphanouvong. Phoumi planned to feel out Souvanna prior to a meeting of the three Princes. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–361)
4. In telegram 2194 from Bangkok, Young concurred with Brown’s general line and noted that Thai reaction to a division of Laos would be emotional and violent and would take considerable time and preparation before they would accept it. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–561)