63. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 52. Following based on uncleared memcon:1
Following a brief exchange with Ambassador T.F. Tsiang in Delegation Lounge yesterday,2 Secretary called in FonMinShen and Ambassador Yeh this morning to review current status of prognostication re vote on ChiRep issue.3[Page 141]
Shen said that following Secretary's conversation with Tsiang yesterday matter had again been reported to Taipei with as yet no comment. He reviewed for the Secretary again the reasons for GRC's obduracy on Outer Mongolian issue.
Secretary said that he wanted to be absolutely sure that GRC fully appreciated the gravity of the situation which we faced and its long-reaching consequences. He pointed out that should GRC's recalcitrance on the Outer Mongolia veto issue result in GRC's departure from the UN, there could well be feeling in Taiwan that GRC's humiliation due to lack of effort on part of US. In order to protect our position we would have no alternative but to review the facts and disassociate ourselves completely from GRC position. Secretary emphasized point that choice before US was between acquiescence to entry of Outer Mongolia or Peking and in this dilemma our position was clear. He reviewed again for the Minister and the Ambassador the tremendous investment in effort which the United States had expended in mobilizing support for GRC. United States also had much at stake in the outcome of this vital issue. If appreciation of this fact were completely disregarded by the GRC an unfavorable outcome could unfortunately affect our future relations.
Although FonMinShen seemed to appreciate situation now facing GRC, he followed the line that bowing to Soviet blackmail on this issue would seriously undermine morale and public support for GRC domestically. He seemed to take unrealistic refuge in possibility that African groups, such as Brazzaville body, would not vote in unison and that the GRC's position may thus still be salvaged on the “important question” even though they exercise their veto or abstain in the SC on Outer Mongolia. In response to the query as to their exact position as of today, Shen said it was to use the veto if necessary if sufficient abstentions in the Security Council would not preclude Outer Mongolia's entrance.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-2961. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Taipei.↩
- SecDel/MC/62, September 29. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1957)↩
- Secto 3 from USUN, September 18, reported that Rusk had urged against a GRC veto of Outer Mongolian membership in a meeting with Shen and Tsiang that day. (Ibid., Central Files, 303/9-1861)↩
- Rusk discussed this with McConaughy in a September 28 telephone conversation recorded by Phyllis Bernau, which reads in part as follows: “The Sec wondered about one last message to Taipei—if this takes the course it appears to be on if they veto OM and the African states vote with the SU and Peiping will be seated and the GRC will be evicted. Then GRC would get indignant at us—if all this happens we will make it publicly clear they elected to commit suicide and there will be a review of our relations. This is not just Outer Mongolia but a question of having anyone including us with them. The Sec will not take anything from them on this issue if they get themselves unseated in the face of their veto of OM. We are going to make this so clear that the American people will lose their interest out there. Somebody there should worry about it. M thinks Chiang is irrational on this but probably we should put it forward to him. M thinks he will take it as a threat though. The Sec said it is a threat. The issue is lost if they pursue this line of events.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)↩