57. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State0
402. Eyes only for the Secretary. Met with Wang at his Embassy September 1, 4 p.m. unobserved. (Deptel 321.)1
I opened with a short statement emphasizing this was private meeting between us.
Wang referred our last meeting and stated would like give his position noting I had suggested we meet again prior my return US. Said at last meeting he had put forth clearly position his government and therefore had doubts necessity of such meetings over such short space of time. He first noted since last meeting international situation had changed significantly. US had undertaken series moves and military provocations leading to dangerous military-like atmosphere. This could not help but affect today’s meeting and would like to express several points of his own opinions about these moves with hope I would take these to Washington. He wished explain his point of view clearly and so had prepared text of his remarks.
He then started reading lengthy prepared Chinese text. Stated that lately US and its allies with the pretext of the Berlin crisis had caused situation approaching war by sending military contingent to West Berlin, as well as other provocative acts of West German revanchists vis-a-vis GDR. Said “I would like to ask you whether this is to lead to the calling forth of military conflict in Europe.” Noted the realization in South Vietnam of so-called storm plan increase of military forces and training of troops in Far East for despatch to neutral Laos, and asked whether this aimed at eruption of war in Indochina. Noted maneuvers of US Marines in Okinawa and land maneuvers in South Korea, stating these further increased tension in Northeast Asia. Accused US military airplanes and warships of gradually more frequent violations Chinese territory. In connection with maneuvers of Chiang Kai-shek forces on Matsu and Quemoy asked whether these actions preparatory to landing on China coast. Stated that they could not help but take these very seriously and [Page 131]issued very strong warning. Would like to take occasion to voice his personal concern about dangerous policies of my government and expressed hope I would bring his point of view to attention my government. War policy present administration had improved upon that of late Secretary Dulles and leads to an increasingly rapid isolation of the US on international scene. Observed people had hoped Democratic Administration and particularly President Kennedy could have changed US policy to one of peace. This was particularly so since President had emphasized his strategy of peace during campaign. But now he noted US Government does not have intention of turning away from path of war but on contrary approached gradually closer to it. US Government had already decided to step onto path of war. These steps have significantly been accelerated, not only does US prepare for atomic war but also has preparations for limited war. US has set time bomb in heart of Europe and various countries in Asia, Africa and South America. Occupation by US on Taiwan leads to especially dangerous military threat greatly increasing threat of war against China.
Desired tell me frankly this type of policy could only lead to worsening international situation. This course was meeting with greatly stronger opposition from people of world including people of US. Chinese value peace and are fighting to create peaceful international conditions. China and US are two great powers and both have responsibility for peace throughout world. War will not bring any advantages whatever and he convinced I would agree with his view. Both countries should make every effort take advantage these contacts and extend greatest efforts to this end. Talks already numbered 106 but up to now no progress achieved. Facts show that reason for this is US interference in international affairs China and Taiwan. Believed betterment of Chinese-US relations required above all solution this basic problem.
Noted that during our discussions on August 152 I had said no US Government could ever turn Taiwan over to China and remove US forces from Taiwan. This was evidence US wished continue these talks as means to further aggressive policies of the US and does not have least intention resolve basic problem by means of negotiation. Indications are US Government intends to worsen these basic differences by means of these negotiations. Said at previous meeting I had utilized US responsibility towards Chiang Kai-shek as pretext for US occupation Taiwan and threatened ChiComs with war. Doubted if I really believed that type pretext and it had no significance.
US responsible for existence Chiang Kai-shek and facts show he is US creature. This is intervention in China internal affairs, equivalent to [Page 132]situation between Japanese Tojo Government and Manchukuo. This is humbug. At same time situation is important responsibility for China. Again reminded me that US position will never be accepted by China and that if US does not recognize this it will be a great historical mistake. Problem of Taiwan is principal problem between China and US. Without resolution will be difficult to resolve other problems. Repeated he wished me to bring this to attention of Washington and again desired state China very much wished to resolve various problems between China and US peacefully and he hoped we would put forth constructive propositions looking toward the removal of US forces from Taiwan.
He then stated we had already agreed that the next meeting would be December 5. But in view of the serious situation we should maintain contact and be prepared for it (contact) at moment’s notice. In response our questions to clarify this point, he stated 107th meeting still on agenda for December 5 and added that if important matters arise in interim they would communicate.
I realized he had made an extraordinary response to my approach. I categorically believed [denied?] false accusations he had made against my government. His remarks about President surpassed bounds of common politeness. Recrimination not helpful but was bound to point out that chief problem of today is action from Communist side threatening peace all over world. This was my necessary answer since Wang had chosen to broaden area of discussion.
I corrected his statement about what I had said concerning Taiwan, reiterating no American Government would turn Taiwan over to mainland against will of its people. US forces in Taiwan area, [apparent omission] this being purpose of my personal suggestions to him. Reiterated necessity finding common ground on matters of mutual interest and advisability making progress, even in small matters, as means breaking impasse. Rejection my suggestions matter of personal regret. Danger was situation would get worse but both sides still have time to consider and I hoped Wang would make personal effort to have my previous suggestions reviewed.
I also doubted usefulness this kind of private talks if they continued in this sense and reminded him he took initiative in starting them. I had hoped his initiatives here and in Geneva might be constructive and so had attempted to offer constructive response. While great effort required on both sides, was worthwhile to relieve tensions in order avoid far greater dangers. Asked Wang if he believed statement US using these talks to further aggressive policies. Would have to report this remark to my government and let it draw its own conclusions.
Thereafter there followed an exchange of the type customary at formal meetings regarding status Chiang Kai-shek government. Nothing new was said.[Page 133]
Comment: Wang obviously read from prepared governmental statement which completely reversed more conciliatory attitude he had displayed at previous private meeting Sunday Geneva. He seemed slightly embarrassed and made effort to be cordial on my departure.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-261. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Received on September 3.↩
- Telegram 321, August 31, replied to telegram 378 from Warsaw of the same date. In it, Beam reported that the Chinese Embassy had just telephoned that Wang would be happy to receive Beam at his Embassy the next day. Beam stated that his visit could be arranged unobtrusively, although the Poles would be aware of it since Wang was dean of the diplomatic corps in Warsaw. Beam doubted that he would be willing to come to the U.S. Embassy first. (Ibid., 611.93/8-3161) Telegram 321, drafted by Johnson and cleared by Ball, replied, “No objection your visit to Wang’s Embassy as unobtrusively as possible. In fact, we feel might be advantages your meeting Wang there.” (Ibid.)↩
- See Documents 51- 53.↩