40. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff0
1. COMUSTDC has been studying for several months the problem of what will be the effect on the GRC if it appears that acceptance of two-China solution is imminent. He has not been able to coordinate his studies with the Embassy but has discussed the essentials of his concern with the Ambassador. The latter, emphasized the political nature of the problem and indicated that COMUSTDC was perhaps out of his field. In our opinions, it is the essence of prudence for COMUSTDC to continue to be concerned.
2. His study develops 3 possible GRC courses of action:
A. Unilateral military action by the GRC,
B. GRC accommodation with Communist China,
C. Negotiation with the U.S. to salvage best possible concessions for mainlander element resident on Taiwan.
3. Further study is required before a recommendation can be forwarded. However, it is clear that the U.S. should anticipate GRC actions in case of a two-China decision and should develop our own courses of action to meet future contingencies.
4. Ref. A promulgates a statement of United States China policy which presents U.S. policy intentions and lines of action with respect to GRC and Red China. This paper is reassuring. On the other hand, a rash [Page 93]of stories has appeared in U.S. newspapers reporting that the U.S. is weighing an offer to admit Peiping to the UN Assembly. We note the difference between policy statement suggested by Senator Goldwater and Mr. Nixon's advice to shoot down unofficial reports that State is considering a change in U.S. policy. Senator Scott4 has called attention to the fact that some advisers are favoring admission of Red China to the UNGA and keeping Nationalist China on the Security Council. These papers add to the Gimo's concern and apprehension.
5. Ref. B reports kinds of unilateral military action which might be taken by the GRC. We have been observing for many months the GRC training programs for dropping large groups of special forces. We are conversant with the development of their plans for utilization of special forces. Adm Smoot informs me that Mr. Ray Cline is in Wash DC with Amb Drumright. I recommend strongly that you make arrangements through CIA to meet with Cline. He has been working with Chiang Ching-kuo for a long time.
6. Ref C is pertinent.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7-1161. Top Secret. Also sent to JCA to pass for information to JACE, AJCC, Fort Richie, Maryland. Repeated for information to PACAF, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, and COMUSTDC.↩
- The reference instruction, sent to all U.S. diplomatic and consular missions, stated that its purpose was to counteract the widespread expectation that the new U.S. administration would make a rapid and substantial change of U.S. policy toward China, and it set forth the basic U.S. position as guidance for discussion with foreign officials and other interested persons. (Ibid., 611.93/6-1661) See the Supplement.↩
- It stated the view of Taiwan Defense Command Commander Vice Admiral Roland N. Smoot that Chiang Kai-shek might undertake independent major action against the mainland if his forces were in the highest possible state of readiness, mainland conditions were at the worst possible level, and he believed U.S. policy was changing so as to foreshadow reduced U.S. support. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1161) See the Supplement.↩
- Not found. [text not declassified] circulated as TDCSDB-3/647,621, July 19, referred to [text not declassified] (TDCSDB-3/647,522) as reporting the training of airdrop teams. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, China)↩
- Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania.↩