Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

378. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 5, 1963.

SUBJECT

• US-Japan Defense Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric
  • Ambassador Reischauer
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank K. Sloan
  • R/Adm. L. C. Heinz,DoD
  • Mr. Robert A. Fearey, State Department
  • Capt. W. M. Carpenter, USN, DoD
• Japan
  • Foreign Minister Ohira
  • Ambassador Takeuchi
  • Mr. Mizoguchi (Interpreter)
  • Mr. Kikuchi, Secretary to Mr. Ohira
  • Col. Mai, Military Attache

Mr. Gilpatric opened the conversation by saying that he was glad to have the opportunity to talk with the Foreign Minister, since some of the aspects of the U.S. balance of payments problem have defense implications.

Mr. Ohira responded that he had come to Washington primarily to discuss the balance of payments question and the equalization tax, but was grateful for the opportunity to continue discussions begun in meetings in Tokyo last February with Mr. Gilpatric. He inquired if the President’s message had caused any change in U.S. Department of Defense expenditure policies.

Mr. Gilpatric replied that when he had talked with Mr. Ohira in Tokyo he had said that the U.S. would not reduce its power base in the Far East and that this intent was as valid now as then. In February the threat of the Chinese Communists was considered a real and present danger and is so regarded now, as President Kennedy had mentioned in his press conference last week.¹ Although there seems to be a possibility for some kind of detente with the Soviets, our assessment of the risk of Chinese militancy is not lessened over the long run.

Adverting again to his February statements about the U.S. power base in the Far East, Mr. Gilpatric said that his remarks at the time were not meant to rule out some future readjustment of our force dispositions, so long as our over-all capability was not impaired. He said that several developments have occurred over the past year. For one thing, the U.S. has greatly improved its airlift capability and by 1966 will have a 300% increase over its 1961 airlift strength. Further, the range of our tactical fighters has been increased to the point where rapid deployment over the Atlantic and Pacific is possible. The U.S. now has the capability to deploy a division to Europe or the Far East in days rather than weeks and, by prepositioning the heavy equipment, can have a division combat ready at a distant location much more rapidly than in the past. As a consequence of these developments, and as the President said in his July 18th message, the U.S. expects by adjusting force levels in the Far East and elsewhere to save about $300 million a year in defense expenditures overseas.

With respect to the proposed adjustments in Japan, the U.S. will, through Ambassador Reischauer and U.S. military personnel, discuss with their Japanese counterparts the specifics involved. Mr. Gilpatric said that, although we were not yet ready to discuss details,² we have in mind such actions as returning some of our transport aircraft, and some of the tactical aircraft, since replacements for these types are capable of long-range deployment. The U.S. also has in mind that some of our squadrons in Japan will be deployed without dependents and that some of our bases there may be put on a “joint-use” status, manned by U.S. and Japanese personnel, rather than in a full operating status. To demonstrate our capability for rapid deployment of aircraft earmarked for bases in Japan we plan to hold large-scale military exercises, and have in mind one such exercise in the Far East next spring if we can work out the necessary arrangements. For logistic support of Far East forces we would continue to use ships as floating depots, to back up rapid force deployments. Mr. Gilpatric emphasized that all these projected actions are part of a world-wide effort to reduce overseas expenditures without affecting combat effectiveness, and that the effort relates particularly to the logistics and support areas. Our Ambassador and military personnel will be working out these moves with Japanese representatives. As the President has said, we do not want to weaken, or to give the appearance of weakening, U.S. strength and resolution to meet the threat in any area.

Mr. Gilpatric pointed out that the U.S. is aware that the moves he had described are recognized as politically sensitive matters to both countries and that he felt neither the U.S. nor the Japanese side would want to discuss them publicly at this time. Mr. Gilpatric added that these moves are but a natural evolution of the U.S. total defense posture, planned when President Kennedy took office and now coming into being.

Mr. Ohira replied that he appreciated Mr. Gilpatric’s frank remarks and that he would see that no leaks were made to the press.

Mr. Ohira went on to a related question. He said that press reports have said the U.S. is withdrawing a division from Korea, and he wondered if this were part of the U.S. balance of payments actions, or perhaps an erroneous report.

Mr. Gilpatric replied that the press statements were at least premature. He explained that the U.S. is in a paradoxical situation in Korea. The US/ROK forces there are more than sufficient for dealing with a North Korean attack but inadequate without reinforcement for containing a North Korean/ChiCom attack. He said that ever since he was Under Secretary of the Air Force ten years ago, the U.S. has had the same force deployed to Korea. Speaking personally, since no decision has yet been made, Mr. Gilpatric said he predicted that we would not make any immediate change in Korean forces—the situation is too uncertain—but that in the long run we will be thinking of some readjustment of forces in Korea as our capability to redeploy will permit.

Mr. Ohira had a second question. He asked when the US-Japan talks could take place, inasmuch as he could foresee a curtailment on Japanese income from U.S. forces and some effect on Japanese defense budget planning. He said it was necessary to put next year’s Japanese defense budget together about November of this year.

Mr. Gilpatric replied that he could foresee some such effects from the moves of U.S. dependents, but he hoped these would be temporary. He said that after the Ambassador returns at the end of August and sometime within the next two months or so we should be ready for discussions. On the U.S. military side General Smart, although he has just moved to Hawaii, would take an active interest in talks, as would Admiral Felt. The full implications of the U.S. moves (FY 64 and later) should be discussed with Japan before the latter had to make budget decisions. Mr. Gilpatric went on to say that the U.S. has its budget problems too. Indeed, some of the projected actions will cost the U.S. more in budget dollars, e.g., to fly out aircraft to the Far East, but that this is a way to save gold.

Mr. Ohira went to a third point, concerning the Japan Second Defense Five-Year Build-up Plan (1962-1966). This plan, which called for Japanese expenditures of about $3-1/3 billion, was drafted with the expectation of receiving about $50 million per year in U.S. grant aid. Of the $250 million anticipated, Japan had received about one fourth. Japan wants to cooperate in the U.S. program to save dollars but is concerned that in the portion of grant aid not yet received is the U.S. portion for BADGE (air defense system),³ and for naval ships and helicopters (ASW). Mr. Ohira said he realized what U.S. thinking was from the President’s message and from Senator Church’s amendment, but he wondered just what to expect from U.S. military assistance.

Mr. Gilpatric said that our position on military assistance to Japan has not changed from that discussed with Mr. Shiga in Tokyo and that the U.S. still intends to share in the cost of BADGE. He said that we have studied the Japanese choice of Hughes as contractor for BADGE, and noted that these projects always cost more than anticipated. As to support for ASW, we can make no commitment in the FY 64 MAP until Congress acts on the appropriation (about two months from now). As to the Church amendment, we hope for a Foreign Relations Committee interpretation that will be helpful.

Mr. Ohira said he wished to conclude with a reference to the proposed entry into Japanese ports of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines.⁴ He said he understood that the U.S. Navy might be impatient, but that it was his idea that it was politically wise to have the Japan AEC make a favorable recommendation to the Japanese Government. For this reason Dr. Kaneshige, JAEC Commissioner, was in Washington to discuss technical matters and that he hoped this would be helpful. Ambassador Reischauer said that he and Dr. Kaneshige had met with V/Adm. Rickover earlier that morning for a useful discussion.

Mr. Ohira’s final question was to ask if there are any new developments in the Far East.

Mr. Gilpatric said that President Kennedy had held a meeting last week to consider the implications of recent international incidents, such as the shootings in Korea, a possible Chinese Communist build-up on the border of India, and the uncertain truce in Laos, and that at the moment the consensus was that, although the situation was threatening, no major moves are foreseen. Mr. Gilpatric assured Mr. Ohira that if any such moves are anticipated, the U.S. will consult with Japan.

Mr. Gilpatric closed by saying that he believes these talks are quite useful and that there should be regular exchanges of views between Defense officials of the two countries.

It was agreed that statements to the press regarding Mr. Ohira’s call would be limited to saying that the latter was a follow-up of Mr. Gilpatric’s visit to Tokyo in February, 1963.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Japan, 8/63. Secret. No drafter is indicated on the source text but it was approved by Gilpatric on August 6.
1. For the President’s remarks on China made at his press conference on August 1, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 614.
2. Documentation on U.S. efforts to reach an agreed U.S. Government position on the nature of its force reductions is in Department of State, Central Files DEF 1 JAPAN,DEF 19-3 JAPAN, and FN 12 JAPAN for 1963.
3. U.S.-Japanese agreement relating to a joint cost-sharing program for the production of equipment and the provision of technical assistance for the base air defense ground environment (BADGE) system was effected by an exchange of notes at Tokyo on December 4, 1946. It entered into force that same day. For text, see 15 UST 2339.
4. The United States and Japan did not reach agreement on entry of nuclear-powered submarines into Japanese ports until 1964. Documentation in Department of State, Central Files DEF 7 JAPAN-US and AE 10-2 JAPAN indicates that a stumbling block throughout 1963 was the inability of the United States under existing security regulations to furnish Japan with information that would answer Japan’s concerns over safety of the vessels.