Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, October 22, 1963, 2:17 p.m.

335. Reference A) Seoul’s 361 rptd Tokyo 136, CINCPAC 140;¹ B) Seoul’s 64 rptd Tokyo 12, CINCPAC 14.²

1. Following are some preliminary views on post-election scene and implications for our policies. Your comments invited.

2. Democratic election was held in orderly manner. Flagrant repression and wholesale rigging which we feared did not occur. U.S. posture of neutrality regarding presidential candidates appears to be well established publicly. For these and other beneficial developments referred to below credit is due in large part to effective efforts of Embassy. You and your staff are warmly commended.

3. Although narrow Pak victory with less than majority of valid votes was unexpected and creates complex political situation, situation has certain compensations from our viewpoint. Had Pak secured strong popular mandate, he could more easily justify repressive trends set forth para 3 reftel B than he can as plurality victor. Had opposition won, particularly by narrow margin, there would have been period of widespread uncertainty, instability, and possibly violence as it sought to establish its authority.

4. Our preliminary and tentative interpretation of election is that opposition won moral victory. Even without evaluating high number invalid votes, it seems clear that genuine support for Chairman Pak was relatively narrow. Vote for opposition in certain military areas makes apparent that support for junta within military cannot now be taken for granted.

5. We are encouraged by talk of moderation on both sides, but especially with Kim Chong-p’il returning there is danger of his baleful repressive influence being reflected in government actions. Beginning of Assembly elections probably will regenerate political controversy, with at least temporary impairment of atmosphere of moderation and cooperation. Our preliminary guess is that Democratic-Republican Party is unlikely win majority of constituencies in Assembly although it could gain majority of seats as consequence of new proportional representation system. Assembly election seems unlikely to have any marked effect on present political balance of power.

6. We believe paras 7 A, B, C, and D reftel B still afford sound guidance for U.S. policy, despite some changes in situation. Strength of opposition vote underlines importance of 7 A and 7 D. Need for pressing for freedom of elections (para 7 B) still pertinent with respect to Assembly elections, especially in view return of Kim Chong-p’il to scene. Linkage of assistance with Korean performance (para 7 C) remains essential. We believe these policies are becoming well understood at present in Korea, largely as result of Embassy-USOM steadfast adherence to them.

7. We suggest three special points of emphases at this juncture:

A. Encouragement of moderation, tolerance, and cooperation on part of both government and opposition. Although we must recognize need for continued political conflict and should not help ROKG subvert opposition in guise of developing cooperation, we should endeavor to move their political dialogue into constructive channels. To this end, we should consult with opposition as well as government on such problems as Korean-Japanese normalization of relations, and economic stabilization.

B. Encouragement of Pak to make best selections possible for cabinet and other key positions on basis of competence and of promoting national interests. We should work to establish authority and responsibility in cabinet and ministries rather than continued behind-scenes activities. Canadian grain purchase could be made case in point. We should also refuse help Korean activities in which Korean CIA improperly involved.

C. Renewed focus on threat of Kim Chong-p’il and his supporters in government. We hope that his prolonged absence from Korea, opposition’s show of strong popular support, and our cold-shoulder treatment may have impaired his political strength in Korea. We strongly question, however, whether he has changed, and regard him as still a dangerous unstabilizing force. In working to counter him, Embassy could truthfully say that Dept has received many inquiries about scandal cases, including quite a few from Congress.

8. At appropriate occasion in course of coming week Hilsman proposes publicly to refer to orderly conduct of election and encouraging post-election developments.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 14 S KOR. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Norred; cleared by Fearey, Green, and Harriman, in draft by Ives of AID and Colonel Moorman of OSD/ISA, and in substance by Hulen of INR/RFE; and approved by Hilsman.
1. In telegram 361, September 18, the Embassy predicted Pak’s election as a “virtual certainty” in light of the failure of the opposition to unite and the junta’s determination to win the election. (Ibid., POL S KOR)
2. Document 311.