306. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 0
When you see Sam Berger you might condition him to the prospect that we may need some deep cuts in Korean MAP.1
If Congress slashes the aid bill this year (or even if not) we’ll have to do some extensive reprogramming to find enough MAP for India and other possible new accounts. Korea, with some $200 million MAP planned for FY 1964, is the logical source and that from which DOD has generally drawn in the past.
In fact, I’d argue that our investment in Korea far exceeds our strategic interest. On top of over $5 billion already invested since the end of the Korean War, we plan another billion in MAP alone over the next five years. Moreover, the ROK falls so far short of being able to fund even the local currency costs of its over-sized army that it’s our biggest remaining SA account ($90 million in FY ‘63 and perhaps $400 million planned for FY 64-68).
Berger, State and DOD reportedly agree on a modest force cut over the next two years. But this will provide only marginal savings. If we gradually cut ROK forces back from 19 to 12 divisions, we might free as much as $50 million a year for use elsewhere (depending on the rate of modernization of remaining forces).
Obvious political factors make a force cut now a delicate operation, but a case can be made for squeezing the ROK military on political grounds. Aside from this, we have failed in the decade since 1963 to get the ROK economy moving at a pace which would offer reasonable prospect of eventually getting it off our backs. Maybe we should spend more on development, and less on the military.
[Page 648]In short, Korea continues to be our most expensive military satellite. Is it worth as much as it costs?
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 4/63-11/63. Secret.↩
- At the White House staff meeting on May 31, the following related exchange took place: “In connection with Ambassador Berger’s call on the President this morning, Bundy asked if there were any ideas on how the President should handle him. For the most part, the President intends to tell him that he has been doing a good job out in Korea, but Komer and Kaysen, eventually supported by Bundy, felt that the President should at least indicate generally to the Ambassador a “clear line” to the effect that if, as is very likely, Congress gets tough on foreign economic and military assistance, the chances are high that a substantial portion of their economizing will have to come out of those areas where the programs continue relatively ‘fat,’ and over $200 million of military assistance to Korean forces is fat indeed.” (Memorandum for the record; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, May 1963, T-211-69)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩