Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, March 16, 1963, 5:58 p.m.

547. Seoul’s 645 rptd Tokyo 196, CINCPAC 172.¹

1. In absence knowledge as to attitudes chiefs ROK armed services and conclusions country team we do not wish express final judgment. In meantime our tentative view is that we have no proper alternative but to oppose course of action Chairman Pak has announced in view of prospects continued military dictatorship would have of increasing instability, factional conflict, and unpopularity. If you believe immediate action necessary, you are authorized to inform Chairman Pak that U.S. Government:

(a) Cannot possibly approve and might be compelled openly to oppose continuation of military government for four more years;

(b) Considers this a violation of repeated pledges made by Chairman Pak, including that to President Kennedy in their joint communique of November 14, 1961;²

(c) Expects that this course of action will be condemned by world opinion and, if they are permitted freely to do so, by Korean people themselves, to whom he so recently promised an early and smooth transition to civilian government. (We do not consider that proposed referendum would provide Korean people truly meaningful choice.)

(d) Would make it inevitable that USG would have to review in most fundamental way degree and character of its support of Chairman Pak’s government;

(e) Plans to make no public comment for moment on decision in hope that Chairman Pak will alter his decision.

2. FYI. We have in mind considering any or all of following actions:

(a) Possibility of Presidential letter to Chairman Pak pegged on November 14, 1961 joint communique;

(b) Public condemnation of Chairman Pak’s decision not to restore civilian government;

(c) Suspension of consideration of any new economic development assistance;

(d) Suspension of certain categories of military assistance not immediately required to maintain minimum level of preparedness against possible Communist military action, such as large hardware items;

(e) Consultations with other governments to secure supporting representations on their part to Chairman Pak. End FYI.

3. Request your comment on above possible actions.³

4. Request your comment also on (a) possible means of inducing Pak to retreat at once or in several stages, and (b) potentials for our influence over service chiefs and other commanders actually controlling military forces. Have service chiefs taken any firm position or are they waiting for U.S. reaction?

5. Report on present reactions and temper Korean public and manner it might be mobilized against Pak plan.

6. Defense concurs.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 S KOR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Norred, cleared by Yager and Rice and in draft with William Bundy, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. In telegram 645, March 15, Berger reported that Pak Chung-hui had informed him that within the next few days he would announce a national referendum on whether the military government should continue in power for 4 more years. If the electorate rejected the proposal to continue the military government, Pak would proceed to turn the government over to civilians in August. Pak justified his decision as necessary to maintain stability. Berger asked if there would be a “national debate” on the referendum and whether opposition elements could observe balloting and ballot counting. Pak assured him the referendum would be fair, although the opposition would be under some limits. In commenting to the Department, Berger stated that he did not see how the outcome of the referendum could be anything but a continuation of military rule. He asked for the Department’s immediate views. (Ibid.)
2. The communique reads: “The Chairman [Pak] reiterated the solemn pledge of the revolutionary government to return the government to civilian control in the summer of 1963, as he declared in the statement made on August 12, 1961. The President [Kennedy]particularly expressed his satisfaction with the Korean government’s intention to restore civilian government at the earliest date.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 979-980)
3. In telegram 548 to Seoul, March 18, Harriman asked Berger “whether this Government can be held together for a period of time until we are reasonably sure conditions are right for the election of a competent civilian government.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S KOR) A draft of this telegram was included in the President’s weekend reading of March 17. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, Cables, 3/1/63-3/21/63)