290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea0

485. Seoul’s 561, rptd Tokyo 147, CINCPAC 130.1 For Berger from Harriman.

1.
You should not encourage Pak to run for presidency, for reasons stated reftel para 6(B). Approaches to you by Kim Chong-p’il and Yi Tongwon (your tels 557 and 563)2 obviously intended elicit U.S. support, which you should not offer. On other hand, you should not counsel Pak against running. He must make this decision himself. You should underline his obligation to see that an orderly transition takes place.3
2.
You should not explicitly advise Kim Chong-p’il’s departure. If Pak’s vacillation on his candidacy proves to be only an exercise, and we tried unsuccessfully to remove Kim, our relations with regime would be difficult. You may, however, wish to repeat in strong terms advice that Kim’s use of CIA apparatus to control Democratic Republican Party is destroying chance of Party’s gaining genuine popular acceptance.
3.
You should emphasize overriding importance of developing government with strong popular support. We are less concerned with processes by which this is achieved than with achievement that objective.4
4.
FYI. If Pak decides not to run, we may need to use our influence with various Korean leaders to create stable situation for interim government under Pak if he willing continue until elections. We are inclined to [Page 626] believe strong government could be developed after elections without Pak, under leadership Ho Chung for example, and that military factions would support such government. End FYI.
5.
Foregoing views transmitted for your guidance, not as detailed instructions in view of fast moving situation in which you are involved.
6.
A visit by me at this time would not be appropriate and is out of question. Norred can come to help you for a time if his knowledge of Washington views and of Korean politics would be of use. Please advise.
Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 14 S KOR. Secret: Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Norred, cleared by Yager, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Document 289.
  3. See footnote 1, Document 289. In telegram 563, February 14, Yi Tongwon made a similar approach on behalf of Pak. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 12 S KOR)
  4. Berger met with Pak for 1-1/2 hours on February 14, which because of the time difference between Seoul and Washington occurred well before he received telegram 485. Pak stated he was leaning toward retirement from politics, but agreed to make no public statement until Berger had a chance to explore the situation and talk with a few key people. In commenting to the Department, Berger questioned whether Pak really planned to withdraw, but he saw no solution to the political instability as long as Kim Chong P’il remained in South Korea. (Ibid.)
  5. In telegram 570 from Seoul, February 15, sent after receiving telegram 485 to Seoul, Berger proposed to tell Pak that while only he could decide whether or not to withdraw, the United States agreed with his reasoning and thought his retirement offered the best hope of stabilizing the economic and political situation. Berger would not mention Kim and the KCIA to Pak who already knew the U.S. views on Kim and that agency. (Ibid.) In telegram 486 to Seoul, February 15, the Department of State concurred with this approach. (Ibid.) Berger talked to Pak again on February 17 and made these points during that conversation. (Ibid.)