288. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)0

SUBJECT

  • ROK/Japan Settlement

Seoul’s 5581 is about as depressing a cable as I have seen. Is it possible that Sam Berger is in a temporary fit of depression brought about by the very difficult political situation he is facing?

All my information is to the effect that if we don’t get this settlement agreed to very shortly, the occasion may pass away for the foreseeable [Page 621] future. I also gather that a great deal is at stake here: almost half a billion dollars of Japanese capital coming into Korea in a way which makes it likely that it would be more effectively used for development than the equivalent amount of Aid funds.

Do you think we should go back at Sam Berger with a cable drafted to convince him of the utmost importance of getting the Koreans to move on this settlement before the election campaign and pointing out, perhaps, that the economic future of Korea is very much at stake?2 I don’t see how we can justify a U.S. effort at stimulating economic development in Korea if we cannot get them to take advantage of this opportunity for substantial and useful outside help.

I cannot estimate whether the President’s personal leverage will have much effect in this area; but I am sure he would want to do anything he could to help bring these negotiations to an early and successful conclusion. Although I have no specific idea of my own to offer, I do think we must rack our brains to find the best method of making another attack upon the problem.

Michael V. Forrestal3
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Japan, 2/63. Confidential.
  2. In telegram 558 from Seoul, February 12, the Embassy reported that as a result of increasing strains within the ROK Government and within Korea as a whole, which arose from renewed political activity in preparation for elections and transfer of government, the short-term prospects for normalization of ROK-Japan relations were becoming dimmer by the day. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-4 JAP-KOR)
  3. In telegram 479 to Seoul, February 12, the Department urged Berger and the Embassy “to press Koreans hard” on ROK-Japanese relations. In telegram 480 to Seoul, February 12, Harriman sent Berger a message to “underline to you personally importance which is placed here at the highest level on ROK-Japanese settlement being achieved this spring.” (Both ibid.)
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.