Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

285. Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ⁰

A-399

Seoul, December 7, 1962.

SUBJECT

• The Political Outlook in Korea

Summary

The political process precedent to the establishment of an elected government under a revised constitution is getting underway in Korea. From now until the seating of a successor government in mid-summer 1963, political activity and elections will dominate the local scene.

The military government has been planning the transition with great care and attention to detail, seeking to ensure the perpetuation of power in the hands of those who made the revolution of May 16, 1961. To succeed they intend to secure the election of Pak Chong-hui as President and majority control of the National Assembly. Government plans include banning political activity by major ex-political leaders, certain restrictions on political party organizations, and constitutional provisions favoring government objectives. The government political party to be formed will be aided also by the natural advantages of a government in power, plentiful financial resources, a head-start in organization, and the absence of a cohesive opposition. We can expect a cleverly managed election rather than a crudely rigged one. Strong leadership within the junta is being exercised by Kim Chong-p’il with the support of Pak Chong-hui. Kim’s power continues in the ascendancy, resting on good organization, dedication, great ambition and an extensive police network.

Opposition to the government’s political plans and ambitions resides in dissident civilian and ex-military elements who see in the “mainstream” of the revolution a long-term threat to their own political survival and ambitions. There is also opposition within the junta to the dominant role played by Kim Chong-p’il and the “young colonels” in the government’s plans: deep factional differences exist and intense political maneuvering is taking place. The students remain a latent force capable of action or manipulation when sufficiently stimulated and an opportunity arises.

The outcome of the ferment and political processes which are now beginning is by no means certain. The government party will probably win a contrived election, but there are a number of possible variations in what might follow:

a. Pak-Kim and the “core group” of the revolution would then govern in authoritarian fashion, gradually eliminating opposition threats to power;

b. Differences within the junta may erupt sooner or later in an all-out fight. If Kim and his faction win, they could hold power by extreme methods. If they lose, new alliances, possibly on a broader basis, would form but be plagued by factional differences;

c. The junta would hold together, but in the aftermath, the actions taken to gain victory would create schisms between the government and the people who would not accept continued rule by a narrow elite of military men;

d. After election, Korea would move toward increasingly successful representative government on an increasingly democratic basis. Instead of military authoritarianism there would be a gradual broadening of power and moderation in government over several years.

Political tension exists in Korea. There is apprehension, dissatisfaction and fear among articulate groups in and out of government. Any complacency as to stability of leadership is unwarranted. The Embassy is concerned that the political trend may move contrary to our objective of a politically stable Korea with an increasing capacity to govern itself on a democratic basis.

In the current situation the US should try to minimize the danger of sharp changes which would only replace the present uneasy and tense stability with irrational instability. We should concentrate on moderating government actions, but prepare for the contingency that may require a change in our attitude and policy toward the military regime.

For the immediate future we should urge the government to accept the need for taking measures to promote national unity and advise the widest possible clearance of people banned from political activity under the Political Purification Law. We should urge the need for the widest possible freedom of debate, assembly and press consistent with normal security considerations. We should not threaten specific action if our advice is not taken but should leave no illusion that the US supports all the political plans of the government. We should be prepared, if necessary, to issue a prudent statement setting forth US policy with respect to the return to representative government.¹

We should begin to think in terms of a possible need for alternatives for leadership in Korea. At the moment, we do not have a clear idea of what these alternatives may be. As a prerequisite the Koreans themselves must coalesce into coherent groups and show readiness to work for their own political evolution without excesses. We should be cautious and not try to be the decisive internal political force ourselves. Many thoughtful Koreans believe the military government is embarked on a disastrous course. On the other hand, some continue to reserve judgment until after political activity gets under way. Others intend to reserve judgment until after elections. We, too, should wait. When we see our problem more clearly, it may be desirable for the Ambassador to return to Washington for consultation to consider new policy lines.

[Here follows the main text of the airgram, comprising 17 pages.]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/12-762. Secret. Drafted by Berger and Habib. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and sent with instructions to pass to the Department of Defense.
1. In airgram 404 from Seoul, also December 7, Berger reported on a conversation with Pak about the upcoming elections and the return to constitutional government. Pak stated that an effort would be made to avoid encouragement of splinter parties and to discourage vote buying and corruption. When Berger mentioned the need to clear currently proscribed politicians, Pak raised his voice in objection, stressing that the United States did not understand how unrepentant these politicians were. Berger encouraged Pak to create the broadest-based government political party possible. Berger asked Pak to stop other SCNR members and government officials from claiming that the United States endorsed the government’s election plan. Berger stated that the United States was neither endorsing or not endorsing the plan, and would be neutral in the elections. Pak promised free and fair elections. (Ibid.)