279. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)0

Carl

President’s view that we could limit US/ROK force mission to meeting North Korean attack alone, [1 line of source text not declassified]provides an opening to get our ROK force cut [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].1

I confess to a twinge as I heard the discussion, but on reflection it comes out this way:

(1)

I may have misunderstood General Taylor, but I see no real difference between our strategic posture in Europe and that in FE. In either case we resist conventionally unless and until confronted with an overwhelming attack. To me, all-out ChiCom attack at outset would be comparable to all-out Soviet attack in Europe. [1 line of source text not declassified]

[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]Remember it was threat of nuclear escalation which led to Korean armistice.

(3)
[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]This, together with US “tripwire” also there, is real deterrent which makes attack on Korea seem so poor a bet to Peiping. Thus the only circumstances under which the ChiComs would think of attacking would be firm conviction that we wouldn’t end up using [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Cutting 6-8 ROK divisions wouldn’t basically change this equation; indeed, it would only underline it more.
(4)
Indeed we have a greater combination of deterrents against local aggression in Korea than anywhere else around the Bloc perimeter—not just the above but two plus US divisions, 19 ROK divisions, UN command and umbrella of UN resolutions, 10 mile demilitarized zone.
(5)
Ergo, direct ChiCom attack on the ROK is the least likely of all cases. There has never been a direct Soviet or ChiCom local aggression. Even the one overt Communist local attack in the whole postwar period was an attack by proxy (North Korean).
(6)
For all these reasons, I’ve never understood why we’ve tied up so much of our MAP (and US) assets in Korea. We are militarily over-insured in this area, by comparison to SEA, Middle East, even Europe. Why did we ever spend so much on ROK forces in 1953-62 instead of shoring up SEA more?
(7)
As McNamara so cogently says, we’re betwixt and between in Korea. We have a lot more than is needed to stop NKs conventionally, but not enough to do more than delay a massive ChiCom attack without either (a) mounting an even bigger Korean War style effort; or (b) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. So who are we kidding?
(8)
Finally, I can’t envisage the truly massive ChiCom buildup needed for attack occurring without lots of warning. We knew when ChiComs left Korea in 1956-59. We should be able to find out easily if 600,000 came back.

Thus to change the mission of the US/ROK forces in Korea would be essentially a bookkeeping transaction. It would not significantly lower the existing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] threshold. It would not significantly increase the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] risks. It would only make somewhat more explicit what is implicit now, i.e. if the almost inconceivable happened and the ChiComs launched a direct attack, we would have to decide whether to use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at some point. Since we have that capability now (and presumably have contingency plans for its use), I see no new policy issue.2

Therefore, I see no need for President, in authorizing change in conventional mission, to give any more authority to count on use of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]than before. We would continue, as in so many other areas of the world, to be prepared against this contingency, for ultimate decision at the time. Have we decided to use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in case Iran is overwhelmed, in case ChiComs invade SEA, etc.? How is Korea different, especially when likelihood is so low?

Bob K.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 8/62-3/63. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Forrestal.
  2. See footnote 1, Document 278.
  3. In an October 4 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Forrestal informed Bundy of the President’s decision at the September 25 meeting. Forrestal noted that Carl Kaysen was “somewhat concerned about this, because it appears to him to be a change in policy, reversing in effect what we have tried to accomplish in Europe.” Forrestal’s own judgment was that “unless the military have something quite different in mind, this assumption does not really change the present situation, [2 lines of source text not declassified]” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Forrestal)