277. Paper Prepared by the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)0

IMPRESSIONS OF KOREA1

1. Contradictory Factors

In studying the economic/political problems and programs for South Korea, one is impressed with the conflicting factors which enter into a consideration of these matters. The following is a list of some of the things we would like to accomplish, yet which obviously can not be done at the same time and without mutual conflict.

a.
Effect a significant reduction in military spending in order to improve the ROK economy and, in so doing, to stabilize the ROK military budget.
b.
Make the ROK Government pay its own way to a greater degree, particularly in meeting the military costs of soft goods (MAP transfer).
c.
Restrain the gold dollar outflow.
d.
Anticipate the effects of a large cut in foreign aid by Congress.
e.
Increase the size of CINCPAC’s general reserve, possibly from forces in Korea.
f.
Retain the confidence and friendship of the ROKs—particularly of the ROK military.
g.
Retain operational control of ROK military forces under the UN banner.
h.
Do all of the foregoing without running undue military risks.

2. New Approach

To bring some order into this chaos of conflicting desiderata, we need to review from the beginning the goals of U.S. policy in South Korea. As a point of departure, we should begin with the fact that we must first meet the hard requirements of adequate defense before concerning ourselves with other things no matter how attractive and desirable. It is essential to be able to defend the ROK economy before building [Page 602] it into a lucrative, vulnerable target for Communist military aggression. After meeting the indispensable requirements of security, we are then ready to take those actions which will be most helpful to the ROK economy at least cost to the U.S., particularly in gold.

3. The Hard Requirements of Adequate Defense

[1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

At the present time, and for several years until the effect of considerable additional MAP expenditures can be felt, this war plan would be implemented in the face of a greatly superior enemy air force. It is not difficult to visualize a surprise 1,000 plane air attack by the North Korean-ChiCom air forces on South Korean targets at the outset of hostilities, resulting in great damage to the S. Korean air defense system, the concentrated logistic facilities, and the ports and airfields necessary to receive the planned augmentation from outside Korea. Until some solution to the air defense problem is found, the successful execution of the war plan is doubtful—without any of the cuts in money and manpower discussed in the following paragraph.

4. Supporting Military Assistance Program

The 5-year MAP program recommended by General Meloy, Admiral Felt and JCS (600,000 strength—$250 million a year MAP and 21 billion won—defense budget)—is designed to support the foregoing war plan. Particularly important to the MAP program are those measures to overcome the weaknesses in air defense mentioned above. They include an improved AC&W capability, the introduction of the F104G AW interceptor to replace the F86D, more SAM missiles (but not launchers), more air fields capable of receiving augmentation aircraft and possibly the F5A tactical fighter to replace the F86F. Deferment is possible in the F5A program as the F86F can still play a useful role in ground support.

5. Reduced MAP Program

The Ambassador’s proposal to set a ceiling on the ROK won defense budget would predictably result in a reduction of the ROKAF by 70,000 in the next two years. However, he does not recommend any decrease in the MAP program, because of the agreed Country Team position that any personnel reduction should be in part compensated by improvement of the remaining forces. As a separate matter, there are independent Washington proposals for reduced MAP programs which, regardless of the outcome of the Ambassador’s proposals with respect to the won budget, would similarly result in reduction of the ROKAF. Two such programs are now being considered. One sets an annual MAP ceiling at $225 million and the other at $180 million. In both cases, the manpower cut would accomplish very little savings—about $9 million a year in the won defense budget and $10 million a year in annual MAP maintenance. The [Page 603] military effect would be a reduction of 4-5 ROK division equivalents if applied over a 2-year period and the serious diminution of the initial ground strength and logistical back-up necessary to execute the war plan. Any chance for ultimate success in the situation contemplated, i.e., massive North Korean-ChiCom conventional attack, would require a compensating increase in augmentation forces brought into Korea under hostile air attack which would make such augmentation slow and costly.

A MAP cut to $225 million would retard modernization of ROK forces undesirably, particularly in the fighter-interceptor program and would weaken logistical capabilities. However, the dollar cut in itself would not seriously affect the ability to execute the war plan.

On the other hand, a cut to $180 million would fail to fund about 48% of the force improvements and make impossible the correction of the weakness in air defense. If such a reduction of MAP were decided, it would be necessary to overhaul completely the ROK force structure and to make a new war plan consistent with this reduced force.

6. Interim Conclusions

a.
One reaches the conclusion that any large personnel cut is unproductive of savings which would justify weakening the defense posture and incurring the political and psychological problems which such proposals would create with the ROKs. Further, we should recognize that if we cut ROK manpower, the US force strength in Korea is nailed down for the indefinite future. If, in spite of these considerations, a large force cut is imposed we must change the concept of the war plan and the objectives of the MAP program.
b.
Some dollar reduction in MAP may be accepted by way of stretchout and deferrals. However, air defense modernization is so important that most of it—certainly the AC&W and F104G parts—should be fully funded. My feeling is that $225 million is about the minimum figure to consider for reducing MAP.
c.
The stabilization of the won defense budget is a desirable objective but should be defined in terms of % of GNP rather than as a fixed ceiling. This is an inflationary economy and defense costs seem certain to rise.
d.
While a withdrawal of US forces would offer the possibility of improving CINCPAC’s strategic posture, it would be hard to find a location for their redeployment in the Pacific. Their withdrawal would offer some reduction of the gold outflow in Korea but this might be offset by the need of greater dollar aid on the economic side to compensate for the dollars lost by the reduction of U.S. forces.
e.
No real savings in Korean manpower and/or MAP can be achieved without changing one or more of the following basic factors:
  • The mission of forces in Korea.
  • The assumption with regard to the use of nuclear weapons.
  • The availability of space in PACOM for the redeployment of US forces from Korea.
  • The assumption as to availability of new and advanced weapons for Korea.

7. Possible Effect of Changing Basic Factors

Let us take the following assumptions and then consider the effect on military plans and programs:

New Assumptions:

a.
The mission of UN/ROK forces in Korea is to defeat without the use of nuclear weapons any aggression by N. Korean forces.
b.
[3 lines of source text not declassified]
c.
Space can be found for a U.S. division force in the Philippines, Guam or Okinawa, singly or in combination.

The effect of these assumptions would permit the change of the Korean force requirements along the following lines:

a.
The Korean active armed forces could be safely reduced to some figure safely above the N. Korean strength of about 350,000 of which a significant number of Army units are tied down to coast defense missions. Obsolescent equipment made excess by this reduction could be stored for use by ROK reserve divisions.
b.
Other forms of force modernization would continue at presently planned levels. The Air Defense component about as presently planned in the $250 million MAP program would still be required.
c.
The MAP program would be reduced to conform to the requirements of the new force structure.
d.
US Army forces in Korea could be reduced to a Task Force of about one division [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (eventually to include the Pershing missile). In the period prior to receiving Pershing, the surface-to-surface capability of Nike Hercules would be fully exploited. The U.S. troops withdrawn from Korea would be redeployed to CINCPAC reserve and stationed in the Western Pacific.

8. Alternatives

In summary, we are presented with these alternatives:

a.
Stay with present assumptions, plans and programs essentially as recommended (600,000—$250 million).
b.
Revise assumptions and restate missions along lines suggested in paragraph 7. Then reevaluate requirements and reshape the MA and AID programs.
c.
Put out diplomatic feelers to the USSR to see if there is a possibility of normalizing North-South relationships in Korea, at least to point of easing the present defense requirements which are an increasingly [Page 605] heavy burden to both sides. This last course can be undertaken concurrently with either of the other alternatives.

  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, FE Trip September 1962, T-022-69. Top Secret. After being confirmed as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 9, but before taking up his post on October 1, Taylor took a trip to the Far East from August 31 to September 21. He explains in his memoirs, Sword and Plowshares, pp. 256-259, that it was a “refresher visit” and an examination of U.S. political-military policy in a key area threatened by the growing power of the People’s Republic of China. Taylor visited Japan, Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia.
  2. These impressions formed the substance of the Korea portion of Taylor’s summarizing telegram on his trip, September 20, to Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, and McGeorge Bundy. (Telegram DTG 200410Z, September; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1590/9-2362)