274. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Secretary of State Rusk 0

Dear Dean : As a result of a recent meeting in Alexis Johnson’s office1 regarding the pros and cons of redeploying one U.S. division from Korea to Okinawa, the JCS were asked to give their recommendations on the military and financial implications of such a move.2

Based on the following conclusions, the Chiefs believe that the redeployment of one division would not be in consonance with U.S. interests:

a.
Removal of a division not only would dilute our present deterrent to Communist aggression in Korea to an unacceptable level but could lead to an undesirable change in U.S./ROK command relationship. It would also result in ROK reluctance to continue U.S. operational control of ROK forces.
b.
Combat capability in Korea would be reduced without proportional increase in the general Pacific area.
c.
In view of the limited airfield and port facilities in Okinawa, redeployment could result in a decrease in flexibility of forces.
d.
Redeployment would require an additional one-time expenditure ranging from an order of magnitude of $87 million without dependents in Okinawa, to $138 million with dependents.
e.
The acquisition of the additional land which would be required in Okinawa would be extremely difficult in view of the attendant political implications.
f.
Transportation resources presently available in the Pacific Command would not support an immediate redeployment of a division from Okinawa to Korea during the initial phases of hostilities.
g.
Redeployment of a division to Okinawa, vis-a-vis having it in Korea, would affect the international balance of payments adversely by [Page 597] approximately $1.1 million annually. This results from the fact that only some $9.3 million of the costs, including pay and allowances, of maintaining a division in Korea enter the balance of payments account each year, whereas the loss of dollars involved in maintaining a division in Okinawa would amount to approximately $10.4 million, because of the close association between the Okinawan and Japanese economies.

In addition to these views, we have had the benefit of several other studies conducted recently in DoD by special study groups regarding the situation in this area and the forces required to cope successfully with the several major contingencies. These studies generally agree that, while present forces in Korea are fully capable of inflicting a decisive defeat against North Korean forces alone, a combined North Korean ChiCom attack would present a quite serious challenge to the ability of these forces to defend South Korea. Obviously, the gravity of this threat and the managing of a successful defense depend upon such critical elements as length of warning time, availability of bases in Japan, and events in other areas of the world, as well as the size and readiness of the defending forces.

In view of these considerations and the fact that no decision has yet been taken on the optimum balance between our economic and military assistance programs in Korea, we are not prepared at this time to recommend the withdrawal of one U.S. division from Korea.3 In the event of a severe reduction in the FY ‘63 appropriations for the Military Assistance Program, we will reconsider the matter.

Sincerely,

Ros Gilpatric
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.65311/8-2862. Top Secret.
  2. The meeting took place on August 2. According to a memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, August 24, Department of Defense officials were asked at this meeting to examine the possibilities of redeploying a division from Korea to Okinawa. The idea had been raised twice by Rusk who anticipated it would result in greater military flexibility and balance-of-payments relief. According to the memorandum, “Mr. Johnson suggested that from the standpoint of Communist intentions, one division should be sufficient to serve as a ‘plate glass’ and thus deter another attack. He presumed that sizeable savings of foreign exchange could be realized by shifting a division to a ‘dollar area’; and that these ‘savings’ would reduce the need for cutting ROK forces.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 320.2 Korea)
  3. The Joint Chiefs made these recommendations to McNamara in JCSM-622-62, August 15. (Ibid.,OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Korea 320.2)
  4. At the White House staff meeting on September 13, this letter was discussed as follows: “The Secretary of Defense has sent a letter to the Secretary of State stating that this is not a good time to cut down US forces in Korea. We have to keep three divisions in the Far East, and shifting the one from Korea to Okinawa would cost more gold as well as being very difficult to do politically. As far as the White House is concerned, this point is settled. Now comes the question of settling on a Korean force reduction, which has been agreed to a certain extent, but Harriman reports that Defense is cutting up about this reduction.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-September 1962)