234. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • New Korean Government and ROK-U.S. Relations

PARTICIPANTS

  • Koreans
    • Ambassador Yang Soo Yoo, Chief of Korean Good Will Mission1
    • Ambassador Il Kwon Chung, Korean Ambassador to the United States
    • Mr. Yun Yong Lim, Political Counselor, Korean Embassy
  • Department of State
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
    • Mr. Leonard L. Bacon, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
    • Mr. Philip W. Manhard, International Relations Officer, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

In the course of an official ROK good will mission to Washington July 5-9, 1961, the chief of the mission, Special Ambassador Yang Soo Yoo, accompanied by the Korean Ambassador, Il Kwon Chung, and the Korean Embassy Political Counselor, Mr. Yun Yong Lim, called on the Secretary. Although Ambassador Yoo’s English is fairly good and he [Page 494] required no interpreting from English into Korean, Counselor Lim interpreted for him from Korean into English.

Ambassador Yoo said that his Government and people have been extremely gratified by the assurances given by Ambassador Berger that the United States Government would continue its keen interest in Korea and cooperate with the new ROK Government for the welfare of Korea. Ambassador Yoo trusted that the Secretary understood the extremely difficult situation the ROK faced from the political, economic, and national security points of view prior to the military takeover, which the junta considered essential as possibly the last opportunity for the salvation of the country. Expressing deep gratitude for the “‘sympathetic understanding” shown by the U.S. Government, Ambassador Yoo affirmed that the new ROK regime intends to make every effort to sustain the “sympathy and expectations” of the U.S. Yoo stressed that among the announced objectives of the new Government the most important are (1) strengthening national security against subversion and aggression, (2) eradicating all forms of corruption and inefficiency, and (3) turning over the Government to civilian control as soon as the regime’s pledges are achieved. Yoo emphasized that his Government has every intention to return to civilian control as soon as the “opportune time arrives when we can turn over the government to conscientious, clean civilians”. The new ROK leaders realize the importance of continued close relations with the U.S. and the need to promote even closer ties.

Ambassador Yoo said he recognized that recent events in Seoul have placed the executive branch of the U.S. Government, particularly the State Department, in a difficult position, and remarked that Senator Morse had told him that the Secretary had been hard pressed by Congress on foreign aid including the Korean aid program. Yoo stated that in this initial stage the new government has many obstacles to overcome and some actions have not met with U.S. approval, but the Korean leaders are aware of “what is required of them” and realize that in trying to achieve their objectives it is of prime importance not to “place a curtain across Korean-American friendship”.

The Secretary pointed out that since 1945 the U.S. and Korean peoples had shared a great deal, fighting a war and struggling to rebuild the ROK together. The American people have accepted large sacrifices in the interest of Korean independence. Although we understand some of the problems which led the ROK military leaders to consider a coup necessary, we are concerned about the future. The Secretary stated that the defense of the ROK depends on (1) its military strength and the determination of the Korean people to defend themselves, and (2) the attitude of the rest of the world toward Korea.

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The Secretary said that we are frankly puzzled and uncertain about the future course of events in Korea.2 We have not felt that our represent-atives in Korea or here were in intimate contact with those exercising real power and authority in Korea. The Secretary stressed the need to discuss many important problems with those in power and hoped that we could stimulate such contact in the near future. We desire to show a spirit of cooperation and partnership. There are points on which we would like to offer advice, areas in which we feel we can assist progress in the ROK. However we need to know that we are working with those in real authority, and it is difficult for us to know how best to proceed. Ambassador Berger has taken the initiative to consult with Korean leaders and we hope they will discuss with him their plans and intentions. The Secretary also emphasized that Ambassador Berger enjoys the full confidence of the President and himself and that the ROK leaders can rely on Ambassador Berger to work for the best relations between the ROK and the U.S.

The Secretary thought that it would be useful if in the next few weeks the Korean leaders could show that they are prepared to exercise authority through processes of law and through the application of procedures and standards general to constitutional governments elsewhere in the world. If the impression is given that the new ROK Government is acting arbitrarily or taking actions not based on generally recognized concepts of legality and justice, the result might well be to undermine confidence in the ROK and alienate the sympathy of many who wish Korea well. The ROK has enjoyed considerable international support over the years. This is a valuable resource which we hope will not be dissipated. Our own policy, interests, military forces and reputation are deeply involved in the success or failure of the ROK.

Ambassador Chung said that Ambassador Yoo during his visit here had been able to gain a clear understanding of the views of the U.S. Government, Congress and people and his imminent return to Seoul would ensure the prompt transmittal of our views to the Korean Government. Ambassador Chung said that he was very hopeful that a “good reaction” would ensue for both the U.S. and the ROK. Ambassador Yoo said that “weak as my position is” he would do whatever he could to impress on his colleagues what needs to be done in the future.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/7-761. Confidential. Drafted by Manhard and approved in S on July 31.
  2. Major General Yang Soo Yoo was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees of the SCNR. A briefing memorandum for the meeting was sent from McConaughy to Rusk on July 7. It noted that the Department just learned that Special Ambassador Soo would be returning to Seoul because “the situation required his presence,” and Ambassador Il Kwon Chung would continue the mission to New York, Canada, and Central and South America. In Seoul SCNR Chairman General Chang To-yong had been ousted and replaced by General Pak Chung-hui. Chang To-yong was detained and charges of Communist collaboration were brought against the former Chang Myon government and its members. (Ibid., 033.95B11/7-761)
  3. At 4:05 p.m. Rusk met with British Ambassador Caccia and French Ambassador Alphand and confided to them that the United States was “very much disturbed by the present situation in Korea. We are puzzled by the present exercise of powers of state in that country.” Rusk noted that the Department had always had doubts about the durability of General Chang To-yong and discounted rumors of Pak Chung-hui’s contacts with North Korea. Rusk hoped that the British, French, and U.S. Ambassadors in Seoul could work closely together. Rusk stated that there might be some danger of the ROK military taking over the country without the knowledge of the U.N. Commander. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 795.00/7-761)